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                                           Abstract  
 
 
The focus of this thesis has been on the identification of the primary 
conditions that attract or deter multilateral interventions into internal conflicts in the 
Asia Pacific region. This thesis develops a framework which is applied to four cases 
of internal conflict to see what roles twenty-two structural and perceptual conditions 
have played in determining why multilateral intervention was initiated in two of the 
cases, and why multilateral intervention failed to be initiated in the other two cases. 
The research found that multilateral organizations will accept risks and costs 
associated with intervention if certain structural and perceptual conditions make 
intervention an attractive option. These conditions are, a favourable or significant 
international environment or international event(s), the consent of a sovereign state 
(even if it is induced), sustained and critical regional and international media 
coverage, a complete collapse of the state in conflict tainting it with the term ‘failed 
state’, a high probability of success, potential economic benefits, a humanitarian crisis 
(in respect of UPMs and genocide/politicide), the possibility of a clear exit strategy, 
and a self-interested Member State who can greatly subsidize an intervention. 
Multilateral non-interventions, on the contrary, are driven by a combination of a lack 
of sustained and critically analyzed media coverage on conflict issues and 
consequences, generally positive tactics and strategies adopted by disputants, conflicts 
of a long duration, the international environment, economic factors unfavourable to 
intervention, resistance levels to intervention or a failure to call for intervention, lack 
of any clear exit points, and an escalation phase. The importance of these conditions 
suggest that multilateral organizations are reluctant to take risks and costs when 
political will, for the collective and self, are not provoked. Consequently, particular 
structural and perceptual conditions trigger or influence political will. The analysis of 
four case studies concludes that multilateral interventions will be the exception to the 
rule in the foreseeable future given the obvious selection bias evident in these 
policies, and the project questions the ad hoc determinants of current multilateral 
intervention policies. 
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                               Chapter One 
 
                             
                                
                               Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 The Problem: Internal Conflict and Multilateral Intervention 
 
‘Never again’ the international community said after the Holocaust, and after 
the Cambodian genocide in 1970, then again after the Rwanda genocide in 1994,  
then, just a year later, after the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia. Yet the international 
community is still a long way away from reaching a consensus about when 
multilateral intervention should occur.  In particular, there continues to be enormous 
disagreement as to whether any multilateral intervention should be undertaken.1  
While the disagreement continues, internal conflicts continue to be waged.  
 
Many of today’s conflicts are fought within states, they are often conducted by 
groups of irregular forces, they are most likely waged with small arms, and they have 
devastating impacts on civilian populations. In the First World War, civilians 
accounted for 5 per cent of casualties; in Mozambique (1977-1992), they accounted 
for 95 per cent; in Sudan (1983-2005) they accounted for 97 per cent.2 In the 6-day 
period between October 8 and October 13, 2003 the Wall Street Journal reported a 
disturbing set of events. Tribal fighters in the Congo shot and hacked to death 65 
civilians; a car bomb in Bogota, Colombia, killed at least 6 people including 2 police 
officers; gunmen in Indonesia killed 9 people targeted for being members of the 
Christian faith; and Bolivia was forced to declare martial law in a city just outside its 
                                                 
1 Gareth Evans, ‘No More Rwandas or Darfurs: The International Responsibility to Protect’, 
International Crisis Group: working to prevent conflict worldwide, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2965&l=1, accessed September 2005. 
2 Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, 
Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention’, Washington, 
D.C. June 19, 2000, http://w01.international.gc.cal, accessed June 2005.  
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capital because of violent demonstrations.3  Although such events may not 
independently warrant intervention, disturbing instances of violence present the 
members of multilateral organizations with difficult decisions regarding intervention. 
Given the severity and continuousness of such violence, there can be no doubt some 
action is warranted, but the question this study attempts to illuminate is what 
structural and perceptual conditions are seen by multilateral organizations as 
warranting the use of intervention or in many cases non-intervention.4 The following 
paragraphs illustrate the extent of the devastation created by internal conflicts.  
 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported in mid-1998 on the continuing 
atrocities being committed in Sierra Leone during its 10 year civil war for the control 
of the lucrative diamond-producing regions of the country. This war has been waged 
on an unarmed and helpless civilian population. The Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) soldiers typically 
captured civilians suspected of President Kabbah or pro-government militia, Kamajor, 
sympathies and committed atrocities against them in an effort to instil terror. The 
atrocities listed and investigated by HRW included: amputations by machete of one or 
both hands, arms, feet, legs, ears and buttocks; lacerations to the head, neck, arms, 
legs, feet and torso; the gouging out of one or both eyes; rape; gunshot wounds to the 
head, torso and limbs; burns from explosives and other devices; injections with 
battery acid; beatings; and sexual mutilation such as the cutting off of breast and 
genitalia.5 Victims of amputation were frequently told that they should take their 
amputated limb(s) and a verbal or written message to the Kabbah government. 
Eyewitness reports of massacres and other atrocities have emanated from this tiny 
state for decades. There is little, if any, accountability for these abuses and 
perpetrators often act with complete impunity.6   
 
                                                 
3 All references are from the Wall Street Journal front page news notes between October 8th, 2003 and 
October 13th, 2003. 
4 Andrew Kapral, Third Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflict: A Cost Benefit Analysis, Res Publica, 
Department of Political Science, 2004, 1. 
5 Human Rights Watch, 1998, 1-16 in John Janzekovic, ‘The Ethical Dilemmas of Humanitarian 
Intervention’, The Australasian Journal of Human Security 1(1), 2005, 22. 
6 Janzekovic, 2005, 22. 
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Yet the conflict in Sierra Leone is not particularly unusual for some of the 
more dangerous conflicts in other states around the world.7 Between April and July 
1994, averages of 8,000 people were slaughtered each day in Rwanda, and the 
regional African and international organizations took little if any forceful action to 
prevent further loss of life.8 The scale of atrocities in Rwanda represents not only the 
most tragic failure of multilateral organizations to date, but also the very best 
evidence that the issues surrounding the choice to multilaterally not intervene must be 
examined closely.  
 
The internal conflict in Zimbabwe, or the ‘drive out trash’ campaign, fronted 
some media headlines in June and July 2005.9 The list of atrocities commented on in 
the media include: the destruction of homes and lives, full control by the police, 
appalling conditions in camps, evictions from office blocks for ‘sanction reasons’, 
removals from jobs, food shortages, no free press, extreme cases of torture, corruption 
entrenched in the government and police forces, and forced relocation into rural 
Zimbabwe. These orders to flatten homes, to raise whole settlements to the ground, 
and extinguish lives were coming directly from President Mughabe. Yet there has 
been a wall of silence from African leaders who are unwilling to criticize; the 
European Union (EU) has only declared its disappointment with the African nation’s 
lack of reaction; and the head of the United Nations (UN) Habitat has only declared 
that she will look at what is happening. Is this a campaign of terror? This question still 
dominates the international community’s inaction. The atrocities depicted in the 
media raises the question: what will it take to shock or shame the international and 
regional communities into intervention? This question will not be directly answered 
but it is related to the area of study this project examines – what conditions determine 
a particular multilateral response. Consequently, it could be examined by researchers 
upon review of the project’s results. 
 
1.2 How to Deal with Internal Conflict 
 
                                                 
7 See Ibid for further examples of the consequences of internal conflict, in particular in Afghanistan. 
8 D. Carment and D. Rowlands, ‘Threes Company: Evaluating third Party Intervention in Intrastate 
Conflict,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(5), 1998, 572-599. 
9 The Press, Christina Lamb, ‘Presidents forbidden to help ‘human filth’,’ Christchurch, Monday, 20 
June, 2005, World B3.  The Press, Xan Rice, ‘200,000 lives ‘rubbished’, Christchurch, Saturday and 
Sunday 11-12 June 2005, B1.  
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Once a conflict breaks out it can be managed in several ways: by violence, 
bilateral negotiation, by the involvement of a third party acting as an arbitrator or as a 
mediator between disputants, or by doing nothing.10 Third parties can be particularly 
useful in the process of conflict abatement. They can make positive and direct 
contributions by focusing disputants on a termination agreement, providing an 
agenda, and/or manipulating the timing of the negotiation process. They can help to 
overcome constraints faced by disputants, such as providing rationalizations for the 
disavowal of previous bargaining positions (face-saving), certifying the benefits of an 
agreement (guaranteeing), or providing insurance against the risks of the failure of an 
agreement (leverage).11 Third parties can also manage a conflict by enforcement 
through militarized intervention, a situation clearly envisaged and occasionally 
practiced under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.12  
 
1.3 Weapon of Choice: To Intervene or Not To Intervene 
 
The decision by multilateral actors to intervene, or not, is the result of a policy 
decision or choice, and represent two different types of phenomena. This project aims 
to explain the point where this decision is taken. Each decision has strategic, political, 
economic, military, diplomatic, ethical, and human implications. Figure 1 depicts this 
“fork in the road” decision. 
 
Figure 1: To Intervene or to Not Intervene: Policy Decisions or Choices 
 
                                                 
10 See J. Bercovitch, ‘International Mediation and Dispute Settlement: Evaluating the Conditions for 
Successful Mediation,’ Negotiation Journal 7(1), 1991, 17.  
11 M. Brecher and J. Wilkenfeld, The Ethnic Dimension of International Crises’ in David Carment and 
Patrick James, eds., Wars in the Midst of Peace: The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict, 
Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997, 164-193, 849.  
12 Jean-Sebastian Rioux, Third Party Interventions in Domestic and International Conflicts: Concepts, 
Data, and Empirical Finding in Africa, presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies 
Association, Montreal, Canada, 17-21 March 2004, 3. 
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Intervention as a way of dealing with conflict grows in popularity each year, 
as does its applicability to different situations. For example, there are currently United 
Nations interventions in Sudan (UNMIS), Burundi (ONUB), Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), 
Liberia (UNMIL), Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Ethiopia and 
Eritrea (UNMEE), Western Sahara (MINURSO), Haiti (MINUSTAH), India/Pakistan 
(UNMOGIP), Cyprus (UNFICYP), Georgia (UNOMIG), Kosovo (UNMIK), Golan 
Heights (UNDOF), Lebanon (UNFIL), and the Middle East (UNTSO).Yet 
notwithstanding its popularity, longevity, ubiquity and importance,13 there is far less 
known about what conditions push forward the decision to intervene. 
 
Or, more interestingly, what conditions deter international or regional 
communities from intervening in some conflicts? There are currently numerous 
protracted, unresolved and often violent internal conflicts where intervention has not 
taken place. For example, such conflicts in Thailand (Patani), Sri Lanka (Eelam), 
Nepal, Chechnya, Colombia, Darfur (Sudan), Jammu and Kashmir, Korean Peninsula, 
and Northern Ireland. There are also internal conflicts springing up every year. In 
2006 internal conflicts have begun in the Basque country, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, and Iraq.14  
 
There appear to be discrepancies involved in these decisions. When the Kurds 
in Turkey raged a guerrilla war against the Turkish state in 1984, the conflict was 
                                                 
13 Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and 
Empirical Evidence in Jacob Bercovitch, ed., Resolving International Conflicts, Boulder, CO, Lynne 
Rienner, 1996, 11-35. 
14 Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution, ‘Uppsala University Conflict 
Data Program,’ http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/index.htm, accessed 23 May 2006. 
Non-
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soon visible to the whole world; nevertheless, as the number of casualties on both 
sides peeked, multilateral organizations remained silent. Yet on the other side of the 
border, when the Kurds in Northern Iraq were massacred by the Iraqi state after the 
Gulf War, the UN took immediate action to stop a possible genocide.15 This thesis 
attempts to identify these contradictions within the four cases studied. 
 
1.4 The Question  
 
Third party intervention can be unilateral or multilateral and it can be into both 
inter-state and internal conflicts. This thesis examines intervention or non-
intervention in a multilateral context. Furthermore, the data for this analysis is culled 
only from internal conflicts in the Asia Pacific region. This is a departure in many 
ways from the broader body of research into the causes of third-party interventions in 
that it excludes cases of interstate conflict and unilateral interventions.  
 
While there are so many internal conflicts underway currently, there is a lack 
of coherent explanations that can account for the primary or essential conditions that 
are conducive to multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene. Consequently, 
this thesis explores the structural (environment) and perceptual conditions that can 
make multilateral interventions an attractive or unattractive option. While the case of 
Rwanda has deeply affected, perhaps even marred, the question of what it takes for a 
multilateral intervention in an internal conflict to occur, the question will be attempted 
in order to understand not only why certain responses are taken but why some 
responses are not taken.  
 
1.5 Methodology: How this Problem will be Tackled 
 
This thesis presents a framework in which to measure particular structural and 
perceptual conditions that may attract or deter multilateral intervention. Conditions 
include, but are not limited to, the media, conflict characteristics, intervener 
                                                 
15 Nil Seda Satana, ‘Commitment or Pure Politics? The Effect of Domestic Factors on Third Party 
Involvement in Civil Wars,’ Doctoral Candidate – Department of Political Science, University at 
Buffalo, Paper to be presented at the Journeys in World Politics Workshop, University of Iowa, 
October 28–31, 2004, http://www.polisci.uiowa.edu/Presentation%20Schedule_files/satana.pdf, 
accessed October 2005. 
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characteristics, phases of the conflict, humanitarian concerns, and the level of outrage 
felt by the international, regional, and domestic public. It applies the framework to 
four internal conflicts in the Asia Pacific region in the post-Cold War period: the 
Solomon Islands conflict, the East Timor conflict, the West Papua conflict, and the 
Philippines (Moro) conflict. Two cases have been intervened in whilst two have been 
left to fester.  
 
The Asia-Pacific region is not a homogeneous entity; there are geographic, 
cultural, religious and economic divisions within and between Asia and Oceania. It is 
also replete with security contradictions and paradoxes and has had its share of 
different types of internal conflicts and interventions or non-interventions. 
Consequently, this region is an invaluable source of case studies. In the Asia Pacific 
region, the intervener(s) (and non-intervener in some cases of conflict) referred to in 
this project are the UN, the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).   
 
Identifying the conditions that lead to such responses has a range of potential 
benefits. First and foremost, identifying the conditions for multilateral intervention or 
non-intervention serves as a useful yardstick from which to evaluate and create 
multilateral policies. Secondly, understanding the conditions under which multilateral 
actors will intervene in internal conflicts is central to the ability to evaluate the 
effectiveness of past multilateral interventions or non-interventions. Furthermore, 
contributing to the international debate concerning whether there could be certain 
guidelines that ‘should’ determine multilateral intervention, the framework will 
present the conditions that ‘do’ currently determine multilateral intervention policies. 
 
While the introduction chapter has leant towards the ethical implications of 
today’s internal conflicts, this thesis takes the ethical debate as a completely separate 
line of enquiry and proceeds with the premise that once the ethical concerns have 
been addressed, practical considerations about when multilateral decide to intervene 
or to not intervene take place come to the fore. These two considerations are, of 
course, related. Furthermore, this thesis will not look at the personal decision-making 
process or the motivations of potential intervening organizations. Motivations of the 
individuals and organizations involved would make this issue extremely complex. 
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Rather, multilateral intervention or non-intervention decisions are approached not as a 
single choice but as a series of small steps and as the result of an interaction of 
various conditions.16  
 
1.6 Defining ‘Internal Conflict’ and ‘Multilateral Intervention’ 
 
The term ‘internal conflict’ is defined here as the clashing of overlapping 
interests (positional differences) around national values and issues (independence, 
self-determination, borders and territory, access to or distribution of domestic or 
international power); the conflict has to be between at least two disputants (generally 
the government and non-state actors) within a state’s borders that are determined to 
pursue their interests and win their case. Possible instruments used in the course of a 
conflict are negotiations, authoritative decisions, threats, pressure, passive or active 
withdrawals, or the use of physical violence and war.  The Small and Singer data17 
adopt the convention of 1,000 fatalities for inclusion as an internal conflict; this 
casualty rate was relaxed by Regan for the data used in his analysis and shall be 
relaxed in this thesis. This thesis adopts the convention of at least 200 fatalities for 
inclusion as an internal conflict. Two hundred fatalities convey a sense that the 
demands of the disputants are such that the potential for further escalation is 
reasonably high and works in accordance with the case studies examined – all of 
which are small states.18  
 
To understand the divergence in multilateral non-intervention and multilateral 
intervention policies the latter must be clearly defined. The term multilateral 
intervention is often used in a rather vague way. Part of the problem is the difficulty 
of defining the concept’s ambivalent nature which, for some, “[i]s practically the 
same as that of international politics in general.”19 Indeed, the literature on 
multilateral intervention is so ambiguous that James Rosenau observed that “[t]he 
                                                 
16 Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson, and Larry Berman, eds., Foreign Military Intervention: The 
Dynamics of Protracted Conflict, Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, 17. 
17 Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980, 
Beverly Hills, CA, Sage, 1982. 
18 Patrick M. Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict, The 
University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 2000, 21. 
19 See S. Hoffmann, ‘The Problem of Intervention’, in H. Bull, ed., Intervention in World Politics, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, 7; Levite, Jentleson, and Berman, 1992; S. Neil MacFarlane, 
Intervention in Contemporary World Politics, Adelphi Paper 350, Oxford University Press Inc., New 
York, 2002, 14. 
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spirit of scientific explanation appears to have had no impact on it whatsoever,”20 or – 
worse still – that writing about intervention seems to be taken by some as “a license 
for undisciplined thought.”21  It is one of the ironies of international studies that, while 
multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene are frequently recurring 
phenomena and possibly even integral parts of the international system, international 
theorists have not succeeded in solving this “international puzzle”.22 However, for the 
benefit of clarity, non-intervention can be defined here as ‘non-action’. 
 
The issue of third parties and conflict management spans many disciplines and 
epistemological/ methodological approaches,23 and there is a certain level of 
confusion regarding the concepts and definitions to be analyzed.24 James Rosenau 
exposed the confusion saying that it was difficult to develop variables and models, 
and thus make scientific progress, when the existing literature:  
 
…is pervaded with discussions of military interventions, 
propaganda interventions, economic interventions, diplomatic 
interventions, and ideological interventions, not to mention customs 
interventions and other highly specific actions through which one state 
experiences the impact of another.25  
 
In other words, if any act can be qualified as an intervention, any explanatory 
model or framework developed losses its meaning as the concept itself is somewhat 
meaningless.26 
 
Rosenau’s critique remains valid: scholars and practitioners still have many 
differing conceptions of intervention. Some commentators define interventions by the 
                                                 
20 J.N. Rosenau, ‘Intervention as a Scientific Concept’, in Journal of Conflict Resolution, xiii(1). 1969, 
149. 
21 See J.N. Rosenau, ‘The Concept of Intervention’, in Journal of International Affairs, xxii(2), 1968, 
173. 
22 Otte in Dorman and Otte, 1995, 3. See also H. Bull, ‘Conclusion’ in Bull, 1984, 181. 
23 For examples see I.W. Zartman, ed., The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications, Beverly 
Hills, CA, Sage, 1978; R. Lewicki, D. Saunders and John M. Minton, Extensions of Negotiation, 
Boston, MA, McGraw-Hill, 1996; H. A. Kissinger, White House Years, Boston, Little, Brown, 1979; 
Kissinger H.A., Years of Upheaval, Boston, Little, Brown, 1982; I.W. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: 
Conflict and Intervention in Africa, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989; Zartman I.W., ed., 
Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1995; 
Raiffa H., The Art and Science of Negotiation, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1982.  
24 Rioux, 2004, 3. 
25 Rosenau, 1969, 344-345. 
26 Rioux, 2004, 3.  
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intervener’s motives, their strategies, or the international environment. In terms of 
motives, intervention has been defined as any interference in the internal affairs of 
another state.27 In particular, Carment and Rowlands write about “biased 
interventions” in internal conflicts.28 Others narrow the definition of intervention to 
UN-sanctioned humanitarian interventions.29 In respect of the strategies of 
intervention, coercive and non-coercive aspects are examined by both scholars and 
practitioners. Focusing on the non-coercive side of intervention, Burton is concerned 
with interveners in the mediation and facilitation process of conflict management,30 
while Diehl is eminent for his research on UN peacekeeping missions.31  
 
The coercive side of intervention is studied extensively. Jack Donnelly defines 
intervention in the strictest sense, as involving unauthorized coercive interference in 
the internal affairs of another state; that is, the threat or use of force, short of 
aggression or war, in ways that infringe on state sovereignty.32 Similarly, Neil 
MacFarlane defines intervention as the coercive attempt to change the internal 
political balance of another state;33 while an article by Butler concentrates on cases of 
militarized interventions.34 Furthermore, some commentators understand intervention 
                                                 
27 Ulrich Beyerlin, ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’ in Rudolf Berhadt, ed., Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Amsterdam, Elsevier North Holland, 1981, 211-12. Compare Lore Fisler Damrosch, 
‘Politics across Borders: non-intervention and non-forcible influence over domestic affairs,’ American 
Journal of International Law, 83, January 1989, 1-50, and Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Intervention and 
International Law,’ in Bull, 1986; Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights, Humanitarian Crisis, and 
Humanitarian Intervention’, International Journal 48(4) Autumn, 1993, 609. 
28 Carment and Rowlands, 1998. 
29 Thomas G. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions. Intervening in Humanitarian Crises, Boulder, CO, 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999. 
30 J.W. Burton, ‘The Procedures of Conflict Resolution’ in E. Azar and J.W. Burton, eds., International 
Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1986. 
31 P. Diehl, ‘The Conditions for Success in Peacekeeping Operations’ in P. Diehl, ed., The Politics of 
International Organizations: Patterns and Insights, Chicago, Dorsey, 1989. P. Diehl, ‘Forks in the 
Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for Twenty-First Century Peacekeeping’ Global Security 14(3), 
2000, 337-360. 
32 Donnelly, 1993, 608. 
33 MacFarlane, 2002, 7. 
34 Butler M.J., ‘Just War Theory and United States Military Intervention in Crisis’ Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 47(2), 2003, 226-248, especially pages 228-230. See also Pearson and Bauman, 1993, who 
define military intervention as consisting of “the movement of regular troops or forces [airborne, 
seaborne, selling, etc.] of one country [or many as in an organization] into the territory or territorial 
waters of another country, or forcible military action by troops already stationed in one country inside 
another, in the context of some political issue or dispute” in Kapral, 2004, 5. See also Rioux, 2004, 4. 
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in terms of the context it takes place in, for example Smith understands intervention 
as a third-party action in the context of alliance.35 
 
These definitions do not answer the fundamental question: what is a universal 
definition of multilateral intervention for the purpose of empirical examination. A 
broad definition proposed by Oran Young serves as a good starting point. He defines 
intervention as “any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the conflict, 
that is designed to reduce or remove one or more problems of the bargaining 
relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the conflict itself.”36 This 
broad definition indicates that multilateral involvement can be of varying levels and 
takes different non-coercive and coercive forms.37  
 
Without a precise definition, analyzing intervention as a distinctive category 
of policy is of questionable value.38 Most international relations involve attempts to 
influence the behaviour of states (and other relevant actors). But to count even 
diplomatic expressions of concern as ‘multilateral intervention,’ as, for example, 
numerous governments have done in response to international human rights criticism, 
trivializes the concept.39 Multilateral intervention in the domestic affairs of states 
should not be confused with the concepts of ‘constructive intervention’, ‘constructive 
involvement,’ ‘flexible engagement’ or ‘enhanced interaction’ which have been 
recently proposed by some Member States of ASEAN.40 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, a useful definition of multilateral intervention 
is a concrete action, be it political or military, undertaken by a coalition of states 
supported by a regional and/or international organization. Its purpose is principally 
to affect the direction, duration or outcome of an internal conflict, whether the target 
                                                 
35 Smith W.P., ‘To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 
40(1), 1996, 16-40. 
36 Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises, Princeton, New Jersey. 
Princeton University Press, 1967, 34. 
37 W. J. Dixon, ‘Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful 
Settlement’ International Organization 50(4), 1996, 653-681 offers a slightly different listing of third-
party management techniques. 
38 Rosenau, 1968 in Yaacov Y.I Vertzberger, Risk-taking and Decision-making: Foreign Military 
Intervention Decisions, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1996, 114. 
39 Donnelly, 1993, 609-10. 
40 David Dickens and Guy Wilson-Roberts, eds., Non-Intervention and State Sovereignty in the Asia 
Pacific, Centre for Strategic Studies, Wellington, 2000, 107. 
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state consents to the intervention or not. A multilateral intervention has a convention-
breaking character, that is, it is an extraordinary and unusual measure. A multilateral 
intervention is an attempt to maximize the expected utility of the disputants by 
making a mutually beneficial peace rather than extending the conflict until only one 
disputant wins. Regardless of the factors that motivate the interventions, the major 
goal of multilateral intervention is the cessation of hostilities on terms favourable to 
the multilateral intervener and consequently, to bring stability to the region. It is 
undeniable that there are multiple goals behind any intervention but very often the 
first step in achieving these other goals is the cessation of hostilities. This conception 
of multilateral intervention is distinctly political in nature.  
 
This proposed operationalization is inclusive because it recognizes that there 
are many reasons for multilateral actors to intervene in internal conflicts. Moreover, it 
is useful because it is concerned only with concrete steps undertaken by multilateral 
actors – actual political or military decisions – which should simplify the data-
gathering process for empirical evaluations. Multilateral intervention is not limited to 
militarized intervention, meaning that it can be either coercive or non-coercive, 
neither does it include insignificant forms of intervention such as ‘calls for action’.41  
 
Three aspects of multilateral intervention that are addressed in this thesis are 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Focusing on these types of 
interventions allows for a maximum impact in terms of any analysis of cases studies, 
as they will illustrate the complexity of multilateral decisions to intervene or to not 
intervene. Committing to these three aspects is extremely complicated as they pose 
high levels of political, ethical, legal, economic and military risks, costs, and benefits 
and often attempt to alter the status quo.42  
 
Multilateral peacemaking and peacekeeping strategies are those which are 
applicable to resolve a conflict after it has crossed the threshold of armed hostilities. 
Peacemaking is best understood as involving the range of methods described in 
Article 33 of the UN Charter, but will be limited in this case to mediation. Initial 
                                                 
41 Rioux, 2003. See also Regan, ‘Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflict’ 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, February 2002. 
42 Regan, 2000, 6. 
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peacemaking efforts are usually aimed at stabilization of the situation on the ground; 
subsequent efforts, which might continue in parallel with the deployment of a 
peacekeeping mission, might be aimed rather at securing a durable political 
settlement.43  
 
Peacekeeping involves the voluntary deployment of military or police, and 
frequently civilians to assist in the implementation of agreements reached between 
disputants. These operations can involve monitoring, supervision and verification of 
cease-fire, withdrawal of troops, and setting up of buffer zones and agreements.44  
‘Expanded’ peacekeeping involves the supplementation of traditional peacekeeping 
with activities such as election monitoring or organization, human rights protection, 
and assisting or exercising civil administration functions during transition to 
independence or democracy.45  
 
Multilateral peace enforcement interventions are responses to conflicts where 
the agreement of all disputants is lacking. The strategies for this type of situation are 
essentially those described in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and fall into two broad 
categories: non-military enforcement measures, or ‘sanctions’; and military 
enforcement measures. As economic sanctions are extremely difficult to track for 
empirical examination, sanctions will not be included when analyzing the four case 
studies examined. 
 
Peace enforcement is the threat or use of military force in response to an 
internal conflict. Such actions may include demonstrations, blockages, and other 
operations by air, sea, or land forces.46 This form of multilateral intervention may be 
to ensure compliance with part of a Security Council resolution, or to enforce 
agreements reached by the disputants. Difficult and delicate applications of peace 
enforcement activity is in support of peacekeeping operations; for example, in 
situations where one or more of the disputants to an agreement have subsequently 
                                                 
43 Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, Allen and 
Unwin, Australia, NSW, 1993, 10. 
44 Examples include UNFICYP in Cyprus and UNMOGIP in Kashmir. 
45 UNTAG in Namibia and the much more ambitious UNTAC in Cambodia are some examples. See 
Evans, 1993, 12. 
46 Hilaire McCoubrey, and Nigel D. White, International Organizations and Civil Wars, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Ltd, England, 1995, 245. 
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withdrawn from it, and action is required to enforce a cease-fire or re-establish a 
buffer zone. It is also used in internal conflicts in support of specifically humanitarian 
objectives.47 The next paragraphs provide brief political and legal backgrounds of 
multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene. 
 
1.7 Political and Legal Backgrounds of Multilateral Decisions to Intervene or to 
Not Intervene  
 
1.7a Political Considerations 
 
The international system currently rests on the assumption that the world is 
constituted of independent, sovereign states, equal in their rights and prerogatives 
though greatly differing in their size, degree of development, and military strength. 
All countries are assumed to possess the capacity to control and administer a territory 
clearly defined by fixed borders.48 Consequently, it is important to keep in mind that a 
multilateral intervention – just like non-intervention – is fundamentally a political 
decision with “inescapable political consequences”. 49 Questions of power, interests, 
and bureaucratic, international and domestic politics undoubtedly affect whether 
multilateral members chose to intervene or not.  
 
The basis of the principle of non-intervention was summarized by Adam 
Roberts,  
It provides clear guidelines for limiting the uses of armed force and 
reducing the risk of war between armies of different states. It involves 
respect for different societies with varying religions, cultures, economic 
systems and political arrangements. It acts as a brake on the crusading, 
territorial and imperial ambitions of states.50  
 
The UN Charter, Article 2(7) states:  
Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
                                                 
47 Evans, 1993, 12-13. 
48 Donnelly, 1993, 607. Compare with Stephan John Stedman, ‘The New Interventionists,’ Foreign 
Affairs, vol.72, 1992-3, 1-16. 
49 Chester A. Crocker cited in Weiss, 1999, 41. 
50 Adam Roberts cited in MacFarlane, 2002, 8. 
 24 
settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice 
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.51  
 
As Roberts acknowledges, and the Article emphasises, the sovereign state has 
a right to control its internal domestic affairs.52 Yet under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
the Security Council is given the power to use coercion and armed force ‘if necessary’ 
to maintain or restore international peace and security.53 At the same time, the 
sovereignty of the most powerful nations is constrained. Ernst B. Haas argues that no 
multilateral act can be considered an infringement of sovereignty because each state 
has in effect “waived its sovereign rights by virtue of becoming a member of a 
multilateral organization.”54   
 
In 1992, Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali affirmed that the 
conditions of the post Cold War era provided an opportunity to realize the 
fundamental goals of the UN – justice, human rights, social progress and a larger 
liberty for all.55  His relativist conception of sovereignty reflects an increasingly held 
view that a state’s enjoyment of sovereign rights in international society should be 
linked to its fulfilment of its responsibilities to its citizens.56 Furthermore, Boutros-
Ghali’s successor, Kofi Annan, declared, “the [UN] Charter protects the sovereignty 
of peoples [sic]. It was never meant as a license to trample on human rights and 
human dignity. Sovereignty means responsibility, not just power.”57 Consequently, 
the systematic violation of human rights could degrade a state’s sovereignty and 
diminish its force of legal protections against multilateral intervention.58 The evolving 
                                                 
51 UN Charter, 2(7) in Semb, Anne Julie, ‘The New Practice of UN-Authorized Interventions: A 
Slippery Slope of Forcible Interference?’ Journal of Peace Research 37(4) Sage Publications, London, 
2000, 471. 
52 Ibid., MacFarlane, 2002, 77. Furthermore, Resolutions that reaffirm the principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention in what amounts to an unqualified general principle of non-intervention, include the 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection 
of their Independence and Sovereignty (GA Resolution 2131 [XX], 1965) and the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the UN (GA Resolution 2625 [XXV], 1970. See Semb, 2000, 471. 
53 Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999, 35. 
54 Ernst B. Haas, ‘Beware the Slippery Slope: Notes toward the Definition of Justifiable Intervention’ 
in (Policy Papers in Internaitonal Affairs no.42), in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen, eds., Emerging 
Norms of Justified Intervention, Cambridge, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993, 65-66. 
55 Boutros Bourtos-Ghali, 1992, 9 in Thomas D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in 
Ethnic Conflicts, US Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1996, 91.  
56 MacFarlane, 2002, 52. 
57 Kofi Annan, 1998 in Ibid., 52. 
58 The UN under Chapter VII of the Charter in Ibid. This scrutiny of the concept of unfettered state 
sovereignty was heightened by the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia using military force for 
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position is that there may be some exceptional cases of internal conflict that are not 
necessarily the sole preserve of a strict definition of absolute state sovereignty.59 What 
those exceptional cases are has yet to be determined. 
 
1.7b Legal Considerations 
 
In terms of legal considerations, the issue is whether and to what extent 
elements of international law might permit violations of the codified and customary 
rights of sovereign states.60 The major difficulty in evaluating the legal status of 
multilateral intervention is that a large number of writers put the question outside the 
realm of international law entirely. Historicu (Sir William Harcourt) indicates:  
 
Intervention is a question rather of policy than of law. It is above 
and beyond the domain of law, and when wisely and equitably handled by 
those who have the power to give effect to it, may be the highest policy of 
justice and humanity.61  
 
Other writers echo this view.62 With an increasingly view of sovereignty as 
conditional, MacFarlane argues that the legal proscription of multilateral intervention 
has become weaker.63  Yet the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the 
International Human Rights Covenants (1966) provide an authoritative list of 
internationally recognized human rights.64 Important and widely ratified treaties deal 
with genocide (1949), refugees (1954), racial discrimination (1964), women’s rights 
(1979), and children’s rights (1990).65 Such documents have created a strong and 
comprehensive set of international human rights norms. Unfortunately none of the 
                                                                                                                                            
humanitarian purposes. Dickens and Wilson-Roberts, ‘introduction’, in Dickens and Wilson-Roberts, 
2000, 1. 
59 Anthony Smith, ‘Intervention and East Timor: A New Zealand Perspective’, in Dickens and Wilson-
Roberts, eds., 2000, 78. 
60 MacFarlane, 2002, 9. 
61 Harcourt, 1863, 14 in Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, 39. 
62 See John Norton Pomeroy, ed.,  Lecture on International Law in Time or Peace, Theodore Salisbury 
Woolsey, Cambridge, MA, Riverside Press, 1886, 224-5; T J Lawrence, ed., A Handbook of Public 
International Law, Percy H Winfield, 11th ed., London, Macmillan, 1938, 46. 
63 MacFarlane, 2002, 78. 
64 The most comprehensive are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). Donnelly, 1993, 610. 
65 See Ibid., 622-23. 
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obligations found in multilateral human rights treaties may be coercively enforced by 
a multilateral actor.66 
 
In particular, states have obligations under international humanitarian law with 
respect to populations victimized in conflict or vulnerable to genocide independently 
of the Charter. Most states in the International Community have accepted, through 
their ratification of the 1948 Genocide Convention, an obligation ‘to prevent and to 
punish’ such acts. This suggests that genocide has been placed beyond the protection 
of the domestic jurisdiction clause of the UN Charter – Article 2(7) – and must be 
viewed as an international crime.  
 
But two caveats must be noted. Firstly, the authors of the Genocide 
Convention explicitly chose not to establish universal jurisdiction. Secondly, while 
legal analysis affirms that multilateral intervention in respect of genocide may include 
military action, at present under international law and UN practice opposition to a 
genocidal state is strictly optional. The Genocide Convention and the International 
Criminal Court could be used as a basis for criminal trials after the fact. Although 
contemporary state practice is evolving on this question, particularly in the wake of 
the establishment of War Crimes Tribunals, it still suggests that prosecution by 
national courts is the preferred course in international law.67 The only protection 
against genocide is the one organization most likely to have orchestrated it, the 
victims’ own state. One of the current international norms, then, which is 
understandably not stated explicitly, appears to be that while no state ought to commit 
genocide within its territory, no other state and no international organization – most 
notably, not the Security Council – is legally bound to do anything about it.68  
 
1.8 Conclusion 
 
This project focuses on specific structural (environmental) and perceptual 
conditions and their subsequent effects on the decision to intervene or not, this 
                                                 
66 There is not a comparable body of law with respect to humanitarian crises. ‘Humanitarian law’ deals 
primarily with situations of war. Only in so far as humanitarian crises generate refugees have they been 
seriously addressed in international law. Ibid., 623. 
67 Henry Shue, ‘Limiting Sovereignty,’ chapter 2 in Welsh, 2004, 19. 
68 Ibid., 20. 
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expands current theoretical insights as it is a departure from the research that 
examines the impact of interventions mostly during or after their occurrence. Little 
empirical research exists on the structural environment and perceptions of multilateral 
actors that influence the decision to intervene or to not intervene in internal conflicts. 
It shows how the existence of conditions such as failed state status and the economic 
importance of the state in conflict can trigger a particular multilateral response of 
intervention or non-intervention. By developing a framework that defines and 
measures certain conditions, this project attempts to develop a useful tool for 
developing theories concerning decisions to intervene or not.  
 
In the following chapters this thesis highlights the conditions that have been 
subject to scrutiny by both scholars and practitioners – all of which may play a role in 
the attractiveness or unattractiveness of multilateral intervention policies. It then 
develops a framework that provides conceptual definitions and operational 
measurements of certain structural and perceptual conditions. This framework is 
applied to four cases of conflict in the Asia Pacific region in an attempt to analyze the 
primary conditions that influence a particular multilateral response. Finally, the 
analysis and conclusion chapters compare the results to portray the descriptive, 
predictive and prescriptive value of the framework. Some guidelines that may explain 
multilateral intervention or non-intervention policies are suggested and the project 
concludes with implications for future research. 
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                            Chapter Two 
 
                                                  
 
                                                Literature Review 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Why multilateral organizations decide to intervene or to not intervene in 
internal conflicts remains an elusive question, and this tends to be reflected in a 
review of the literature. It is important to fill this gap in the literature in order to 
understand these two phenomena and to assist in predicting when these different 
responses may occur. The literature is generally dedicated to singling out successful 
strategies of intervention. Little attention has been given to the question of why 
various multilateral peacemaking, peacekeeping or peace enforcement interventions 
were initiated or even why they have not been initiated. More than 20 years ago, 
James N. Roseanu observed, “Scholarly writings on the problem of intervention are 
singularly devoid of efforts to develop systematic knowledge on the conditions under 
which intervention behaviour is initiated, sustained and abandoned.”1 8 years ago 
Patrick Regan argued that “[we] [still] do not have a set of logically consistent and 
empirically verified conditions that increase the likelihood that outside actors will 
intervene in internal conflicts.”2 Both authors were writing in respect of unilateral 
intervention. In fact most literature on intervention analyzes conditions in terms of 
unilateral or, arbitrarily, third party intervention. While this literature is still important 
to consider, the emphasis in this thesis will be on multilateral decisions to intervene 
or to not intervene.  
 
                                                 
1 Rosenau, 1969, 149; Levite, Jentleson, and Berman, 1992, 15. 
2 Patrick M. Regan, ‘Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions into Internal Conflicts as a Policy 
Choice’, Journal of Politics 60(3), 1998, 756. 
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Although many scholars go some way towards analysis of why interventions 
should be, or were, initiated, there remain many gaps.3 Stephan Solarz4 indicates 
when an intervention policy should be chosen, but he does not articulate the criteria 
by which such decisions are made; James M. Scott5 informs us that the process of 
deciding involves many factors but not how the specific outcome of the decision is 
derived. Through his analysis of four British responses, Richard Little supports the 
construction of a model of the processes by which governments decide to intervene in, 
or remain aloof from, internal conflicts. He offers a useful argument that there is both 
a prescriptive and a behavioural norm prescribing intervention in internal conflicts.6  
Recently a few researchers have attempted to find some conditions that increase the 
likelihood that outside actors will intervene in internal conflicts. Regan, in particular, 
offers some useful approaches by using certain conditions as a basis to explain a 
particular response of intervention.7 However, none of these scholars have analyzed 
intervention in a multilateral context and they have not approached the issue of non-
intervention.  
 
Furthermore, in the period since NATO’s bombing of Kosovo, a number of 
scholars, practitioners and international bodies have even presented certain conditions 
as guidelines for when to intervene in an internal conflict. It is hoped that these 
guidelines might be used by multilateral organizations, such as the Security Council, 
to assist in decision-making, especially in respect of humanitarian crises. In an 
attempt to uncover criteria for multilateral intervention, the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
concept was introduced in a report produced by the Canadian-sponsored Independent 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). ICISS was 
charged with confronting a dilemma that the norm of non-intervention, codified in the 
UN charter and based on the right of state sovereignty, is used to justify inaction in 
the face of gross violations of human rights.  The ICISS report found a way forward 
by shifting the question away from the issue of state sovereignty, and putting the 
                                                 
3 Regan, 2000, 2. 
4 Stephan Solarz, ‘When to Intervene’ Foreign Policy, 63, 1986, 20-39. 
5 James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy, Durham, 
NC, Duke University, 1996. 
6 R. Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars, New Jersey, Rowman and Littlefield, 
1975.  
7 Patrick M. Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict, The 
University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 2000, 135-6. 
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emphasis on the point of view of those seeking or needing support. That is, is the state 
fulfilling its responsibility to protect its citizens, and, if not, is the international 
community prepared to react?8  
 
“The basic argument is that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect 
their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe,” says Gareth Evans, ICISS co-chair 
and former Australian Foreign Minister. “However, when they are unable, or 
unwilling to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of 
nations.” The report warns the UN that its failure to rise up and protect “in 
conscience-shocking situations” could lead the concerned states to explore other 
means to meet the urgency of the situation. In such a case, “the UN’s stature will 
seriously suffer,” Evans says.9 The ICISS report goes on to propose principles for 
military intervention. But it stresses that military intervention should always be a last 
resort, with the least intrusive and coercive means used as possible. The development 
of such principles should, according to the report, be useful in limiting the number of 
otherwise illegal military interventions that could be justified. The conditions 
highlighted by the ICISS report and other scholars, practitioners and international 
bodies are illustrated in the next section.10 
 
2.2 Expectations from some Scholars, Practitioners, and International Bodies of 
the Conditions that Should Make Multilateral Intervention an Attractive Option 
 
1. Clear and objective evidence of the threat or occurrence of gross, grave, blatant, 
persistent and large-scale violations of human rights, including substantial 
deprivation of basic needs.11  
                                                 
8 Welsh, 2004, 179. See UN, Larger Freedom, 
http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/executivesummary.pdf, 34-35. 
9 Gareth Evans cited in Akhilesh Upadhyay, ‘World Panel outlines guidelines for military intervention’ 
AsiaTimes Online, December 21, 2001, http://www.atimes.com/front/CL21Aa02.html, accessed 
November 2005. The Responsibility to Protect: Engaging Civil Society, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/pages/1, accessed 23 April 2006. ICISS, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect, 2001,’ http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp; accessed 4 May 2006. 
10 See ICISS, http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp; UN, In Larger Freedom, 
http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/executivesummary.pdf; Stanley Hoffman, The Ethics and Politics of 
Humanitarian Intervention, South Bend, Ind, University of Notre Dame Press, 1997; Dickens and 
Wilson-Roberts, 2000, http://aus-cscap.anu.edu.au/NonInterv.pdf; CSS Strategic Briefing Papers, 
‘Humanitarian Intervention: Definitions and Criteria,’ vol.3, part 1, June 2000, 
http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/Strategic_Briefing_Papers/Vol.3%20Jun%202000/HI.pdf, accessed 20 
March 2006. 
11 UN, In Larger Freedom, http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/executivesummary.pdf, 67. CSS Strategic 
Briefing Paper, 
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2. The Just Cause Threshold or Seriousness of Threat. In the case of internal threats, 
does it involve genocide or other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious 
violation of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended? 
Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, 
which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or 
inability to act, or a failed sate situation; or 
Large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by 
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror, or rape.12  
3.   Right Intention. The Primary Purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives   
intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right 
intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by 
regional opinion and the victims concerned. 
4.   Proportional Means. The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military  
intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human 
protection objective. 
5.   Reasonable prospects. There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or  
averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences  
of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction. 
6.   The government of the state in conflict is unwilling or unable to take remedial  
      action.  
7.   There is a clear urgency.13  
8.   Last resort. Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military  
      option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored,  
with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have  
succeeded.14  
9.   The purpose is clearly explained to the public involved in the conflict and the  
international community15 
10. Proper Purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed intervention  
is to halt or avert the threat in question, for example, the cessation of hostilities  
between the disputants, whatever other purposes or motives may be involved?  
11. There is support or involvement of regional states in the peacemaking,  
peacekeeping or peace enforcement policies.16 
12. There should be a high probability that the intervention itself would not create a  
rapidly deteriorating situation when the policy is either ill-conceived or could be  
potentially poorly implemented. 
13. When the projected time horizon for achieving the main objective is short 
14. When domestic and international opposition to intervention is minimal 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/Strategic_Briefing_Papers/Vol.3%20Jun%202000/HI.pdf. See also 
ICISS Report, http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#meeting.  
12 ICISS Report, http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#meeting.  
13 CSS Strategic Briefing Paper, 
http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/Strategic_Briefing_Papers/Vol.3%20Jun%202000/HI.pdf.  
14 Tension exists between those who argue that military intervention can legitimately occur only when 
peaceful remedies have been exhausted. Some analysts have suggested that all peaceful alternatives 
should be “considered” rather than “exhausted” prior to the use of forceful intervention. Hoffman, 
1997, 39. See also ICISS Report, http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#meeting. See also  CSS Strategic 
Briefing Paper, 
http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/Strategic_Briefing_Papers/Vol.3%20Jun%202000/HI.pdf.  
15 CSS Strategic Briefing Paper, 
http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/Strategic_Briefing_Papers/Vol.3%20Jun%202000/HI.pdf.  
16 Ibid. See also Dickens and Wilson-Roberts, 2000, http://aus-cscap.anu.edu.au/NonInterv.pdf. 
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15. The use of force should be proportional to achieving the goals 
16. International law on the conduct of war should be followed during the action.  
17. Non-intervention option - How serious will the consequences be for the people in  
the state in conflict or for the peace of the region if the multilateral organization  
does not intervene? 
18. The Movement of IDPs and Refugees in numbers significant enough to affect the  
security of neighbouring states.  
19. Extent of Abuse. Severe and large-scale abuses present a stronger case  
for intervention than mid or small-scale ones.  
20. Capacity to Respond. Can the situation be improved?17 
21. Costs of Intervention both in dollars and in lives. In some cases the costs may  
outweigh the benefits.  
22. Legitimacy and Legality. Interveners should hold themselves accountable to the  
      international community for their intervention, since it is from the international  
      community that they derive the authority to intervene.18 
23. There should be a high probability of success 
 
These attempts to establish criteria for multilateral intervention are more likely 
justifications for multilateral intervention rather than actual conditions that lead to a 
particular response.  What conditions are significant remains a matter of debate.  
 
In particular, there is no agreed-upon framework which is useful for analysing 
conditions which result in multilateral intervention or non-intervention. There is also a 
need to identify conditions that are evident in decisions by organizations that consider 
an intervention option, but reject it.19 The criteria set out by ICISS and other scholars 
suggest that a pressing need exists for a systematic analysis of the real conditions that 
are currently attracting multilateral intervention and non-intervention policies.20  The 
next section illustrates the conditions raised in the literature that may attract or deter 
multilateral intervention. For a full view of the conditions addressed in the literature 
refer to figure 2. It is important to note that the literature does not provide for 
conditions that may determine non-action or non-intervention. 
 
2.3 The Nature and Scope of Past and Current Research 
                                                 
17 Unless sufficient resources can be mobilized, there is a great risk that an intervention may fail, 
drawing criticism upon the organization and the Member States that engage in such an operation. The 
Mr Hans Corell, ‘To Intervene or Not: The Dilemma That Will Not Go Away,’ Keynote Address to the 
conference on the future of humanitarian intervention, Duke University, 19 April 2001, 
http://www.un.org/law/counsel/english/duke01.pdf, accessed 20 March 2006.  
18 CSS Strategic Briefing Paper, 
http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/Strategic_Briefing_Papers/Vol.3%20Jun%202000/HI.pdf.  
19 Regan, 2000, 145. 
20 ICISS Report, http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#meeting.  
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Figure 2: Conditions that May Attract or Deter Multilateral Intervention into 
Internal Conflicts as Discussed in the Literature. 
 
Key Categories  Conditions Sources 
Dispute Issues Dispute Issues: including 
Territory, Ideology, Security, 
Independence, Resources, 
and Ethnicity 
Bercovitch and 
Langely, 1993, 676. 
Tangibility Akbaba, Carment, 
Taydeas, 2004. 
 
Issue Complexity Bercovitch and 
Langley, 1993; Kolb, 
1983, 247-269. 
Characteristics of Conflict Nature of International 
Environment 
Heracldes, 1990; 
Regan, 2000. 
Intensity – Fatalities Regan, 2000, 139. 
               – Duration Bercovitch and 
Houston, 1996, 23; 
Edmead, 1971. 
Unregulated Population 
Movement 
MacFarlane, 2002, 
51-53. 
Humanitarian Considerations 
– ‘Massive and Systematic 
Violation of Human Rights’ 
Pence, 8 
 
Regional and Global Side-
Effects 
Burci, chapter 9 in 
Sellers, 1996, 242; 
Miall, Ramsbotham 
and Woodhouse, 
1999, 95. 
Characteristics of 
Disputants and State in 
which Conflict is Occurring 
Identifiable and Organized 
Groups 
Burci, chapter 9 in 
Sellers, 1996, 242; 
Fretter, 2001, 131. 
Access to Non-State 
Disputants 
Rupesinghe, 1998, 19. 
Cultural Characteristics of 
Disputants 
Regan, 2000, 23. 
Identification and 
Orientation of Disputants 
Regan, 2000, 23. 
State Failure Kaplan, 2004, 24; 
Fukuyama, 2004, x-
xi. 
 
Economic Importance or 
Wealth of the Target State 
Cooper and Berdal, 
1993, 118-42; 
Clement and James, 
chapter 2 in Lobell 
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and Mauceri, 2004, 
12. 
Resistance Levels to 
Intervention/ Consent 
Akashi, 1997, 218; 
Sririam and 
Wermester, 2003, 46. 
Strategies and Tactics 
Employed by Disputants 
Akashi in Burci. 
Chapter 9 in Sellers, 
1996, 250. 
Levels of Civil Liberty and 
Political Freedom 
Fretter, 2001, 138. 
Homogeneity Bercovitch and 
Houston, 2000, 178-
179. 
Previous Disputant 
Relationship 
Kleiboer, 1996, 367. 
Enduring Rivalry Bercovitch and Diehl, 
1997; Goertz and 
Diehl, 1992, 1-11. 
Intervener Characteristics Levels of Outrage Janzekovic, 2005, 20. 
Political Will or 
Self/Collective Interest 
Morgenthau, 1967, 
420; Levite, Jentleson 
and Berman, 1992, 
17. 
Major and Super Power 
Opposition or Support 
Frei, 1976. 67-99. 
Organizational Capabilities – 
Military and Economic 
Vertzberger, 1996, 
116-117; Evans, 
1993, 8; Neuman, 
1986, 90-106. 
Dominance by a State in an 
Organization 
Donnelley, 1993, 630. 
Reputational Interests Vertzberger, 1996, 
401-404. 
Domestic, Regional and 
International Audience Costs 
Seda Satana. 2004; 
Joffe, 1992/3, 33. 
 
Ideology Vertzberger, 1996, 
133-134. 
Nature of Relationship Ethnic Affinities  Gurr in Midlarsky, 
1992, 16-17. 
 Geographic Contiguity Mitchell, 1970, 166, 
194; Kholsa, 1999; 
Lemke and Regan, 
2003. 
Information From Previous 
Intervention Efforts and 
Outcomes 
Information From Previous 
Intervention Efforts and 
Outcomes 
Fomerand in Krasno, 
2004, 216. 
Media Coverage The CNN effect Viggo Jakobsen, 
1996, 205-215; 
Gowing, 1994b; 
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Robinson, 2000, 613. 
Time or Duration Regan, 2000, 105. Time 
Phase of Conflict Regan, 2000, 110. 
The Level of Complexity 
when Getting Involved 
Regan, 2000, 110. 
International Administration 
Potential 
Roberts, chapter 5 in 
Welsh, 2004, 95. 
Impartiality Miall, Ramsbotham 
and Woodhouse, 
1999, 140. 
Loss of Face – Failure/ 
Humiliation 
Lacina, 2003. 
Disincentives 
Possibility of Re-Ignition of 
Violence 
Lacina, 2003, 83-84. 
 
2.3a Dispute Issues 
 
Numerous studies have accessed the linkage between intervention 
effectiveness and dispute issues.21  Yet there are limited studies that question the 
linkage between multilateral intervention policies and dispute issues or dispute 
complexity. To what extent have the parties’ goals and interests been determining 
factors in multilateral decisions to intervene or to not in internal conflicts? Does the 
fact that a disputants’ goal is status quo or expansionist-orientated establish the 
direction of a multilateral response? Bercovitch and Langely have acknowledged that 
dispute issues influence the decision to intervene or not by “the substantive nature of 
the issues at stake, their number and complexity.”22 Six of these substantive issues 
have been established as significant in the literature. These are issues of territory, 
ideology, security, independence, resources, and ethnicity.23  
 
                                                 
21 The type of issue is acknowledged as a factor in a disputant’s acceptance of intervention. See J. 
Bercovitch and A. Houston, Why do they do it Like This? An Analysis of the Factors Influencing 
Mediation Behavior in International Conflicts, Journal of Conflict Resolution vol.44, no.2, April 2000, 
170-202; J. Bercovitch and J. Langley, The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International 
Mediation, Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, 1993, 670-691; J.W. Burton and D. Sandole, ‘Expanding 
the Debate on Generic Theory of Conflict Resolution: A Response to a Critique,’ Negotiation Journal 
January 1987, 87-100; M. Kleiboer, ‘Understanding Success and Failure in Internationals Mediation’ 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 40(2), 1996, 360-389; K. Kressel and D.G. Pruitt, Mediation Research. 
The Process and Effectiveness of Third Party Intervention, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1989; M.C. 
Ott, ‘Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution’ International Organization 26, 1972, 595-618. 
22 Bercovitch and Langely, 1993, 676. 
23 J. Fretter, Effective Mediation in International Disputes: A Comparative Analysis of Mediation by the 
United Nations and Regional Organizations, 1945-1995, Thesis, Political Science Department, 
University of Canterbury, 2001, 135. See also Kumar Rupesinghe, Civil Wars, Civil Peace: An 
Introduction to Conflict Resolution, Pluto Press, London, 1998, 30. 
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The tangibility of these issues may determine the extent to which an internal 
conflict can be resolved. Intangible issues which derive from the parties’ 
psychological needs – reflecting matters of principle such as moral rules, beliefs about 
one’s rights, and normative standards – may serve as a serious disincentive to 
multilateral intervention. However this has not been established in the literature. 
Tangible issues, such as those over territory, sovereignty, resources, security and 
independence may be perceived as easier to manage and, while perhaps not incentives 
to multilateral intervention, may not be disincentives to multilateral intervention.24  
 
Moreover, an internal conflict may become extremely complex when multiple 
issues are involved, when disputants do not agree on which issues are being disputed, 
or which issues are important. As a consequence, issue complexity may deter 
multilateral intervention.25 However Jackson suggests that a high degree of issue 
complexity may create “greater opportunities for trade-offs, sequencing, and 
packaging, thus enhancing the chances of successful multilateral intervention.”26 
Could issue complexity create incentives as well as disincentives for multilateral 
intervention?  
 
2.3b Characteristics of the Conflict 
 
Each internal conflict has its own baggage which needs to be assessed before 
multilateral intervention can take place. For example, the existence of a humanitarian 
crisis associated with the conflict may be necessary for multilateral intervention to 
occur. Regan has suggested other influential conditions including the number of 
shared borders, the intensity of the conflict, and the number of fatalities.27   
 
The nature of the international environment may be a significant 
determinant for whether multilateral intervention takes place or not. Wendt argues 
                                                 
24 Yasemin Akbaba, David Carment and Zeynep Taydeas, Understanding Third Party Intervention: 
Minorities at Risk, Discrimination and State Action, paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the 
International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 16-20, 2004, 1. Available at 
http://www.mrgec.mcgill.ca/Papers/james%20et%20al,%20mar%2005.pdf, accessed 24 April 2006. 
25 Fretter, 2001, 137; Bercovitch and Langely, 1993; D.M. Kolb, ‘Strategy and Tactics of Mediation’ 
Human Relations 36, 1983, 247-269. 
26 E. Jackson, 1998 cited in Fretter, 2001, 136. 
27 Regan, 2000, 23. 
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that the international environment is the generator of “conditions of possibility for 
organization action”28 that shape opportunities, provide incentives, or act as 
constraints on the use of this particular form of response. More specifically, the 
international setting affects the payoff structure, duration, targets, location, frequency, 
and format of multilateral intervention. Vertzberger argues that at any point in time, 
particular multilateral actors have fewer or greater opportunities and incentives to 
intervene, depending on the prevailing external conditions.29 It is relatively rare, 
however, Vertzberger continues, that international factors deter intervention. At most, 
they modify decisions about the scope and style of intervention. Only with time, as 
the multilateral intervention becomes protracted, he declares, do international factors 
come to be considered important constraints.30 
 
There can be little disputing that the intensity of an internal conflict can affect 
the attractiveness of multilateral intervention or non-intervention policies. Yet there is 
disagreement over what extent intensity has an impact. Conflict intensity has been 
measured on several levels including negative perceptions, anger levels, the degree of 
previous hostilities, the type of issues at stake, and even the type of warfare used. 
However, some of these indicators are too problematic to define, operationalize or 
quantify because they involve subjective perceptions of disputant feelings and 
behaviour.31 The literature has generally measured intensity using two contextual 
characteristics: the number of fatalities and the duration of the conflict. These 
characteristics reflect the seriousness of the internal conflict and the extent to which it 
is visible to the global community.  
 
According to Regan, fatalities exceeding a certain threshold of 200 are more 
likely to attract unilateral intervention. Yet Regan’s analysis confirms that the more 
intense the conflict, the less likely outside interventions will be. He argues that this is 
because potential interveners hold very low expectations about the likely success of 
                                                 
28 System period is a fairly self-explanatory condition identifying the chronological era in which the 
dispute takes place. Alexander E. Wendt, ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations 
Theory’ International Organization, 41(3), Summer, 1987, 335-370. Available at 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183(198722)41%3A3%3C335%3ATAPIIR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A, 
accessed 25 April 2006. See also Alexis Heraclides, Secessionist Minorities in International Politics, 
Portland, O.R., Frank Cass, 1990. 
29 Vertzberger, 1996, 143. 
30 Ibid., 404. 
31 Bercovitch and Langley, 1993, 675. 
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their efforts in these types of conflicts.  As the fatality numbers rise it becomes less 
likely that an outside actor will estimate that their intervention will be sufficient to 
stop the fighting.32 Whether this applies to multilateral intervention as well as to 
unilateral interventions has yet to be recognized in the literature.  
 
The duration of an internal conflict is an indication of conflict entrenchment. 
Bercovitch and Houston argue that the longer a conflict lasts, the more entrenched 
disputant positions become, decreasing the likelihood of intervention success.33  This 
may increase the disincentives for multilateral interventions. With higher fatalities 
and prolonged hostilities, disputants can become polarized, more likely to reject 
intervention, and more willing to win at all costs. Yet Bercovitch asserts that the 
longer a conflict continues, the more amenable it may become to outside 
intervention,34 while Edmead argues that disputants must reach a certain “threshold of 
violence” before becoming willing participants of multilateral intervention.35  
 
Unregulated population movements (UPMs) are increasingly seen as a 
condition that can generate multilateral interventions. UPMs may be defined as the 
forced or unsanctioned (by governments) movement of people across borders and 
within states for economic reasons, or as a consequence of war, persecution or 
environmental factors. Migration is, of course, hardly new; however, current 
instabilities in the global security environment have triggered new waves of 
international mass migration, unprecedented in their numbers and scale.36  Between 
1975 and 1995, UPMs globally increased over 1,000 per cent, from 2.4 million to 
between 14.5 and 27.4 million. This figure includes some 14.5 million refugees, 5.4 
internally displaced people and another 3.5 million who did not meet the refugee 
criteria but were nevertheless considered to be in refugee-like situations.37 High 
                                                 
32 Regan, 2000, 139. 
33 Bercovitch and Houston, 1996, 23.  
34 Bercovitch, 1986a. 
35 F. Edmead, Analysis and Predictions in International Mediation, New York, UNITAR Study, 1971. 
36 Gil Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Paper, no.268, Brassey’s for 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Summer 1992, 3. 
37 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees 1995: In Search of Solutions, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1995, 19-20.  
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numbers of refugees pose serious problems, according to Kris Pence, and are hard for 
international and regional communities to ignore.38 
 
According to MacFarlane, this rapid rise in numbers of persons displaced 
within and between countries has dramatically altered the interests of organizations 
vis-à-vis internal conflicts. It has raised the prospect of overpowering existing border 
control and asylum procedures, creating substantial domestic political and economic 
costs, overcoming the infrastructure of neighbouring states, and destabilizing internal 
politics by altering ethnic balances.39 Uncontrolled migration, especially involving 
sudden and large influxes of people who are ethnically or religiously different from 
indigenous inhabitants, can create a perception of threat. There is a fear that military 
forces retreating from one state could use their refuge in a neighbouring state’s 
territory to recover their strength and resume their armed conflict. This in turn could 
provoke military attack on the territory of the host state. Whether this leads to 
multilateral intervention has not been examined. Immigration issues are still 
provoking intense debate in the US and Europe, with demands for various control 
policies to stem the tide of new arrivals.40 This illustrates how UPMs are an 
undesirable consequence of conflict – it is not hard to accept that UPMs may be a 
determining factor in multilateral intervention.41  
 
Humanitarian issues appear to matter in whether to respond multilaterally to 
internal conflicts. Kris Pence argues that humanitarian considerations increase the 
likelihood of intervention into an internal conflict.42 This is accepted by UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan who states that the trigger for multilateral intervention 
                                                 
38 Kris Pence, Outside Intervention in Civil Wars: Reconsidering the Timing of External Intervention, 
Political Science Department, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 2003, 
http://www.indiana.edu/~iupolsci/gradcv/kgpence/outsideinter.pdf, 8, accessed as late as March 2006. 
39 MacFarlane, 2002, 51-53. 
40 Rupesinghe, 1998, 50. 
41 MacFarlane, 2002, 53. Refugees and IDPs affected the decision of Resolution 688 (1991) which 
defined the movement of Kurds towards Iraq’s frontiers and cross-border military incursions as threats 
before demanding an end to Iraq’s repression. Furthermore, in Northern Iraq, the trilateral UK-French-
US intervention was strongly influenced by the fact that the country of destination for a considerable 
number of the displaced was Turkey, a NATO member and close ally. Turkey was unwilling to accept 
several hundred thousand more Kurds flowing into a region that it was already having difficulty in 
controlling.41 The invasion of Haiti was also in part a response to the flood of Haitian migrants seeking 
refuge in Florida and the importance of that state in the American electoral process. For more examples 
see Ibid., 54-65. 
42 Pence, 8. 
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is “massive and systematic violations of human rights”.43 Furthermore, an 
examination of the types of conflicts for which the Security Council has authorized 
field operations shows the decisive element as being ‘humanitarian considerations’.44 
Despite his assertion that very intense conflicts are considerably less likely to attract 
an outside intervention, Regan has demonstrated that humanitarian crises increase the 
probability of an outside actor intervening. He argues that this is a result of the 
political forces coming to bear on decision makers, compelling them to take some 
action to alleviate the resulting carnage.45  Whether this applies to multilateral 
decision makers has not been examined.  
 
Another hypothesis offered is that internal conflicts create harmful regional 
and global side-effects that can create security dilemmas.46 These result from the 
spread of weaponry, world-wide media coverage, economic dislocation, links with 
terrorism, floods of refugees, destabilization of surrounding regions or when one 
ethnic group straddles several states.47 The regional effects are both outwards – ‘spill-
over’, ‘contagion’, ‘diffusion’ – and inwards – ‘influence’, ‘interference’, 
‘intervention’.48 According to Gian Luca Burci, when the Security Council has used 
its enforcement powers in connection with a field deployment it has established the 
existence of a threat to the peace on the basis of finding that a systematic and 
organized use of military force within a state has grave humanitarian consequences 
that could spill over into a surrounding region. The existence of such an armed 
conflict within a state provides a solid foundation, he argues, for the involvement of 
the Security Council.49  
 
2.3c Characteristics of the Disputants and of the State in which the Conflict is 
Occurring 
                                                 
43 UN Secretary General Annan cited in Linbo Jin, ‘The Principle of Non-Intervention in the Asia-
Pacific Region: A Chinese Perspective’, in Dickens and Wilson-Roberts, eds., 2000, 53. 
44 Gian Luca Burci, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Situations of Internal Conflict” 
chapter 9 in Mortimer Sellers, ed., The New World Order: Sovereignty, Human Rights and the Self-
determination of Peoples, Berg, Oxford, 1996, 240. 
45 Regan, 2000. 
46 See Miall, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, 1999, 95.  
47 Carment and James, Chapter two, in Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, 14. See also Miall, Ramsbotham, and 
Woodhouse, 1999, 81. 
48 D.A. Lake and D. Rothchild, eds., The Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion and Escalation, 
Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1998. 
49 Burci, chapter 9, in Sellers, 1996, 242. 
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Another category offered in the literature focuses on the characteristics of the 
disputants and of the state in which the conflict is occurring. The conditions offered 
include the strategic and economic value of the state,50 regime type,51 the number of 
disputants, homogeneity, power, previous disputant relationship, and the strategic 
interactions between the non-state disputants and government. 
 
A continuing problem for multilateral decision-makers is the question of who 
the disputants are in an internal conflict. According to Gian Luca Burci, operations 
undertaken by the Security Council tend to make the ‘threshold’ for intervention the 
existence of an armed conflict between identifiable and organized groups.52 
Disputants to inter-state conflicts are at least identifiable and are often willing to abide 
by certain minimum standards of international humanitarian law.  Disputants to 
internal conflicts, on the other hand, can be hard to identify, have no central authority, 
often are not in uniforms, have no allegiance to a particular flag, do not respect certain 
commitments, and have little or no regard for international humanitarian law. They do 
have access, however, to an endless and easily available supply of generally small 
arms.53 Without clear identification, multilateral interveners face the prospect that 
there is ‘no one to settle with.’ To make an intervention even more unattractive would 
be if the disputants themselves do not even have a clear understanding of their own 
and other disputants’ identities.54  
 
This unattractiveness can be compounded by the difficulty of not only 
identifying but also gaining access to non-state disputants in internal conflicts. 
Guerrilla disputants operate over a wide terrain and often have no means of 
communicating with the outside world. They are able to use local populations, blend 
in with their environment, regularly change location, and often deliberately maintain a 
                                                 
50 Pearson F., ‘Foreign Military Intervention and Domestic Disputes’ International Studies Quarterly 
18, 1974, 259-290.  
51 Lemke D. and Regan P., ‘Interventions as Influence’ in Diehl P., ed., Towards a Scientific 
Understanding of War: Studies in Honour of J. David Singer, Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 
2003.  
52 Burci, chapter 9, in Sellers, 1996, 242. 
53 Singapore Institute of Policy Studies, UN Institute for Training and Research, The National Institute 
for Research Advancement of Japan, Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping Operations: Debriefing 
and Lessons, Klewer law International, London, 1997, 3. 
54 Fretter, 2001, 131. 
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low profile. So even establishing the first point of contact is difficult. Working in 
isolation, disputants have less chance of establishing links and building relations with 
multilateral organizations and their representatives. Often they are distrustful of 
official representatives who, by virtue of working under an explicit mandate that 
states any communication with ‘insurgent groups’ must be with the knowledge and 
approval of the host government, do not appear to be impartial. This is, according to 
Rupesinghe, a significant obstacle to the development of any relationships between 
multilateral representatives and non-state disputants.55  Furthermore, Regan asserts 
that aspects of the organizational decision calculus will involve the cultural 
characteristics of the disputants and the identification or orientation of the 
disputants in conflict because these conditions have implications for the political 
costs of intervening.56  
 
Multilateral actors, Western politicians and policymakers in particular, have in 
recent years expressed increasing concern about the consequences of state failure.  
The term ‘failed state’ re-emerged to describe the major human rights and 
humanitarian disasters of the 1990s in places like Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and East Timor. These situations attracted the attention of scholars and 
policymakers because of the enormous suffering involved, as well as the massive 
international interventions they sometimes provoked. Perhaps most importantly, these 
crises raised the “specter of the imminent breakdown of the state-centered global 
order that had been relatively stable in the Cold War era”.57 This doomsday idea was 
popularized by journalist Robert Kaplan in an article called ‘The Coming Anarchy’ 
where he predicted the withering away of the modern nation-state in favor of tribal 
domains “city-states, shanty-states, and nebulous and anarchic regionalisms”.58  
 
Since the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, questions of ‘failed 
states’ and what to do about them have become firmly linked to concerns about 
terrorism and the deployment of weapons of mass destruction. The problem is not 
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only that the decline or collapse of states such as Afghanistan, Angola, Sierra Leone, 
Sudan, Somalia, Burundi or Liberia threatens the welfare of the citizens involved. It is 
also that failing and failed states are assumed to be vulnerable to the overtures of a 
variety of non-state actors, including transnational criminals. These elements could, 
the argument goes, threaten the economic, security, or political interests of other 
states.59 According to Francis Fukuyama, “For a while, the United States and other 
countries could pretend these problems were just local, but September 11 [2001] 
proved that state weakness constituted a huge strategic challenge as well….state 
weakness is both a national and an international issue of the first order”.60 
Strengthening weak nation-states in the developing world has consequently assumed 
new urgency. 61  
 
Usually considered important for attracting unilateral interventions, the 
economic importance or wealth of the target state may also be considered potentially 
important for multilateral interventions. Internal conflict may weaken state structures, 
which in turn, according to Cooper and Berdal, encourages intervention by 
multilateral actors who hope to maintain an economic members’ stability, obtain 
resources, or influence the outcome of the strife to their advantage economically.62 Oil 
or diamonds in particular are popular and scarce resources that may be seen as good 
incentives for multilateral intervention.63  
 
In the literature, the resistance levels to multilateral intervention and whether 
the disputants consent to multilateral intervention or not are considered important 
conditions for or against intervention policies. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-
General, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, DPKO argues that most peacekeeping 
operations undertaken by the UN have been formally based on the principle that the 
mission should be deployed only at the request, or with the acceptance of, the 
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disputants.64 Adherence to the principle of consent has opened a whole range of 
political, ethical and legal problems for multilateral operations. The UN has 
occasionally pressed the limits of positive non-intervention, for example, in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance in Sudan. But Donnelly insists that the only 
operations that can plausibly be called multilateral interventions have occurred where 
an international agency has been invited by, or able to act in the absence of, an 
internationally recognized government65  Accordingly, multilateral actors need 
evidence of a ‘willingness to settle’ before joining an effort to implement a 
settlement.66 Disputants are likely to resist multilateral intervention and to defend 
their sovereign jurisdiction against external intrusion if there is no consent 
beforehand.67  
 
 To what extent do the strategies and tactics employed by the disputants, or 
the modes of conflict management, create an international push for multilateral 
intervention or non-intervention? Have there been ‘measured’ attempts on either side 
to manage the conflict? This could either produce multilateral intervention in support 
of the efforts or lead to the perception of not wanting to create any difficulties to the 
process. Yasushi Akashi argues that for a conflict to end there must be at least a 
grudging acceptance of peace amongst the contending parties, both from their 
populations and from their leaders.68 Perhaps this acceptance of peace may be 
perceived by multilateral actors through the disputants’ behaviour.  
 
It might be argued that the levels of civil liberty and political freedom (for 
example, free elections and participation, political competition, or repressive systems 
– dictatorships, military juntas, autocracies) could attract or deter policies of 
multilateral intervention. Fretter suggests that high levels of civil liberty and political 
freedom in a state would not necessitate multilateral intervention, whilst low or no 
                                                 
64 Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, DPKO cited in 
Burci, chapter 9 in Sellers, 1996, 250. 
65 Burci, chapter 9, in Sellers, 1996, 250-1. 
66 Akashi, , Under-Secretary-General, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, DPKO, ‘Comments on a 
Humanitarian Perspective’, cited in Singapore Institute of Policy Studies, UN Institute for Training and 
Research, The National Institute for Research Advancement of Japan, 1997, 218. 
67 Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester eds., From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN 
Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colo: 2003, 46. 
68 Akashi in Burci, chapter 9, in Sellers, 1996, 250. 
 45 
levels of civil liberty and political freedom may increase the willingness of 
multilateral organizations to intervene.69  
 
Homogeneity considers the degree to which the disputants’ internal 
characteristics are alike. The degree of commonality or disparity between the 
disputants’ characteristics relates to the disputants’ willingness to actively participate 
and cooperate in the intervention process, and may provide incentives for multilateral 
decisions to intervene or to not intervene. Gouchman argues that sharing a similar 
economic, cultural, social and political background increases the level of cooperation 
and understanding between disputants.70 This may be advantageous, allowing for 
disputants to readily identify with one another.71 A great degree of homogeneity may 
reduce anxieties of potential multilateral interveners, while disputants who share very 
little commonality could be seen as an obstacle to a successful multilateral 
intervention.  
 
The previous relationship between disputants or the level of amicability or 
animosity in the disputants’ relationship may be important in increasing the 
willingness to intervene multilaterally. Kleiboer argues that:  
 
…both the history and the nature of the relationship are important in 
this respect. Disputants in an ongoing relationship are far more interested 
and willing to invest to preserve this relationship than parties that have only 
a short-term relationship or relationship that has been built on 
animosities.72  
 
Disputants with a history of friendship or cooperation create the potential for a 
successful intervention, something that a multilateral intervener may look for when 
deciding whether to intervene.  
 
Closely linked to the nature of the disputants’ previous relationship is whether 
the disputants have a history of recurring disputes. More definitively, enduring 
rivalry is understood as 
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 …a long history of conflict and hostility between disputants…[or] 
a prolonged competitive relationship…that is characterized by mutually 
reinforcing conflictual interactions that are very resistant to many outside 
efforts aimed at their termination.73  
 
Several studies have sought to understand the nature of protracted conflicts 
and their impact on the attractiveness of multilateral intervention policies but it is 
generally agreed in the literature that enduring rivalries are extremely difficult to 
manage,74 and this may be a disincentive to the decision to intervene multilaterally.  
 
2.3 d Intervener Characteristics 
 
The impact of intervener characteristics on the attractiveness of multilateral 
intervention policies is still a matter of debate. Conditions that may be influential 
include institutional constraints,75 the level of international and domestic outrage, 
regime type,76 and domestic pressures and politics.77 
 
The levels of outrage felt regarding an internal conflict, Janzekovic argues, 
often equate to the severity of the response. The greater the outrage, the more likely 
actor(s) will intervene. Small atrocities, he continues, do not have the same impact as 
large atrocities. The moral impetus to act is dependent on the degree of outrage felt 
and the immediacy of the act itself.78  Responses vary between’…it’s terrible, we 
should do something about it’, to ‘…it’s not our problem’, depending, according to 
Janzekovic, on their moral views, or on how long people are able to maintain their 
focus on a particular incident. This is not an objective appraisal of the seriousness of 
the situation. Constant priming by the mass media is required to maintain levels of 
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concern, even levels of interest.79  Claiming a common human empathy between 
people on different parts of the globe does not mean, Janzekovic argues, that 
perceived moral values are boundless. He sees them as very selectively applied 
depending on convenience or circumstance.80 The ongoing humanitarian crisis in 
Burma (or Myanmar), Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe could not be described as 
anything but severe, yet international interest has not reflected the urgency of 
humanitarian need in these regions. 
 
Morgenthau asserts that multilateral actors are “guided in their decisions…by 
what they regard as their respective national interests.”81 The importance of political 
will or self-or collective-interest in determining multilateral intervention cannot be 
underestimated. It would be naïve to assume that multilateral organizations actually 
want to intervene in internal conflicts. Kumar Rupesinghe argues that “too often they 
are not sure of the action that could or should be taken…This is further compounded 
by a lack of strategy and of relevant and effective ‘instruments’ for intervention.”82  In 
the case of Rwanda, it was neither a lack of coordination between the multilateral 
actors, nor a lack of concrete evidence about the scale of genocide, which stalled 
intervention. The UN even had its own forces stationed there. The fact was that 
Rwanda was not a priority for multilateral organizations. Rwanda was deemed of such 
little consequence that not even the ‘Genocide Convention’ was agreed upon.83  
 
The instrumentalist school of thought asserts that multilateral members 
intervene in internal conflicts to obtain access to valued resources or to create a 
diversion.84 Multilateral organizations are expected to respond like rational actors to 
external opportunities to maximize their security, wealth, and power. Accordingly, the 
organizational decision to intervene or to not intervene in the affairs of a nation is 
usually based on a pressing economic or geopolitical interest.85 However, this 
argument cannot explain why multilateral members refrain from opportunistic 
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interventions.86 Consequently, the extent to which the interveners see themselves as 
collective stakeholders in the conflict or country that is in conflict may determine 
multilateral intervention or non-intervention.  
 
Major power opposition or support could prove a determinant for whether 
multilateral intervention occurs or not. Superpowers are able to apply leverage, 
commanding more resources than medium or small powers and, consequently, their 
support of, or opposition to, multilateral intervention efforts may be decisive in the 
decision to intervene.87  Charles Hauss argues that multilateral intervention is all but 
completely ruled out when one of the world’s major powers opposes such 
intervention,88 as is the case with the Russians in Chechnya’s case.  
 
The organizational capability of multilateral organizations should be 
considered an important condition in respect of whether multilateral organizations 
decide to intervene or to not intervene. These decisions necessitate considerations of 
the size and composition of the military force capability.89 Unlike interstate wars, 
which are usually carried out in well-defined military zones, these multilateral 
operations are executed in a mostly civilian environment. The lines between civil and 
combat zones, where different rules of conduct apply, are often fuzzy or nonexistent. 
This imposes significant restrictions on how military power can be deployed and on 
the rules of engagement. Specifically, multilateral actors may need to determine 
whether they have a sufficient number of regular troops to sustain intervention as well 
as the organizations and individual states other commitments or whether the 
organization will have to call up reservists. Another component, suggests Vertzberger, 
is the availability of hardware.90 Multilateral actors must determine whether the 
intervening military force has the quantities and types of hardware required by the 
task and geographic features of the target country (terrain and climate).  
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A fundamental dilemma confronting multilateral organizations is that they 
face many more security problems than there are apparent resources available to 
respond to them. Gareth Evans argues that economic capability continues to 
determine the multilateral decision to intervene or to not intervene.91  In Rwanda, UN 
action was increasingly constrained by its financial crisis, due in part to the refusal of 
the US to pay its contributions to the peacekeeping budgets.92 The deployment and 
maintenance of a sizable multilateral military force can turn out to be a significant 
economic burden, generating both direct and indirect costs.  In cases of protracted 
intervention, the costs of hardware, spare parts, and ammunition can, according to 
Neuman, become a decisive factor in determining the intervener’s capacity to 
maintain the level of military activity required for success.93  
 
The economic costs of multilateral intervention may be offset when 
intervention provides direct economic gains. Atsu Amegashie and Kutsoati find that 
multilateral intervention will occur if the interveners care sufficiently about the net 
resources that will be left after the conflict.94 Alternatively, multilateral intervention 
is, according to Vertzberger, sometimes used to prevent economic loss, such as the 
disruption of production or loss of access to vital natural resources (for example, 
oil).95  
 
Donnelly suggests that dominance by a state in a regional or international 
organization could manipulate multilateral intervention or non-intervention policies. 
Regional actions may be unusually subject to the interests of a single state, as in 
Nigeria’s domination of the intervention of Liberia by the Economic Community of 
West African States.96  Reputational interests may be another significant condition 
for why some multilateral interventions take place. Vertzberger suggests that 
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interveners may be concerned that by not taking action they might risk adverse effects 
on their reputation and the viability of the organization.97  
 
Another line of argument emphasizes domestic, regional and international 
audience costs as inducing or discouraging multilateral intervention decisions. Nil 
Seda Satana argues that domestic politics impinges on the decision-making of 
multilateral organizations.98 An organization is unlikely to initiate an intervention 
without regional and international support.99  Belief by the public that their 
multilateral organization’s policy is constructive and that the policy will succeed 
tends to make costs and sacrifices acceptable even when they are high. But when the 
public doubt the efficiency and morality of the policy, even low costs may be 
considered a burden not worth bearing. Regional and international opposition to a 
multilateral policy undermines the probability of success and the freedom to escalate 
or de-escalate intervention. Vertzberger agrees, arguing that the combination of 
possible public dissatisfaction and failure of a high-stake policy is often perceived as 
threatening decision-makers’ personal interests, including survival in the organization 
or being judged positively by history.100 The public’s conscience can be aroused, but 
multilateral leaders generally remain fearful that it will turn against them if there is a 
serious risk of casualties. It is hard to stipulate how much suffering a population must 
undergo before multilateral actors may justifiably override public opposition.101 
 
Ideology affects assessments of the risks worth taking to shape developments 
in a state’s internal conflict. According to Vertzberger, an ideology that justifies or 
advocates multilateral intervention as a legitimate and necessary instrument of the 
organization’s mandate or as a way to achieve collective interests – for example, 
spreading the faith, freeing oppressed people – encourages multilateral intervention, 
notwithstanding the risks. The resulting confidence, generated by ideology, that 
intervention is going to work and that it is justified at virtually any cost makes 
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ideology a powerful instrument for building cognitive and normative legitimacy and 
incentives for multilateral intervention.102 
 
2.3e The Nature of the Relationship Between the Potential Intervener(s) and the 
Disputants 
  
Multilateral organizations do not behave in a vacuum; rather prior interactions 
and relationships often shape future expectations and current behaviour. Therefore, 
another category identifies those conditions that indicate the nature of the relationship 
between the potential intervener(s) and the disputants, including conditions such as 
shared borders, ethnic affinities, and regime types. 
 
One of the most significant linkages cited in the literature is ethnic affinities – 
such as cross-border affiliations or the existence of diasporas which provide support 
for these responses.103 Carment et al., in agreement with the affective school of 
thought,104 argue that a strong ethnic affinity between the people in the warring 
country and those in the intervening organization is a necessary condition for 
multilateral intervention.105 Saideman agrees that ethnic allegiances are an important 
factor in motivating interventions, particularly in secessionist conflicts.106 Yet while 
such tendencies exist, the empirical record, set out by such scholars as Gurr, 
demonstrates that cross-border ethnic ties do not always “bind” – these ties inspire 
intervention in some cases but not in others.107   
 
The role of geographic contiguity, or the number of shared borders, receives 
substantial attention as a linkage condition for unilateral intervention and non-
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intervention.108 Regan suggests that the greater number of shared borders, the less 
likely an intervention. Regan accounts for this by asserting that, since an intervention 
would deplete resources, as the number of potential adversaries increase (that is, a 
greater number of shared borders) the intervening actor(s) would increase their 
vulnerability through the process of intervening. In a hostile strategic environment 
this depletion of resources in a neighbour’s conflict might have grave consequences 
for security. These results look quite compelling in the context of multilateral non-
interventions. During the Rwandan upheaval of 1994 African regional organizations 
were clearly reluctant to take decisive action. The killing was so intense that smaller 
neighbouring states were probably incapable of bringing the slaughter to an end; the 
capable states were unwilling to try.109 While this condition may not be relevant in 
attracting multilateral intervention it is still an important condition discussed in the 
literature. 
 
2.3f Information from Previous Intervention Efforts or Outcomes 
 
Information from previous intervention efforts or outcomes may present 
numerous conditions that may determine whether a multilateral organization decides 
to intervene or to not intervene. Trepidation from previous multilateral intervention 
experience with or without the current disputants may lead the potential intervener to 
forestall on intervention or dismiss it altogether. The disastrous outcome of the 
Somalia operation has, according to Fomerand, led to “a new disinclination of the 
international community to intervene in non-strategic civil wars.”110 
 
2.3g Media Coverage 
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While Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former UN Secretary General declared 
“[Television] has changed the way the world reacts to crises,”111 the international 
debate over the relationship between media coverage and multilateral intervention 
remains inconclusive. While most accept that the impact of the media on the 
international public has increased, there is little agreement on what this impact 
amounts to. As Livingston points out, “despite numerous…books, articles, and 
research fellowships devoted to unravelling the ‘CNN effect’, success at clarifying 
it…has been minimal.”112 This lack of progress can be seen in the discussion of the 
so-called ‘CNN-effect’ which has dominated the debate. The causal mechanism of the 
‘CNN effect’ is usually conceived in the following ways: Media coverage (printed 
and televised) → journalists and opinion leaders demand that multilateral 
organizations ‘do something’ → the (public) pressure becomes unbearable → 
multilateral organizations ‘do something’.113  
 
A factor perceived to have enhanced the impact of the media is the increased 
importance of ‘real time television’. Using mobile satellite dishes, journalists are now 
able to bring atrocities to the attention of international audiences either 
instantaneously or hours after they have occurred.114  The CNN-lead explosion of 
global news coverage has increased public awareness of the human dimension of 
internal conflicts and has contributed to pressures on policymakers to take 
‘constructive’ action.115 But has this actually made intervention more or less 
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attractive? Can limited or no media coverage be a factor in the decision to not 
intervene? 
 
Supporters of the ‘CNN effect’ argue that the media drives multilateral 
conflict management by forcing organizations to intervene in humanitarian crises 
against their will.116 Many decision-makers have lent credence to this view. For 
example, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US General John M. 
Shalikashvili argues  
 
Surely the ‘CNN effect’ exists, and surely we went to Somalia and 
Rwanda partly because of its magnetic pull. Surely the world’s actions – or 
inaction – and political leaders’ pronouncements are greatly influenced by 
this effect.117  
 
Yet sceptics such as Gowing argue that the influence of the ‘CNN effect’ is 
negligible, that a decision to launch a multilateral intervention is ultimately decided 
by other factors, and that the ‘CNN effect’ may actually prevent multilateral 
intervention because organizations fear that televised images of dead soldiers may 
cause public support behind an intervention to collapse.118  
 
In cases such as the intervention in northern Iraq to save the Kurds (April 
1991), the intervention in Somalia (December 1992) to create a secure environment 
for the distribution of humanitarian relief, and the intervention in Rwanda (June 1994) 
which set up a security zone for refugees, there is clear evidence that the ‘CNN effect’ 
did matter.  However Peter Viggo Jakobsen argues that interventions were ultimately 
decided by other factors, notably low risks of casualties and clear exit points. 
Consequently, the ‘CNN effect’ is only likely to pave the way for multilateral 
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interventions in exceptional circumstances when multilateral actors believe that they 
can be undertaken quickly with few losses.119  
 
Moreover, Piers Robinson posits that media influence on organizational policy 
occurs only when policy uncertainty exists and there is critically framed media 
coverage that emphasizes the consequences of conflict on citizens. In this situation, 
multilateral actors, uncertain of what to do and without a clearly defined policy line 
with which to counter critical media coverage, can be forced to intervene during a 
humanitarian crisis due to media-driven public pressure or the fear of potential 
negative public reaction to organization inaction. However, with multilateral actors 
set on a particular course of action, critical media coverage is unlikely to influence 
policy. Instead, multilateral actors are more likely to work harder to promote their 
chosen course of action through press briefing and public announcements.120  
 
2.3h Time or Duration 
 
The role of time may be important when considering whether to intervene due to 
the costs of intervening. Efforts to rebuild a country’s infrastructure or provide the 
types of humanitarian relief that can prevent famine cannot operate with a short-term 
horizon. Yet there are gaps in the literature in terms of the linkages between 
multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene and the time or duration of 
effort. Cost and intractability increases with time and under the best of conditions 
these costs increase.  The longer it takes to make a decision concerning intervention, 
or the longer the duration of the conflict, the less appealing a multilateral intervention 
policy may become.121 How the duration of the conflict attracts or deters multilateral 
intervention attempts has not been extensively examined in the literature. 
 
2.3i Phase of Conflict 
 
Are there some phases of conflicts that are more predisposed to multilateral 
interventions than others? Regan asserts that multilateral interventions will be 
                                                 
119 Viggo Jakobsen, 2000, 136. 
120 Robinson, 2000, 613. 
121 Regan, 2000, 105. 
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considered once the most violent phase of conflict has passed, a cease-fire has been 
negotiated, and the contending groups are trying to find ways to reconcile their 
differences. Then it may be likely that a multilateral community can achieve 
consensus on an intervention policy.122  
 
2.3j Other Disincentives 
   
 There are particular disincentives which may convince potential multilateral 
interveners to dismiss or accept a policy of intervention. One disincentive is the level 
of complexity that can be felt upon intervention. This can include such demands as 
needing to build on the positive results of earlier or simultaneous efforts, gaining 
access to disputants on all sides, and convincing them that ending the fighting is in 
their best interests.123  
 
Many of the interventions of the 1990s led to the establishment of some form 
of international administration in the territory concerned. Administrative assistance 
requires a high degree of competence in a range of administrative matters with which 
multilateral organizations do not ordinarily deal – hence the accusations of ‘gap-year 
colonialism’.124  Their involvement in the administration of territories puts 
intervention representatives in a peculiar position in which they have both to uphold 
the interests of the territory they administer, and the impartiality of the organization 
they represent vis-à-vis its Member States.  An intervening organization can be 
viewed, sometimes unfairly, as partisan to a disputant, not least because 
representatives need to engage with various protagonists in order to carry out their 
organization’s mandates. In Tajikistan, for example, the UN and The Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were portrayed as puppets of the regime, 
and at other times of the opposition. 125 Furthermore, the international community was 
criticized, for example, for conferring legitimacy on the ethno-nationalist parties in 
Bosnia by including them in international negotiations, while excluding the 
moderates.126 
                                                 
122 Ibid., 110. 
123 Ibid., 74-75. 
124 Sir Adam Roberts, ‘The UN and Humanitarian Intervention,’ chapter 5 in Welsh, 2004, 95. 
125 Sriram and Wermester, 2003, 358 
126 Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 1999, 140. 
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Another disincentive from multilateral intervention could be the fear of being 
criticized for an intervention failure or actions taken during interventions. By almost 
any normative standard, interventions that exacerbate an existing conflict are difficult 
for the intervenee, the intervener(s), and the international community. Even a 
multilateral intervention with the most humane of intentions can create a rapidly 
deteriorating situation when the policy is either ill-conceived or poorly implemented. 
Bethany Lacina argues that, the humiliation of the missions in Yugoslavia and 
Somalia have spelled an end to the boldest attempts to have UN blue helmets engage 
in coercive peace enforcement.127 Beginning in 1992, UN troops proved powerless to 
prevent siege, bombardment, and, in some cases, military takeover of the protection 
areas in Bosnia and Croatia. Nor did UN troops help to bolster a political process to 
end the violence. As in Yugoslavia, no UN Member State proved willing to commit 
its troops to the prolonged urban combat required to forcibly disarm the factions.128 
 
Finally, there is the possibility of the re-ignition of violence or remaining 
instability post-intervention. This perception may prove a disincentive to multilateral 
intervention. In Angola, both disputants maintained their military capacity while 
theoretically implementing a peace agreement, only to return to open conflict 
immediately after the elections in 1992. Furthermore, while Haiti and Tajikistan have 
remained weak states despite efforts to enhance the government’s security control and 
capacity to enforce law and order, the Central African Republic continues to be 
plagued by coups, and the hold of the government in Sierra Leone is tenuous in the 
face of insurgent rebel activity.129 
 
2.4 Key Themes that have dominated the Literature 
 
The literature presented in this chapter suggests that there are identifiable 
conditions that influence the attractiveness of a multilateral decision to intervene or to 
not intervene. Five key themes that dominate the literature are presently listed. These 
                                                 
127 Lacina, 2003, 77. 
128 For more information on the conflict in Yugoslavia and Somalia see Ibid., 79. 
129 Ibid., 83-4. 
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are connectivity, selectivity, costs-risks and benefits, likelihood of success, and clear 
exit points.  
 
Connectivity (as a consequence of globalization) equates to the sharing of 
human aspirations and endeavour through worldwide telecommunications, economic 
trading, defence arrangements or cultural exchange. Provided one is able to accept the 
idea of the existence of some sort of connectivity between human endeavour, human 
aspiration and human value, then it is not unreasonable to suggest that whenever and 
wherever humans deliberately inflict extensive pain and suffering on each other all of 
humanity is affected in some way. When a state engages in conflict then there is the 
likelihood that such conflict will spread the circle of death, suffering and destruction.  
 
This also applies to a realist view of the world. If a state causes hardship and 
suffering to its own citizens then eventually the ramifications will permeate among all 
states. Economics and trade will suffer, relationships will be strained, and meaningful 
discourse will be diminished. Regional trading partners and economic arrangements 
set up to benefit all parties may be jeopardized, neighbouring states will suffer from a 
‘spill-over’ of side effects; no State or organization could be said to benefit from 
internal conflict in the short or long term.130  Furthermore, there is the recognition in 
all multilateral organizations that today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are 
connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as the national 
levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself 
invulnerable to today’s perceived threats which may currently include terrorist threats. 
As such, the theme of connectivity must not be lost amongst the other determinants of 
the multilateral decision to intervene or to not intervene.  
 
Multilateral organizations contemplating an intervention into an internal 
conflict face a range of options, one of which is to do nothing with the military and 
political tools at their disposal. The ability of multilateral organizations to substitute 
policy alternatives under varying conditions suggests a need for greater attention to 
issues of selection bias.131 This selectivity has been explained by Sir Adam Roberts as 
                                                 
130 Janzekovic, 2005, 25. 
131 B.A. Most and H. Starr, Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics, Columbia, University of South 
Carolina Press, 1989.  
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“the interweaving of the normative agenda with considerations of collective or state 
interest”.132 The contrast between the international reaction to the crisis in Kosovo 
and the absence of reaction to the war in Chechnya provide powerful examples of the 
problem of selectivity in multilateral policies. The humanitarian consequences of the 
latter were considerably greater than those of the Serbs’ actions in Kosovo prior to the 
NATO campaign. This selectivity has drawn into question the legitimacy of the ‘new 
interventionism.’133  
 
 Any type of intervention or non-intervention comes with risks, costs and 
potential benefits to Member States and the organization. The cost of either policy is 
comprised of material, human, and audience costs. Multilateral intervention involving 
troops and/or equipment incurs, at minimum, the cost of the supply and transport of 
the hardware, while at the extreme a military or extensive economic intervention can 
result in loss of life. Regan argues that factors that raise domestic and international 
consistency costs will lead to a policy of non-intervention, while the factors that raise 
the political benefits to multilateral leaders will result in an interventionist policy.134  
 
For its part, the UN is currently running 16 peace operations involving 
approximately 62,300 personnel. In addition, at the time of writing plans were well 
advanced for a 17th operation to deploy to southern Sudan.135 If this goes ahead, the 
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has estimated these 17 operations will 
cost an unprecedented $5.18 billion during 2004/5.136 Other examples of the financial 
costs of response include the relief and reconciliation in Bosnia in 1992-98 which cost 
                                                 
132 For instance there have been accusations that there has been selectivity due to the preoccupations of 
the Permanent Five. Roberts, chapter 5 in Welsh, 2004, 91. MacFarlane, 2002, 80. 
133 The effectiveness of some interventions has influenced the scholarly debate in leading Western 
nations to the point that such operations are now viewed as a model for solving innumerable 
international crises. The old definition of intervention is no longer relevant due to the qualitative 
changes in the nature of the definition of sovereignty itself. The state can no longer be considered the 
sole master within its borders if it cannot carry out the basic functions of such a "master". In essence 
this notion forms the basis of a "new interventionism" doctrine. However, several recent cases of 
international interventions have failed to bring the desired results, indicating that "humanitarian 
intervention" may not in fact be such a versatile tool. MacFarlane, 2002, 64. 
134 Regan, 2000. 
135 A UN advance mission has already been deployed to Khartoum, and if the parties involved in the 
Machakos-Naivasha peace process conclude a political settlement a larger peace operation is set to 
follow. For details see UN doc. S/2000/763, 28 Sept 2004. 
136 All personal figures refer to 30 Sept. 2004. They and the estimate costs are available at 
www.un.org/Depts/dpko, accessed June 2005.  As of June 2004, UN member states owed $1.2 billion 
in current and outstanding peacekeeping dues in Regan, 2000, 8. 
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$7,500,000,000 (per annum) and the NATO bombing and reconstruction effort in 
Kosovo that cost $670,000,000 (per day of bombing).137 An example of the direct 
human cost of intervening would be when the Sudanese Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) held 500 UN peacekeepers hostage for weeks and murdered several in 2000 
until a negotiated release was arranged between the UN and the RUF’s chief sponsor, 
Liberian President Charles Taylor.138 Indirect costs can also be considerable, such as 
the AIDS epidemic that Cuba suffered when infected soldiers returned home from 
Angola.139 These costs often expand as interventionist forces may find themselves 
reacting to political and strategic imperatives that have little to do with why they 
intervened in the first place.  All too often political and strategic imperatives 
supersede humanitarian intent.140   
 
Yet there are benefits to be gained by intervening multilaterally. Benefits can 
include the combat hardening of military, the development of potentially long-term 
relationships with local, regional or international allies, not to mention regional and 
global stability.141  There are also costs from not intervening in respect of human lives 
in the target state, the destabilization of local, national, regional, and international 
economies and political systems, alliances and regions, and the undoing and 
undermining of any development processes. Moreover, a missed opportunity for a 
role in conflict management, for winning an international reputation, for establishing 
solid credibility, and for the chance to restructure a state’s political system could cost 
heavily in terms of audience, material and political costs.142 
 
The decision to intervene or to not intervene is also a function of the 
multilateral actors’ subjective estimate of the likely outcome of the conflict and the 
effect of multilateral intervention on that outcome. Regan argues that the probability 
                                                 
137 S.L Burg and P.S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International 
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138 Janzekovic, 2005, 22. See also Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some 
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139 Elliot A. Cohen, ‘Dynamics of Military Intervention’, chap. 9, in Levite, Jentleson, and Berman, 
1992, 282. 
140 Janzekovic, 2005, 26. 
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of a conflict abating with or without an intervention is one of the crucial factors in 
determining the likelihood that a third-party will intervene.143 Uncertainty over likely 
outcomes shows up as a declining probability of interventions.144 Organizations 
pursue intervention when they believe there is some beneficial utility in acting.145 
That organizations are unlikely to intervene unless the chance of success is perceived 
as good is a common assumption in the literature. However there is little evidence of 
how it can be measured qualitatively. The difficulty, of course, is that the definition of 
‘success’ is hard to define. When considering the likelihood of a successful 
intervention – what is the minimum requirements of ‘success’?  Multilateral actors 
seeking regional or global security would generally prefer that an internal conflict end 
without them having to expend resources to achieve the outcome. However they 
would also prefer to expend some resources if they thought that their efforts could 
ensure stability. If it is assumed that multilateral actors get no utility from the act of 
intervening, then they would not intervene if they had a low expectation about the role 
of an intervention in ensuring stability. One of the key problems is that multilateral 
actors generally do not have sufficient information to know with confidence when 
success or failure is likely.146 
 
Finally, multilateral ‘non-interventions’ from the 1990s onwards suggest that 
clear exit points are decisive.147 Organizations have repeatedly withstood strong 
media generated pressures to intervene militarily in humanitarian emergencies when 
the exit points could not be identified. Concern about quagmires and casualties played 
a major role in decisions to withstand media generated pressures for multilateral 
intervention in Bosnia between 1992 and May 1995, in Chechnya in November to 
December 1994 where it would have triggered a confrontation with Russia, in 
Burundi in July 1996, in the Great Lakes region in November 1996, and in Kosovo in 
June 1998.148   
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
What decision-makers face is an ad hoc choice among different uncertainties 
and risks. A coherent understanding in the literature in terms of what primary 
conditions attract multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene is lacking. 
Scholars and practitioners do, however, offer plenty of suggestions on what 
conditions ‘should’ contribute to an intervention policy. Most studies have focused on 
unilateral interventions, with conditions that ethically justify such interventions. 
Consequently, further research on this extremely interesting and significant topic is a 
necessity.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
York, Macmillan, 1998, 79-109; Jeffery R. Smith, ‘NATO Albania Deployment Less Likely’, The 
Washington Post, 28 May, 1998, A30. 
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                                   Chapter Three 
 
 
 
                                          
                                         Theoretical framework 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
A review of the available literature on the conditions that attract or deter 
multilateral intervention into internal conflicts reveals significant shortcomings. There 
are no agreed-upon conditions that determine multilateral intervention or non-
intervention policies and there are some conditions whose importance has not been 
fully explored and explained. There are no useful frameworks measuring certain 
conditions which may describe, predict, or prescribe multilateral decisions to 
intervene or not. There is a further need to identify conditions that are evident in 
decisions by organizations that consider an intervention option, or are asked to 
intervene, but reject it without responding.  
 
This chapter describes a framework that, upon application of four case studies 
in the Asia Pacific region, attempts to understand which structural (environment) and 
perceptual conditions make multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene 
attractive. The framework developed serves as a tool for conceptually defining and 
operationally measuring certain conditions. It is hoped that the effects of these 
conditions on decisions to intervene or to not intervene can be systematically tested 
upon application of numerous cases of internal conflict. The conflicts examined are 
the Philippine (Moro) conflict, the East Timor conflict, the Solomon Island Conflict, 
and the West Papua conflict. This research provides reasons behind multilateral 
organizations taking concrete action to help cease hostilities between disputants and 
reasons behind these same actors choosing to take no action whatsoever. The findings 
may be of particular descriptive, predictive and even prescriptive value after their 
further application on other cases of internal conflict. In particular the results may aid 
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in establishing further theories in respect of the organizational decision-calculus, 
selection bias in multilateral organizations, and the unattractiveness of an intervention 
policy.  
 
3.2 Three Key Components Underlying the Framework 
 
Some key scholars, including Patrick Regan and John Janzekovic, have 
developed ideas about the causes of unilateral interventions. Costs, risk and benefits; 
the issue of connectivity; and the level of outrage felt by the domestic and 
international communities are essential ideas when developing an accurate framework 
that considers the determinants of multilateral decisions to intervene or to not 
intervene. These three ideas are adopted as the key headings of the framework and are 
used in respect of a multilateral context. Unfortunately it must be noted that these 
concepts do have some limitations. It is difficult to measure or even define all of the 
conditions that may represent them, especially perceptual conditions such as levels of 
outrage and perceived connectivity. However, their importance in the literature 
validates their inclusion.  
 
As noted in the previous chapter, multilateral actors have to weigh the costs, 
risks and benefits of alternative actions and estimate the probability that any action 
will achieve a desired outcome. While the costs and benefits of multilateral 
interventions are distributed across all sanctioned parties, they still act as a powerful 
influence on the attractiveness of a particular policy, and, as such, are incorporated as 
an essential element of the framework. Andrew Kapral argues that the basic premise 
of cost, risk and benefit analysis is that some factors of a certain decision will yield 
negative outcomes to the decision maker (costs), or certain risks will have to be taken, 
and some conditions will yield positive outcomes (benefits).1  The goal, therefore, is 
to choose the path that leads to the highest level of benefits in exchange for the lowest 
levels of costs and risks. If multilateral actors are militarily superior to the disputants, 
direct multilateral intervention will have relatively low costs. Conversely, if the 
disputants have a powerful military relative to the multilateral intervener(s), the 
                                                 
1 Kapral, 2004, 3.  
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likelihood that intervention will yield benefits is low, and the danger that multilateral 
intervention will be costly is increased.  
 
In a similar vein, Regan asserts that when the expectations are such that the 
rewards are slight and the costs prohibitive, “we should not expect to see many 
interventions.”2 He argues that political leaders choose to intervene only when they 
have considered an intervention to be necessary and they expect that intervention will 
have a high chance of success or that the benefits of success are accessible and greatly 
worthwhile.3 This could work in the context of multilateral intervention. The 
multilateral intervener(s) estimates that the conflict will continue without an 
intervention or that the costs of non-intervention outweigh the costs of multilateral 
intervention.  
 
The specific goals of multilateral intervention may determine the extent to 
which an intervening organization will accept the material and political costs of 
intervention.4 If such goals are included in an organization’s rationale, the perceived 
benefits of intervention increase. In addition to the material interests of multilateral 
organization, such as the protection of economic, strategic, and territorial interests,5 
intervention for humanitarian goals may also benefit the multilateral intervener(s). 
Multilateral intervention to protect humanitarian interests may generate support from 
the interveners’ regional and international public. It is likely that the regional and 
international audiences will accept greater material losses for more profitable goals 
that they have agreed on. 6  
 
Consequently, the main theme of multilateral intervention proponents is 
always that the cost-benefit ratio is favourable, and the risk involved is acceptable. If 
this cannot be argued forcefully and with a convincing emphasis on the controllability 
                                                 
2 Regan, 2000, 4 As Regan argues, “The decision to intervene is laden with political costs that go far 
beyond the resources expended.” 
3 Regan asserts that there are undoubtedly more factors that influence the decision to intervene, though 
he argues that the relative purchase that additional explanations give is marginal when compared with 
those identified here.  Ibid., 139. 
4 For example, some studies have posited that the goal of intervention is not only to eliminate violence 
and create stability, but also to do so in a manner that favours the longer-term economic and territorial 
goals of the intervener. Pearson 1974. 
5 Kapral, 2004, 1. 
6 Ibid.  
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of risk, Vertzberger argues, a decision to intervene is unlikely to be made; even 
supporters will find it difficult to accept and defend an open-ended commitment. 
Thus, the question of control is crucial. Control, by definition entails the reduction of 
risk, uncertainty, and complexity to an acceptable minimum – not an easy task in most 
multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene, which by their nature require a 
degree of policy-relevant knowledge that is not readily, if at all, available.7  
 
The degree of connectivity or global and regional spill-over effects created by 
the internal conflict may attract or deter multilateral intervention. With the 
acceleration of globalization and the growth of supranational organizations, so-called 
internal conflicts have become more ‘internationalized’ than ever before.8 Internal 
conflicts can weaken state structures, create instability in the world market place, 
generate refugee problems, and instigate conflicts beyond the borders of the original 
conflict. All these may pose a security threat against outside citizens which may 
encourage intervention decisions by multilateral organizations. In particular, 
humanitarian crises affect the entire global community to some extent, and there is a 
need to act in pursuit of alleviating their consequences.9  The Member States that are 
for intervention may indicate the importance of proximity, historical factors, and spill-
over effects, especially if these are refugees.  
 
Finally, depending on its nature, the level of outrage generated by regional 
and/or international communities created by certain conditions could attract 
multilateral intervention or non-intervention. Regional and international 
constituencies may press strongly for either policies particularly when the conflicts 
and the resulting carnage are covered by the media.10 It is possible that human 
empathy may be able to transcend state boundaries and that the greater the public 
                                                 
7 Vertzberger, 1998, 6.  
8 Midlarsky, M.I., ed., The Internationalization of Communal Strife, London, Routledge, 1992; Brown 
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Ethnic Conflict, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1996a, 3-25; Brown M.E., ‘Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: 
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9 Regan, 2000, 47. 
10 Ibid. 
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outrage over an internal conflict, the higher the likelihood of multilateral intervention. 
Whether the moral impetus to act is dependent on the degree of outrage or shock felt, 
the extent of the atrocities,11 and the immediacy of the act itself will be explored. It 
must be acknowledged that such outrage is not boundless; indeed these vocal feelings 
are frequently very selectively applied. Janzekovic argues that constant priming by the 
mass media is required to maintain levels of concern and even levels of interest.12 
 
3.3 Research Design 
 
The framework in this thesis concentrates on the point where multilateral 
decisions to intervene or to not intervene were taken, and it limits the conditions to 
key structural and perceptual conditions that may attract or deter multilateral 
intervention. This section argues that both the structural environment and the 
perceptions of the structural environment are required for a full description and 
explanation of intervention or non-intervention decisions. These concern the 
relationships between multilateral actors and their surrounding environments; how the 
environment limits or encourages the activities of these actors, and how multilateral 
actors perceive their environment.  The unit of analysis in this project is naturally 
intervention decisions and non-intervention decisions. 
 
At its foundation this project is interested in following Most and Starr’s 
thinking: 
 
…partitioning the world in at least two crude ways: the presence or 
absence of dependent variables (Y and –Y or intervention decisions and 
non-intervention decisions), and the presence or absence of predictor 
variables (X and –X or the presence or absence of certain structural and 
perceptual conditions). In doing so, there is the realization that the most 
general questions or propositions might not hold because these crude 
partitioning factors might limit their general applicability. Furthermore, by 
organizing our thinking in these terms, they may help us in bringing 
disparate phenomena together in an orderly manner. At the least the results 
of this project might indicate some factors and/or relationships which are 
                                                 
11 The grim reality, Janzekovic continues, is that small atrocities do not have the same impact as large 
atrocities (except, of course, to those doing the suffering and dying). Janzekovic, 2005, 20. 
12 Ibid., 24-25, 36. 
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essential, others significant, and others marginal or insignificant to a 
particular multilateral decision.13  
 
In order to clearly define and measure the conditions in this framework, 
various conceptual definitions and operational measurements have been adopted. 
Conceptual definitions of the conditions are sourced from such references as Regan’s 
Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict, 14 the 
Correlates of War Project,15 and from Marshall, Gurr et al.’s PITF Set Codebook.16 
The operational measurements include yes/no/limited answers, statistical information, 
analytical descriptions and multi-choice definitions. Particular operational 
measurements were picked for their abilities to provide the clearest results and 
information in respect of each condition. Operational measurements are generally 
sourced from such references as Marshall, Gurr et al’s database or are original 
measurements.17  
 
In particular, some of the measurements have been modified in accordance 
with the particular case studies examined, especially in respect of the numbers of 
fatalities and refugees. While the yes/no/limited and multi-choice nature of some of 
the questions has, in past research,18 required an analytical tool, a logit procedure; this 
thesis will provide a numerical value to the answer, for example, yes=1, no=2, 
limited=3, and no basis for judgement = 9. Such a rudimentary form of investigation 
can at best serve as a prelude to a more systematic treatment to follow in succeeding 
chapters and, in respect of future research, will require further case studies for a more 
thorough analysis. Figures 3 and 4 provide broad illustrations of how this framework 
can work and what conditions it includes.  
 
                                                 
13 For more information on this method of analysis see Most and Starr, 1989, 17. 
14 Regan, 2000. 
15 Correlates of War Project: National Material Capabilities Data Documentation Version 3.0, last 
update: May 2005, http://cow2.la.psu.edu/, accessed June 2005.  
16 Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, ‘Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 
1955-2004’ PITF (Political Instability Task Force) Problem Set Codebook, revision date: January 
2001, http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfcode.htm, accessed May 2005. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Such as Regan, 2000, 55; Scott D. Bennett and Allan C. Stam, ‘The Duration of Interstate Wars, 
1816-1985’ American Political Science Review 90(2) 1996, 239-57; Paul Hensel and Paul Diehl, “It 
Takes Two to Tango: Non-Militarized Response in Interstate Disputes” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
38, 1994, 479-506. 
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In respect of the cases where intervention was considered but it was dropped 
as a valid policy, there should be visible traces left behind from the multilateral 
process. Two ways to identify this trace is to look for an indication of threats to 
intervene that were ultimately not carried out or an attempt by the state in conflict to 
call for an intervention, a call which was ultimately ignored. The problem with the 
first condition would be that clear threats are not always evident. The second 
condition works much more efficiently. In the case of the Solomon Islands conflict, 
the authorities sought intervention three times before gaining multilateral intervention. 
What was it that deterred multilateral intervention from taking place earlier? Since the 
question of whether multilateral actors considered intervening, but chose not to, is 
difficult to disentangle, it will be included as much as possible when applying the 
Solomon Islands case to the framework.  
 
While it may be critiqued as limited in scope,19 the framework in this thesis 
offers valuable conditions for further analysis, extending the current international 
debate. Conditions that have not been mentioned in the literature, such as the impact 
of tactics and strategies adopted by the disputants, and the impact of identifiable and 
organized disputants will be included in the framework, challenging their invisibility. 
This framework allows an understanding not only about what the primary conditions 
are that make multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene attractive, but it 
will be of descriptive worth in constructing data on current internal conflicts. Once the 
conditions are perceived as valuable in case study analysis, then a set of predictive 
criteria can be produced to ascertain when a multilateral intervention may or may not 
take place. It should be noted at the outset that an organization can intervene as a 
result of many conditions at once.  
 
Figure 3: Model of Structural and Perceptual Conditions that Attract and Deter 
Multilateral Intervention  
                                                 
19 For example, it fails to consider personal attributes of the potential intervener or the decision-making 
process. 
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Figure 4: Summary of Key Structural and Perceptual Conditions 
 
Structural Conditions Perceptual Conditions 
Costs and Risks 
• DISPS – Dispute Issues 
• FATAL– Fatalities 
• YRBEGIN – Duration 
• YREND – Duration  
• PHASE – Phase  
• MILCAP – Military 
Capabilities 
• ECOCAP – Economic 
Capabilities  
• MAGFIGHT – Number of 
Disputants  
• TACSTRA – Tactics and 
Strategies adopted by 
Costs, risks and benefits 
• LIKESUCCESS – Likelihood 
of Success 
• CLEAR – Clear Exits 
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2. Connectivity 
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Perceptual 
Conditions 
 
1. Costs, Risks, 
Benefits 
2. Connectivity 
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Outrage 
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Disputants 
• SUPEROS – Superpower 
Support or Opposition 
• IDENORG – Identifiable and 
Organized Disputants 
• INITIATE – Resistance 
Levels 
• MAGFAIL – Status of 
Government 
Benefits 
• ECWEALTH – Economic 
Wealth of the State in Conflict 
 
Connectivity 
• ECIMPORT – Economic 
Importance of the State in 
Conflict 
Connectivity 
• UPMCRISIS – IDP and 
Refugee Crisis 
• DEATHMAG – 
Genocide/Politicide 
Level of Outrage 
• MEDIA – Media Coverage 
• INTENVIRO – Nature of the 
International Environment 
Level of Outrage 
• LEVOUT – Level of Outrage 
 
3.4 Operationalization of the Structural Conditions 
 
Structural Costs and Risks 
 
3.4a Dispute Issues 
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The types of dispute issues have implications for the political, economic, and 
audience costs and risks of intervening. The more intractable the dispute issues are, 
the higher the likelihood of costs and risks to resolve it. Tractable disputes such as 
territorial or resource issues, especially those which are limited in number, may be 
more attractive to multilateral interventions than those intractable disputes that 
involve such issues as ethnic divisions.20  The following code is sourced from 
Marshall, Gurr et al., but it is slightly modified in its order.21 
  
DISPS: This paper categorizes dispute issues into eight categories, although 
internal conflicts may involve one or many of the following:  
1. Territory, borders, sea borders  
2. Resources  
3. Others dispute issues  
4. Decolonization, national independence  
5.  Internal power  
6.  International power  
7.  Ethnic, religious or regional autonomy 
8.  Ideology, system 
9.  No basis for judgement  
 
These eight categories can be aggregated into three groups that characterize 
the conflict by the main objectives in dispute:  
1.  1, 2, 3. material or territorial issues  
2.  4, 5, 6. international power 
3.  7, 8. national power  
9.  No basis for judgement 
 
3.4b Intensity 
 
Although the ‘intensity of a conflict’ (the degree of threat or tension? the 
magnitude of violence? the number of fatalities?) remains ambiguous in meaning, it is 
                                                 
20 Chaim Kaufmann, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts’ International Security, 20, 
4, 1996, 136-75. 
21 Marshall et al., 2001. 
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presumed to affect the attractiveness of multilateral decisions to intervene or to not 
intervene. Conflict intensity is operationalized in this framework in terms of the 
number of casualties and the tactics and strategies adopted by the disputants. The 
tactics and strategies adopted by disputants are, however, addressed as a separate 
condition to illustrate its importance. On the one hand, to a liberal perspective, highly 
intense conflicts tend to be associated with humanitarian concerns22 making a 
multilateral intervention policy compelling. Yet highly intense conflicts may also 
pose severe threats to regional and international stability, of paramount importance to 
the realist. 
 
The role of intensity reflects to a large extent the certainty or uncertainty with 
the decision to intervene or to not intervene multilaterally. It is quite likely that in 
intense internal conflicts both the expectation that the conflict will be resolved 
without multilateral intervention and the expectation about the efficiency of a 
multilateral intervention will be low. According to Regan, one result of this should be 
a decreased likelihood of observing multilateral interventions, even though Member 
States may see an intervention as necessary to stop the fighting.23 Yet a reflection of a 
high intensity conflict may be a high level of outrage and shock expressed by the 
media. This outrage which can generate audience costs may override the costs and 
risks associated with intense conflicts. An important question for this work is whether 
there is a threshold in the number of fatalities which influence multilateral 
intervention or non-intervention decisions. Fatalities not only denote an operational 
point for inclusion of cases but also reflect the seriousness of the conflict and the 
extent to which it is entrenched in the society and is visible to the global community.  
 
FATAL 
 
The intensity of the conflict is measured in terms of the number of fatalities 
over the course of the conflict prior to the multilateral intervention or the estimated 
fatalities to date if the conflict has not attracted multilateral intervention. The numbers 
of victims in internal conflicts given in governmental and academic records vary 
                                                 
22 There are, of course, benefits to intervening in intense conflicts that result from humanitarian aspects 
of the mission, but with a low probability of success the intervener is too likely to end up with the least 
preferred outcome – a failed intervention. 
23 Regan, 2000, 48. 
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considerably. In many protracted internal conflicts, for example with the 1994 
massacre in Rwanda or the decades of war in Angola, it is technically impossible to 
estimate any exact number of victims. It also becomes more and more difficult to 
draw the lines between civilian and military victims. This paper has listed the lowest 
and highest estimates of victims available at the point of intervention, at the point of 
consideration or to date. Sources for the number of casualties in each Asia Pacific 
case of conflict include the Correlates of War data, the Pearson and Baumann data on 
military interventions, Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr et al.’s24 PITF (Political 
Instability Task Force) Problem Set Codebook, UN databases, and Monty G. 
Marshall’s Measuring the Societal Impact of War data.25  
 
The following code, sourced from Marshall, Gurr et al., provides a definition 
of what number of fatalities converts to a crisis or war. The code is based on source 
estimates of fatalities directly attributed to fighting, armed attacks, and revolutionary 
protest including rebel fighters and leaders, demonstrators, regime forces and 
officials, civilians massacred in war zones or caught in cross-fire, victims of 
government campaigns of genocide and politicide, and victims of terrorist attacks. It 
excludes, insofar as possible, victims of disease and starvation that result indirectly 
from open conflict.26 
 
0.    Less than 200 fatalities: this converts to latent conflict heading   
        towards a crisis 
1.    200 to 1000 fatalities: this converts to a crisis 
2.    1000 to 5000 fatalities: this converts to a severe crisis  
3.    5,000 to 10,000 fatalities: this converts to war 
4.     More than 10,000 fatalities: this converts to war  
9.     No basis for judgement 
 
3.4c Duration 
                                                 
24 Marshall et al. 2001. 
25 Monty G. Marshall, ‘Measuring the Societal Impact of War’ chapter 4 in Fen Osler Hampson and 
David M. Malone, eds., From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System, A 
Project of the International Peace Academy, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2002. See also 
Marshall, ‘Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1945-2005,’ Centre for Systemic Peace, 
http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/warlist.htm, last updated February 27 2006, last accessed April 2006. 
26 Marshall et al., 2001. 
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A conflict is not a static situation but dynamic. An understanding of the 
conflict cycle is essential for an understanding of when a multilateral intervention 
may appear an attractive option or not. Numerous models of conflict patterns have 
been put forward by scholars. Typically, conflicts tend to be described as cyclical in 
regard to their intensity levels, escalating from (relative) stability and peace into crisis 
and war, and therefore, de-escalating into relative peace. Most scholars also agree that 
these cycles are recurring. For an illustration of the conflict cycle see figure 5.27  
 
Figure 5: The Conflict Life Cycle 
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27 Niklas L.P. Swanstrom and Mikael S. Weissman, “Conflict, Conflict Prevention, Conflict 
Management and Beyond: A Conceptual Exploration,” Concept Paper, Summer 2005, Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, Washington, D.C., 
http://www.silkroad.org/new/docs/ConceptPapers/2005/concept_paper_ConfPrev.pdf, accessed 
January 2006. 
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According to Bercovitch the duration of a dispute and the timing of 
multilateral intervention determine to a significant extent the likelihood of 
intervention success.28 To be effective, intervention must take place at a propitious 
moment. There is, however, no agreement about exactly when potential interveners 
are attracted to multilateral intervention. Is there a particular phase of conflict that 
attracts multilateral intervention? History might argue that a multilateral intervener 
only intervenes when the conflict has not managed to settle itself – when duration is 
lengthy, yet it would also seem that the longer a conflict’s duration, the more 
intractable it appears and, as such, the less attractive it is to multilateral actors. The 
operational measurement for duration and phase of conflict, modifying Marshall, Gurr 
et al.’s PITF Set Codebook,29 dates the beginning and end of armed conflict, and what 
the phase was when intervention was taken, was considered, or has not taken place.  
 
YRBEGIN (4-number numeric year denoting event beginning (9999=no basis 
for judgement)). This code records the year in which the conflict began. Marshall, 
Gurr et al. define ‘open armed conflict’ as beginning when more than 100 conflict-
related fatalities are recorded in a single year, or defined by an overt, symbolic or 
decisive action.30 However this is not appropriate for Asia-Pacific conflicts in the 
Philippines (Moro), East Timor, West Papua, and the Solomon Islands. Consequently, 
UN sources or specific case histories are used to determine the year that the conflict 
began.  
 
YREND (4-number numeric year denoting event ending (9999=ongoing)). It 
records the last year of open armed conflict. If there is a decisive conclusion, such as a 
multilateral intervention that ends almost all fighting, it records the year of the 
concluding event and indicates the nature of that event.  
 
PHASE At what phase of the conflict was intervention initiated, considered, 
or to date? 
1. Dispute (non-military) phase 
2. Conflict (pre-hostilities) phase 
                                                 
28 Bercovitch, 1986, 161. 
29 Marshall et al., 2001. 
30 Ordinarily, open conflict results from a conscious, strategic policy on the part of one or both conflict 
groups; in this case, date armed conflict from the year in which the first attacks or clashes occur.  
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3. Hostilities phase 
4. Escalation 
5. De-escalation 
6. Termination (post-hostilities) phase 
7. Settlement 
9.   No basis for judgement 
 
3.4d Capabilities of the Intervener and Disputants 
 
Motivation, opportunity and a strong willpower to intervene need to be 
supplemented by appropriate skills or capabilities.  Power and material capabilities 
are not identical; but given their association it is essential that there is an attempt 
made to define the latter in operational terms so as to understand the former. Military 
personnel and military expenditure reflect the breadth and depth of the resources that 
an organization could bring or has brought to bear in instances of multilateral 
interventions. Furthermore, the ability of an organization, including the capabilities of 
the interested Member State(s), to create and sustain a long-term commitment to 
resolution and reconstruction will limit the costs or risks incurred by multilateral 
intervention. The higher the capabilities may mean the higher the likelihood of 
intervention. While on the other hand, the less the capabilities or the weaker the 
capabilities, the less likelihood of multilateral intervention.31 In terms of non-
intervention cases, the capabilities of the disputants need to be considered as a factor 
that has motivated inaction. Consequently, while the capabilities of the intervener(s) 
are noted in the cases of intervention, the capabilities of the disputants are considered 
as deterrents in the cases when multilateral organizations have not been forthcoming 
with intervention. The following codes come from the Correlates of War Project 
codebook.32  
 
MILCAP This code contains numerical data on the size of the organization’s 
military33 (including the number of troops offered by interested parties) at the time of 
intervention. In the matter of non-intervention the numerical data on the disputants’ 
                                                 
31 Regan, 2000, 50. 
32 Correlates of War Project, 2005. 
33 Or at least under the command of the multilateral organization. 
 78 
military capabilities is noted in an effort to understand policies of non-intervention. 
Due to the difficulty in gaining precise numbers of military personnel, the accurate 
numbers of active forces remains uncertain on a conceptual basis. A lot of the results 
are broad estimates from the most recent data reported.34 
 
ECOCAP Military expenditure is defined as the total military budget for an 
organization for a given intervention. How much was spent in the actual 
interventions?35 Just as with the condition on military capabilities, this condition will 
look at disputant economic capabilities when it comes to policies of non-intervention. 
 
3.4e Number of Disputants 
 
This only includes those disputants who have been actively involved in the 
negotiations or who have been recognized as disputants by the government. The 
higher the number of disputants may mean the higher the complexity of the conflict 
and thus the higher the chance of a policy of non-intervention. This code, based on 
Marshall, Gurr et al.’s PITF codebook,36 scales the number of disputants, ranging 
from 1-5; with 9=missing. The scale is based on source estimates of the number of 
groups of "armed supporters," "guerrillas," of rebel and revolutionary movements and 
the state. 
 
MAGFIGHT:  
1.  The government only  
2.  2 groups of disputants only  
3.  3-4 groups of disputants  
4.  5-6 groups of disputants  
5.  7 or more groups of disputants 
9.  No basis for judgement  
 
3.4f Tactics and Strategies Adopted by Disputants 
  
                                                 
34 Correlates of War Project, 2005. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Marshall et al., 2001. 
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The attractiveness of multilateral intervention as a policy depends to a large 
extent on the behaviour of the disputants.37  If the strategies and tactics adopted by 
disputants are destructive and conflictual, would this lead to a lesser probability of 
multilateral intervention taking place? Could evidence of an agreement and 
reconciliatory acts by at least one disputant influence the multilateral decision to 
intervene or to not intervene? If there is an end to the conflict in sight, without the 
need for multilateral intervention, then there may be less likelihood of multilateral 
intervention occurring. The following is an original code.38 The strategies and tactics 
of the disputants over the course of the conflict up to intervention, at the point of 
considering intervention, or to date, will be used as the duration threshold for studying 
the disputants’ modes of conflict resolution. Figure 6 illustrates positive and negative 
modes of conflict resolution that the disputants may adopt during the duration of the 
internal conflict. 
 
Figure 6: Positive and Negative Modes of Conflict Resolution 
 
instruments positive use (+) negative use (-) 
1. Bilateral diplomacy  
   
establishing diplomatic 
relations 
dispatching envoys 
visits by government 
officials 
negotiations 
entrance of a mediator 
use of diplomatic channels 
recalling diplomats 
suspending of relations 
cutting diplomatic relations 
notes of protest 
leaving the negotiation 
table 
ignoring signs 
breaking treaties 
expelling foreigners 
2. Multilateral diplomacy   
   
organizing a conference 
mediation by an 
boycotting a conference 
resolution against a party 
                                                 
37 Regan, 2000, 50. 
38 For more information on conflict Management Strategies and Conflicts see Marshall and Gurr, 
2005.  
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international organization 
resolution in favour of a 
party 
arbitration, facilitation by 
third parties 
ignoring multilateral 
initiatives 
3. Information, propaganda  
   
information policy to find 
solutions 
misinformation 
information policy to heat 
the conflict 
4. Economic instruments  
   
granting of most favoured 
nation status 
credits 
economic support 
trade agreements 
tariffs, contingents 
embargo 
taxation of imports 
subsidizing exports 
nationalization 
hidden trade barriers 
demands for reparation 
black mailing 
cancellation of trade 
agreements 
closure of borders 
5. Military instruments  
   
dispatching military 
observers 
delivery of arms 
peacekeeping forces 
withdrawal of troops 
  
dispatching troops or 
vessels 
concentrating troops at 
borders 
mobilization 
alerts 
manoeuvres 
sporadic military incidents 
intervention or invasion 
blockade 
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ending of military support 
terrorist attacks 
full fledged war 
6. Secret agencies and 
services 
gathering of information using information against 
the other party 
7. Informal, subversive 
instruments 
support of non-
governmental groups 
  
8. Alliances admission to alliances leaving an alliance 
9. Regional or universal 
integration or isolation 
founding international 
organizations 
organizing an international 
conference 
supporting international 
organizations 
leaving an international 
organization 
cancelling participation in 
a conference 
cancelling support of a 
conference 
10. Internal instruments government talks with 
opposition 
ending of state of 
emergency 
amnesty 
recognition of opposition 
change of government 
fulfilling demands 
agreement on settlement 
policy 
opposition is willing to 
compromise 
demonstration pro/contra 
the government 
street blockades, terrorist 
assaults 
bribery, corruption 
ideological mobilization, 
populism, charismatic 
leadership 
censorship 
unorganized resistance, 
street battles 
arrestments, police action 
state of emergency, martial 
law 
expulsion of citizen, 
exiliation 
coup d'état 
liquidations 
military force 
organized resistance, 
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rebellion 
anti-regime demands 
  
       TACSTRA 
1. There have been only systematic positive uses of conflict resolution 
instruments by both parties. Governments and oppositions are bound to non-
violent actions in their dispute over conflicting interests.  
2. There have been some attempts at positive uses of conflict resolution by both 
parties but the Governments and opposition resort occasionally to force or 
threat of force. 
3. There have been systematic negative uses of conflict resolution instruments by 
just the disputants, but the government has adopted some or systematic 
positive uses of conflict resolution instruments 
4. There have been systematic negative uses of conflict resolution instruments by 
just the government 
5. There have been systematic negative uses of conflict resolution instruments by 
the government and disputants.  
9. No basis for judgement 
 
3.4g Superpower Opposition or Support 
 
The extent to which a superpower or other major states support, or are 
opposed to, multilateral intervention could make an option of intervention or non-
intervention attractive. While superpower support is not essential to interventions by 
regional organizations, superpower opposition may be highly detrimental to 
intervention by an international organization. Opposition by a superpower to 
multilateral intervention may increase the political, economic and military costs of the 
potential multilateral intervener. For the time period between 1990 and 2006 this 
paper considers the US a superpower. The code, from Marshall, Gurr et al., suggests 
that a superpower can respond to internal conflicts in a variety of ways. 39   
 
SUPEROS  
                                                 
39 Marshall et al. 2001. 
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1. A superpower takes a direct interest in the resolution of the internal conflict 
of another state and supports multilateral intervention.  
2. A superpower remains neutral and inactive to the conflict resolution process 
and multilateral intervention decision. 
3. A superpower remains in complete opposition to intervention. 
9. No basis for judgement  
 
3.4h Identifiable and Organized Disputants 
 
If the disputants are not clearly identifiable or organized in their aims, there 
may be less likelihood of multilateral intervention. This is due to the fact that the 
more clearly identifiable and united the disputants are, the higher the perception of 
high chances of a successful multilateral intervention.40 The following code scales 
whether the disputants are easily identifiable and organized, ranging from 1-3 or 9 for 
no basis for judgement. 
 
                  IDENORG 
1. Yes – the disputants are easily identifiable and organized 
2. Limited – the disputants are generally identifiable and are marginally 
organized 
3. No – the disputants are not easily identifiable, nor are they organized 
9.   No basis for judgement 
 
3.4i Resistance levels to intervention by disputants 
 
What were the circumstances under which multilateral intervention was 
initiated or not initiated? The following code, modified from ‘Third Party Military 
Interventions 1900-2002’ Codebook, 41 refers to whether there was a request for 
intervention, consent to intervention, or resistance to an intervention option. Were 
there any calls for intervention by one or more of the disputants? As long as one of 
the disputants is interested in intervention, induced consent by other disputants may 
                                                 
40 Bercovitch, 1986, 160. 
41 University of Central Arkansas, Third Party Military Interventions, 1900-2002 Codebook, 
http://faculty.uca.edu/~markm/tpi_military_codebook.htm, accessed September 2005. 
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still lead to multilateral intervention; while high resistance levels by the disputants, 
especially state actors, may lead to a policy of non-intervention.  
 
      INITIATE 
     1. Multilateral intervention was requested or consented to by the central  
         government of the state (even if it was induced). 
2. Multilateral intervention was requested or consented to by an  
    opposition group. 
     3. While there was resistance by disputants to multilateral intervention, it   
         was requested/ welcomed by the civil society/grassroots community. 
     4. High resistance levels to multilateral intervention, but intervention was  
         still initiated multilaterally. 
      5. High resistance levels to multilateral intervention and as such there was   
          no intervention.  
     9. No basis for judgement 
 
3.4j Status of the government 
A failing or failed state may be perceived as a reasonable condition for 
multilateral intervention. Characteristics of state failure include economic 
deterioration, dramatically falling living standards, declining governance, misrule and 
corruption, failing institutions, and an incapacity to deliver services for citizens. If a 
government cannot control their territory, and are no longer able to pay their 
employees, law and order may break down, control of armed forces may be lost, and 
others may be looked to in order to provide security. Loyalty may be given to a tribe, 
clan, group or warlords.42 In some extreme cases, there are no alternative elites or 
authority structures to replace failed governance systems and an extended period of 
chaos results. If there is no recognized sovereign or governing body, there is more 
likelihood of multilateral intervention due to the low risk of intimidating or insulting 
such a state, and more risks of spill-over effects if left un-intervened.43 The status of 
                                                 
42 Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), ‘Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of 
Solomon Islands’, 2005, http://www.aspi.org.au/22484solomons/directors.html, accessed August 2005. 
43 When no real government is in place, the idea that intervention constitutes a violation of sovereignty 
unless requested by the government appears outright absurd. 
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the government or any adverse regime changes at the time of intervention, at the point 
of consideration, or to date is noted in this code, taken from Marshall, Gurr et al.44  
MAGFAIL This scale refers to situations in which the institutions of the 
central state at some point in the conflict are so weakened that they can no longer 
maintain political order in significant parts of the country. Evidence includes shut-
downs of routine government services, failure of security forces and administrators to 
carry out any government directives, and anarchic conditions in large parts of the 
country, with rival militias, warlords, or local or regional authorities attempting to 
establish autonomous zones of government.45  
 
1. No adverse regime changes  
2. Adverse regime change (defined above) with no significant  
            weakening of state institutions or persistent collapse of public  
            order. 
3. Failure of state authority in a limited part of the country, for   
      example, secession or rebel control of, or anarchic conditions  
      in, one or several regions that do not include the core area of    
      the country or its capital 
4. Failure of state authority in a substantial part of the country, or in the 
capital and its environs 
5. Complete collapse or near-total failure of state authority 
9.   No basis for judgement. 
 
Structural Benefits 
 
3.4k Economic Wealth of the State 
 
This section asks whether the state in conflict has valuable resources that the 
multilateral actors may wish to consume or take advantage of. The code is an original 
piece of dataset. 
 
                                                 
44 Marshall et al., 2001 
45 Ibid. 
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ECWEALTH 
1. No important resources evident  
2. Some important resources – has the potential to be of economic benefit in 
terms of land or labour. 
3. Exceptionally scarce and valuable resources – such as oil or diamonds 
            9.   No basis for judgement. 
 
Structural Connectivity 
             
3.4L The Economic Importance of the State in Conflict 
 
This code addresses whether an internal conflict will be more susceptible to 
multilateral intervention or non-intervention if the economic value of the state in 
conflict directly affects the economic value of organizations. This includes the state’s 
ability as a trading partner with Member States. The higher the economic importance 
of the state in which the internal conflict is taking place may translate into a higher 
likelihood of multilateral intervention.  
 
ECIMPORT Is the state in conflict highly integrated in the international 
market, a strong and important trading partner, with membership in important 
trading agreements?  
1. No.  
2. Limited  
3. Yes  
9.  No basis for judgment 
  
  Structural Level of Outrage 
 
3.4m Media Coverage 
 
MEDIA Media coverage of internal conflicts may contribute to the levels of 
outrage felt by regional and international audiences. Public constituencies may press 
strongly for multilateral intervention when media coverage is particularly intense. 
Media coverage may only be measurable with more time and effort, something that is 
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restricted by the thesis time constraints. Consequently, no precise measurements will 
be made but active examination of the evidence, such as practitioner statements of the 
importance of the media or important pieces of media evidence will be induced in the 
analysis of the four case studies.  
 
3.4n Nature of International Environment 
 
INTENVIRO At what stage in the international environment did the 
multilateral intervention occur or was considered before dismissal? Is there a link 
between particular events on the international stage and the attractiveness of 
multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene into an internal conflict? Like 
media coverage, the international environment is difficult to measure. The operational 
measurement for nature of the international environment will be purely descriptive, 
using strong evidence to examine the importance of the nature of the international 
environment.  
              
3.5 Operationalization of the Perceptual Variables  
 
 Perceptual conditions are at this point in time largely immeasurable, and will 
not be identified or measured in the same manner as the structural conditions. Rather, 
there will be an attempt made to analyze them only to the extent that they are evident 
and will create a greater understanding of the importance of the structural conditions 
and the current arguments in the literature.  
 
Perceptual Costs, Risks and Benefits 
 
3.5a Likelihood of Success  
 
The perception of high success is continuously referred to in the literature46 as 
being of high importance when considering an intervention option. Successful 
multilateral interventions will generally maximize political benefits while minimizing 
political costs; failure would tend to do the opposite. It is unlikely, both practically 
                                                 
46 Regan, 2000, 107.  
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and conceptually, that a multilateral actor confronted with a choice over whether to 
intervene in an internal conflict will choose to intervene when they have no 
reasonable expectation of a successful outcome. Multilateral actors currently rely 
more on ad hoc criteria than on systematic evaluation.47 This thesis suggests that if at 
least three elements are evident, if the conflict has a strong society/grassroots element 
willing and working for peace, if there is a stalemate evident, and if there is an 
agreement from which to work from, then there may be a perception of medium to 
high likelihood of success. 
 
LIKESUCCESS 
1. If the conflict has a strong civil society/grassroots element willing 
for peace; if there is a type of stalemate evident; and if there is an 
agreement present to work from. 
2. If none of these are present then there will be a low perception of the 
likelihood of success. 
9.             No basis for judgment 
 
3.5b Any Clear exit points 
 
CLEAR Clear exit points were a recognized feature of importance in the 
literature review for ascertaining whether an option of intervention or non-
intervention is an attractive action.48  The ability to perceive points in the internal 
conflict in which the potential intervener(s) could exit the process may be extremely 
difficult to attain.  But due to its prevalence in the literature, it will still be considered 
in each of the examination of four case studies.  
      
Perceptual Connectivity  
 
3.5c Humanitarian Concerns 
 
Serious human rights violations may be a necessary or permissible condition 
for multilateral intervention or non-intervention. The universality of the principles of 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 41, 34. 
48 Viggo Jakobsen, 2000, 131-143. 
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human rights means that state borders provide no immunity from international action 
when the violations are severe. However the extent of severity has not been 
determined. This thesis considers refugee and IDP numbers higher than 50,000, and 
genocide and politicide, as the leading humanitarian concerns that impact on the 
attractiveness of multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene.  
 
UPM Crisis  
 
It must be noted, however, that the humanitarian crisis could be the cause of 
the conflict rather than a consequence of it. The following code, modified from 
Regan’s dataset and Marshall, Gurr et al.’s code book, suggests that a conflict 
associated with the flow of at least 50,000 refugees and IDPs are considered to be a 
humanitarian concern,49  which may determine a higher likelihood of multilateral 
intervention. This number may not be appropriate for the cases of conflict in the Asia-
Pacific region, but it will still be used as it illustrates the seriousness and visibility 
when considering the population scale of these states. Data has been derived from the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and specific case histories 
where necessary. 
 
UPMCRISIS 
1. Not a crisis – less than 50,000 refugees and IDPs 
2. A Humanitarian Crisis – 50,000 refugees and IDPs + 
9. No basis of judgement 
 
Genocide/Politicide 
  
Genocide and politicide involve the promotion, execution, and/or implied 
consent of sustained policies by governing elites, their agents, or either of the 
contending authorities, resulting in the physical extermination of enough (not 
necessarily all) members of a target communal group or politicized non-communal 
group so that it can no longer pose any conceivable threat to their rule or interests. In 
                                                 
49 Regan uses 50,000 as the cut-off between a crisis and a non-crisis, but the cases examined have 
limited population numbers and this must be taken into consideration. Regan, 2000, 56; Marshall et al., 
2001. 
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genocides the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal 
(ethno-linguistic, religious) characteristics. In politicides, by contrast, groups are 
defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant 
groups. The following criteria and code are based on the codes developed by Barbara 
Harff and T.R. Gurr.50 Cumulative estimates of civilian deaths over the course of the 
conflict are identified from multiple sources. More research could be done on this 
issue with some improvement in the reliability of the following codings.  
 
Three operational criteria for Genocide or Politicide should be noted. Firstly, 
authorities' complicity in mass murder must be established. In situations of internal 
conflict either of the disputants may be deemed responsible for carrying out, or 
allowing, such actions. Secondly, the victims to be counted are unarmed civilians, not 
combatants. It rarely is possible to distinguish precisely between the two categories in 
the source materials. Certain kinds of tactics nonetheless are indicative of authorities' 
systematic targeting of non-combatants: massacres, unrestrained bombing and 
shelling of civilian inhabited areas, declaration of free fire zones, starvation by 
prolonged interdiction of food supplies, or forced expulsion (‘ethnic cleansing’) 
accompanied by extreme privation and killings. Lastly, in principle, numbers 
provided in ‘body counts’ do not enter the definition of what constitutes an episode of 
genocide or politicide. A ‘few hundred’ killed constitutes as much a genocide or 
politicide as the deaths of thousands if the victim group is small in number to begin 
with.51  
 
            DEATHMAG 
1.  Less than 300 
2.  300 – 1000 
3.  1000 – 2000  
4.  2000 – 4000 
5.  4000 – 8000 
6.  8000 - 16,000 
                                                 
50 Note: Definitions and operational guidelines are adapted from Barbara Harff and T.R. Gurr, ‘Victims 
of the State: Genocides, Politicides, and Group Repression from 1945 to 1995,’ in Albert J. Jongman, 
ed., Contemporary Genocides: Causes, Cases, Consequences, Leiden, University of Leiden, PIOOM 
Interdisciplinary research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations, 1996, 33. 
51 Note: Definitions and operational guidelines are adapted from Ibid.  
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7.  16,000 - 32,000 
8.  32,000 - 64,000 
9.  64,000 - 128,000 
10. 128,000 - 256,000 
11. 256,000 + 
99. No basis for judgement 
 
Perceptual Level of Outrage 
 
3.5d Level of Outrage  
 
LEVOUT To what extent is there an international and/or regional level of 
outrage produced by the internal conflict? To what degree has this led to potential or 
real audience costs, and has this influenced the attractiveness of multilateral decisions 
to intervene or to not intervene? From a liberal perspective, it could be expected that 
domestic, regional and international politics would play a central role in the making of 
organizational policy. Humanitarian crises which result in large numbers of casualties 
or lead to large social dislocations could lead to a sense of moral outrage on the part 
of the public, who may then exert pressure on multilateral organizations to 
constructively respond.52 Audience costs are generated by the level of outrage that can 
emerge as a consequence of extensive and analytical media coverage. When 
contemplating multilateral intervention, multilateral actors have to weigh the 
competing demands of various groups and states that will often be at odds over 
policy. In this environment the organization incurs audience costs for being too timid, 
too indecisive, or too aggressive. Some of these costs are incurred even when the 
decision is made not to intervene, though they could generally be considered to be 
minimal relative to the cost of multilateral intervention.53  The level of outrage will be 
measured by the evidence of Member States pushing for intervention or the extent of 
protests or forums held in the states that are most interested in multilateral 
intervention.  
 
                                                 
52 Barry M. Blechman, “The Intervention Dilemma” Washington Quarterly, 18, 3, 1995, 63-73; 
Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, “Arms and the People” Foreign Affairs, 73, 6, 1994, 47-61. 
53 Regan, 2000, 43-44. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
Understandings of the multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene 
into internal conflicts can be advanced by closely examining the structural and 
perceptual conditions which together contribute to the attractiveness of these policies. 
The framework attempts to analyze those conditions that appear to make such policies 
attractive or unattractive. Strong evidence relating structural and perceptual conditions 
to certain types of policies can allow political researchers to draw inferences about 
how those conditions affect the organizational decision calculus and what conditions 
could be used in establishing particular criteria that could determine or predict 
intervention or non-intervention within regional and/or international organizations. 
The next chapter applies this framework to four cases of internal conflict in the Asia 
Pacific region to determine its descriptive, predictive and prescriptive value. 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
 
 
Application of the Framework 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to determine if the framework developed in the 
previous chapter is useful. Does it provide conditions for why some internal conflicts 
attract multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene? Does it describe internal 
conflicts competently? Is it of predictive and policy (or prescriptive) value?  The 
framework is applied to four case studies of internal conflict in the Asia Pacific 
region: East Timor, the Solomon Islands, the Philippines (Moro) and West Papua. 
These cases were chosen because they represent the differences and similarities of 
internal conflicts within one region and recent multilateral decisions to intervene or to 
not intervene. Evenly split, the cases depict internal conflicts that attracted 
multilateral intervention and internal conflicts that have failed to attract multilateral 
intervention. These cases will be compared in the chapter on analysis in order to 
generalize the inferences that may be drawn from the study of the four cases.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Each section will present an overview of 
the case, an application of only the most relevant structural and perceptual conditions 
that affected a particular multilateral response, and a table presenting all of the 
individual findings in a concise format. A wide range of sources were researched, 
including the International Crisis Group, CIA Fact sheets, Uppsala University conflict 
databases, and various credible sources to enable a generous account of each case for 
application of the conditions.  
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4.2 East Timor - Intervention 
 
4.2a Introduction and Overview 
 
East Timor was declared independent from Portugal on 28 November 1975 
but was invaded and occupied by Indonesian forces nine days later. It was 
incorporated into Indonesia in July 1976 as the province of East Timor. The majority 
of the international community refused to acknowledge the legality of Indonesia’s 
claim to East Timor. An unsuccessful campaign of pacification followed over the next 
two decades, during which an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 individuals lost their 
lives. On 30 August 1999, in a referendum supervised by the UN, an overwhelming 
majority of the people of East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia. 
Following this referendum, anti-independence Timorese militias - organized and 
supported by the Indonesian military - commenced a violent campaign of retribution. 
Wary of alienating Indonesia and of being drawn into the East Timor imbroglio, the 
UN and ASEAN members nevertheless intervened.1  On 20 September 1999 the 
Australian-led peacekeeping troops of the International Force for East Timor 
(INTERFET), authorized by the UN Security Council, were deployed to the country 
and managed to control most of the violence. On 20 May 2002, East Timor was 
internationally recognized as an independent state.2 The framework attempts to 
understand why this internal conflict managed to attract the interest of multilateral 
organizations and led to a policy of multilateral intervention. 
 
Structural Costs and Risks 
 
4.2b Fatalities  
 
DEATHMAG = 4 = more than 10,000 fatalities: this converts to war or genocide. The 
suffering of the civilian population of East Timor was extreme. Estimates of the 
                                                 
1 Alan Dupont, ‘ASEAN’s Response to the East Timor Crisis,’ Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, 54, 2, Academic Research Library, Australian Institute of International Affairs, July 2000, 163. 
For a fuller description of the East Timor conflict see TPI-Intrastate Disputes Data Sets, (51) Indonesia 
(secessionist/separatist dispute), 1976-2002, http://faculty.uca.edu/~markm/tpi_narratives_asia.htm, 
accessed January 2006. 
2 United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Fact sheet, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/feedback/print/tt.html, accessed July 2005. 
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number who died as a result of the invasion, resistance, repression, dislocation, 
famine and unavoidable disease, range from the tens of thousands acknowledged by 
Indonesia itself, to as many as 250,000 victims.3  
 
4.2c Economic Capabilities  
 
ECOCAP = The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) cost from 1 July 2001-30 June 2002 a total of $476.8 million (gross).4 
Australia, and to a lesser extent Japan, carried the majority of this financial burden. 
The UN Security Council resolution established a trust fund which enabled Member 
States that supported but did not participate in the operation to contribute to the costs 
of those that did.5  
 
4.2d Number of Disputants  
 
FATAL= 2 = 2 main groups of disputants, but there were also pro-Indonesia militia 
groups operating that would have been taken into consideration when the option of 
intervention was contemplated. 
 
Party A: FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), with its 
military arm the FALANTIL (Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor).6 
Party B: Indonesian government and the Indonesian military (TNI)  
Militia Gangs in East Timor: numbered in their twenties, with members ranging 
from double digits to over a thousand. The Militia Gangs, operating throughout East 
Timor’s many districts, had extensive arsenals that included M-16s, World War II-
                                                 
3 Peter King, ‘Breaking Deadlocks – Peacemaking opportunities for Australia in East Timor, West 
Papua and PNG’ chapter 3 in Kevin Clements, ed., Peace and Security in the Asia Pacific Region, The 
UN University Press, Tokyo, 1993, 83. Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research, Conflict Database, http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=198, accessed 
July 2005.  See Helder Da Costa, ‘East Timor: The Role of Civil Society in Conflict Prevention and 
Peace-building,’ chapter 9.4, in Annelies Heijmans, Nicola Simmond, and Hands van de Veen, eds., 
Searching for Peace in Asia-Pacific: An Observer of Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Activities, 
Lynne Rienner Publisher Inc., London, 2004, 348. Guardian Unlimited, ‘Blood on our hands’, Monday 
January 25, 1999, http://www.guardian.co.uk/indonesia/Story/0,2763,208968,00.html, accessed April 
2005. 
4 United Nations, UNTAET Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetF.htm, accessed 
May 2005. 
5 Interviews with UN officials, November 1999 by Dupont, July 2000, 166. 
6 Tamrat Samuel, ‘East Timor: The Path to Self-Determination’ chapter 8 in Lekha Sriram and 
Wermester, 2003, 201. 
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vintage G-3 rifles, AK-47s, and hand grenades obtained from TNI. Often working 
with TNI in intimidating and arresting pro-independence youth, their methods were to 
force people to become members through intimidation.7 
 
Eurico Guterres (centre) with his Aitarak terror squad.  
4.2e Tactics and Strategies adopted by Disputants  
 
TACSTRA = 4 = There were systematic negative uses of conflict resolution 
instruments by just the Indonesian government. 
The tactics and strategies adopted by the Indonesian government and military 
to manage the conflict were rife with contradictions, varying between attempting to 
kill off the disputants to agreeing to consider autonomy for East Timor.8  Despite 
negotiation and mediation efforts, killings, torture, burning of homes continued – 
causing people to flee. Despite these attacks, Independence leader Xanana Gusmao 
told militia gang Muladi he was still willing to talk with pro-Indonesian leaders. 9  
The following are examples of Indonesia’s use of ‘sticks rather than carrots’ 
methodology. On 28 January 1999 Clementino Amaral, East Timorese head of the 
Dili delegation of Indonesia’s National Human Rights Commission, said "the 
[Indonesian] military are giving weapons to the civilians who support Indonesian rule, 
which means they can shoot supporters of independence who do not have guns".10  On 
5 February 1999 Cancio Lopes, commander of militia gang Mahidi told the BBC that 
                                                 
7 University of the West England, Indonesia's Death Squads: Getting Away With Murder, 
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Yimor/death_squads1.htm, accessed 8 May 2005. 
8 Marsden Country Brief, East Timor (Timor-Leste). 
9 University of the West England, 1999, http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Yimor/death_squads1.htm. 
10 Ibid.  
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he led an attack near Suai using automatic weapons supplied less than four weeks 
previously by the Indonesian army.11  Furthermore, when the violence erupted after 
the UN supervised referendum, Indonesian soldiers, despite clear commitments made 
under the 5 May agreements, refused to intervene. They even supposedly helped the 
militia gangs. When the violence became visible to the international community 
several countries called for a UN armed peacekeeping intervention.  
 Indonesian officer coordinating with militia.  
4.2f Superpower Opposition or Support  
 
SUPEROS = 1 = The US took a direct interest in the resolution of the internal conflict 
and supported multilateral intervention. On 8 September 1999 the US promised some 
non-combat military participation. The public message to Indonesia became clear 
when Clinton gave a press conference on 9 September 1999, it must invite – “it must 
invite,” he repeated emphatically – the international community to assist in restoring 
security. US pressure was crucial in persuading Indonesia to accept a UN force.12 
 
4.2g Resistance Levels to Multilateral Intervention  
 
INITIATE = 1 = Multilateral intervention was requested or consented to by the 
central government of the state in conflict, even though it was induced. Indonesia’s 
agreement to a multinational force was the critical precondition for effective action.  
 
                                                 
11 Ibid.  
12 Lindsay Murdoch, ‘Moore’s Stance Arrogant: Alatas’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 November 
1999, 13. See Dupont, Australian Journal of International Affairs, July 2000, 54, 2, 166. 
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It was our judgement that, without an invitation from the Indonesian 
government for the deployment of an international peacekeeping force, it 
was unlikely that the approval of all members of the Security Council 
would have been obtained for the proposed arrangements. 13  
 
Even in a case where national sovereignty did not apply, as the UN did not 
recognize Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty over East Timor, the Security Council was 
solicitous of the need for Indonesia’s consent to intervention. Tactics were, however, 
employed by international actors such as the Secretary-General and President Clinton 
to induce Indonesia’s consent.14 Furthermore, without Indonesia’s consent the 
humanitarian tragedy may have been compounded many times over. 
 
Structural Benefits 
 
4.2h Economic Wealth of the State  
 
ECWEALTH = 3 = East Timor has exceptionally scarce and valuable resources, 
including oil, gold, petroleum, natural gas, manganese, and marble.15 The Timor Sea 
is believed to contain the world’s 23rd largest oil field with estimated reserves of five 
billion barrels of oil and 50 trillion feet of liquid natural gas.16  
 
Structural Connectivity 
  
4.2i Economic Importance of the State in Conflict  
 
ECIMPORT = 1 = East Timor has no economic importance as yet on the international 
stage, but it has potential.  
 
The World Bank referred to the situation in East Timor as “of paramount 
concern to our shareholders,”17 while in the months following the intervention, critics 
                                                 
13 Ian Martin, ‘International Intervention in East Timor’, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 153-160. 
14 Ibid. 
15 United States CIA, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/feedback/print/tt.html.  
16 Geoffrey C. Gunn, East Timor and the UN: The Case for Intervention, The Red Sea Press, Inc., 
Lawrenceville, NJ, 1997, 58. 
17 World Bank Statement on East Timor, Washington, 7 September 1999 cited in Martin, chapter 8, in 
Welsh, 2004, 155. 
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were to argue that the reconstruction of East Timor was providing an opportunity for 
massive foreign direct investment in the areas of telecommunication, banking, 
tourism, construction and legal services. George Aditjondro sees East Timor under 
UN and World Bank management as becoming “a paradise for market-driven foreign 
investors…a new outpost of global capitalism in the Asia Pacific region, due to the 
absence of a democratically elected government.”18  
 
Structural Level of Outrage 
 
4.2j Media Coverage  
 
MEDIA = evidence = yes 
 
Tamrat Samuel argues that the role of the media in 1999 cannot be under-
estimated.19  After two and a half decades of almost complete neglect, the world 
media focused on East Timor, especially during the fateful months of August and 
September 1999, at a time when there happened to be no other major world event 
competing for attention.20 Some incidents, such as the Santa Cruz massacre of 1991, 
the jailing of Gusmao in 1992, and the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to the 
East Timorese independence leaders Jose Ramos Horta and Bishop Carlos Ximenes 
Belo, created a lot of attention from the international media.21 In particular, after the 
Santa Cruz massacre, when Western journalists caught on camera Indonesian forces 
firing on unarmed pro-democracy supporters,22 media coverage was extraordinarily 
intense, with East Timor in the headlines and leading news bulletins for days, with 
images of Dili burning on television screens, and news articles of women and children 
seeking protection from likely slaughter.23 
One explanation of the lack of multilateral intervention prior to this period was 
the lack of critical media analysis of the root causes or consequences of the crisis in 
                                                 
18 George Aditjondro, ‘From Colony to Global Prize’ Arena Magazine, 47, 2000, 22-32. 
19 Samuel, chapter 8 in Sriram and Wermester, 2003, 208-9. 
20 Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 154. 
21 Uppsala University Conflict Database, 2003.  
22 International Crisis Group, ‘Conflict History: Timor-Leste,’ 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=121, 
updated January 2006, accessed November 2005. 
23 SC Res 1264 (1999) cited in Chesterman, 2001, 150. Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 154. 
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East Timor. Coverage of the conflict in East Timor was one sided. For example, a 
journalist writing in the New York Times states:  
Though the anti-independence militias have clearly had the upper 
hand in terror, the pro-independence forces, with 24 years of experience in 
both war and propaganda, have seized the role of well-intentioned 
victims.24  
John Pilger, writing in the Guardian, 7 September, 1999: 
For almost 20 years, the BBC and the major western news agencies 
preferred to "cover" East Timor from Jakarta, which was like reporting on a 
Nazi-occupied country from Berlin. The coverage was minute; not 
offending the invader…became all-important.25 
4.2k Nature of International Environment  
 
INTENVIRO = evidence = The timing of the international response to the conflict in 
East Timor was influenced by the international context. Multilateral actors had been 
repeatedly reminded of the shame heaped upon the UN for inaction at the occurrence 
of massacres in Rwanda and at Srebrenica. This has influenced the UN to be more 
willing to advocate intervention in East Timor.26 Previously, non-intervention in the 
affairs of Indonesia had been attractive in the Cold War climate. Recently released 
documentation reveals that the government of Indonesia had received support from 
the US and Australia for its East Timor policy in the 1970s and 1980s, as FRETILIN 
was perceived as a communist threat.27 
 
Perceptual Costs, Risks, and Benefits 
 
4.2L Reputational Interests  
 
REPUT = evidence = In respect of ASEAN, its critics argue that it had little choice in 
their willingness to support the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in East Timor. Its 
reputation was on the line given its inability to respond effectively to the Southeast 
                                                 
24 New York Times, 30 August 1999 cited in Anup Shah, ‘The Mainstream Media,’ last updated 
Sunday, June, 04, 2000, http://www.globalissued.org/Geopolitics/EastTimor/Media.asp. 
25 Shah, http://www.globalissued.org/Geopolitics/EastTimor/Media.asp. 
26 Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 160 -2. 
27 D. P. Moynihan 1975 cited in Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 143. 
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Asian economic crisis, or to ameliorate the anti-democratic behaviour in Burma. The 
strength of international reaction to the bloodshed in East Timor was so 
overwhelmingly negative towards Indonesia that failure to respond to Jakarta’s 
request for ASEAN assistance would have been a setback for ASEAN that might well 
have proved fatal for the organization.28 As already explained the UN was also in 
danger – after the massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia, many Member States had became 
critical of the UN’s ability to stand by its mandate of maintaining international peace 
and security. 
 
4.2m Likelihood of Success  
 
LIKESUCCESS = 2 = It is difficult to determine whether there was a perception that 
a successful intervention in the East Timor conflict was likely among multilateral 
actors. There was no stalemate evident. Furthermore, an agreement between the two 
main disputants, the Indonesian government and the East Timorese pro-independence 
groups, was lacking. However, the civilians in East Timor were desperate for peace 
due to the fact that they were the main casualties of the conflict. The Tripartite 
agreement between the Indonesian Government, Portugal and the UN on the future of 
East Timor also constituted a base for any multilateral intervention policy.  
 
4.2n Any Clear Exit Points or Strategies 
 
CLEAR = yes = A key element that contributed in making a multilateral intervention 
policy attractive was the clear statement of an exit strategy for the multinational force. 
In considering participating in the proposed force, the Australian Government was 
determined that the action should have a clearly defined end-point when a certain 
amount of social and political stability was in place.29  
 
Perceptual Connectivity 
 
                                                 
28 Dupont, 2000, 168. 
29 Eric Schwartz, ‘The Intervention in East Timor Report for the National Intelligence Council 
December 2001’http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/schwartz.pdf, accessed 4 May 2006. 
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4.2o Humanitarian Concerns in terms of Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons  
 
UPMCRISIS = Refugees = over 1,300-1,500 to Northern Australia,30 with  
between 100,000 to over 300,000 refugees in West Papua.31 
= Internally Displaced Persons = since November 1998 to March 31 
1999, there have been a total of 18,091 internally displaced persons 
(IDP's).32 Some 500,000 individuals were internally displaced between 
May 6 and October 20, 1999.33 
= 1 = Total estimates of the displaced range from over 600,000 to 
700,000 = a Humanitarian Crisis.34 
 
Groups of IDPs became a target for militia groups, as clearly demonstrated in 
the attacks of the Liquiça Church on April 6, and at the home of Manuel Carrascalao 
on April 17. Before the Security Council met on 11 September 1999, members had 
been in East Timor, viewing the destruction of Dili and IDP camps. Nothing could 
conceal the extent of destruction, or the misery of people waiting at the port before 
being taken to West Timor.35  
 
                                                 
30 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,  
Grave Humanitarian and Food Crisis Developing in East Timor, Special Alert no. 295, 14 September 
1999, http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/fao-14s.htm, accessed July 2005. 
31 Shah, 2000.  
32 Including Kontras – Committee for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence, Yayasan HAK – 
Foundation for Law, Human Rights and Justice, Caritas East Timor, Gertak – Anti-Violence Women’s 
Group, Fokupers – Communication Forum for Women, DSMPTT – Student Solidarity Council, 
GFFTL – Women Students’ Group, and Emergency Aid Post for Internal Refugees. 
33 TPI-Intrastate Disputes Data Sets, (51) Indonesia. 
34 Shah.  
35 Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 157. 
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 The scene of the massacre in the church and home of Father Rafael, in the town of Liquisa.36 
 
4.2p Genocide/Politicide  
 
DEATHMAG = 10 = as many as 250,000 East Timorese people died.37 There was no 
one significant event – rather there were many events that could portray genocide or 
politicide. 
 
Leaked military documents reveal that Indonesian military numbers in East 
Timor were in the region of 20,000. This means that there was 1 soldier per 40 
inhabitants in East Timor, a ratio that is 7 to 9 times higher than the ratio in 
Indonesia.38 Moreover, militia gangs were used as a backup force for military 
operations to combat any resistance to Indonesian military control.39 The Foundation 
for Legal and Human Rights in Dili said the issue of 'internal conflict' was nothing 
more than an artificial design to support actions of violence, terror and intimidation.40 
On 10 September 1999, the UN Secretary-General declared that Indonesia “cannot 
escape responsibility for what could amount, according to reports reaching us, to 
crimes against humanity.”41 
 
                                                 
36 University of the West England, 1999, http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Yimor/death_squads1.htm. 
37 King, chapter 3 in Clements, 1993, 83. Uppsala University, 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=198. See Dunn, A People Betrayed, 
Sydney, Jaracanda Press, 1983. Guardian Unlimited, January 25, 1999. 
38 University of the West England, 1999, http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Yimor/death_squads1.htm.  
39 Ibid. For more examples of the Indonesian government’s control of militias groups see Samuel, 
chapter 8 in Lekha Sriram and Wermester, 2003, 214. 
40 The Foundation for Legal Human Rights in University of the West England, 1999, 
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Yimor/death_squads1.htm.  
41 Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Statement on East Timor, New York, 10 September 1999 cited in 
Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 156. 
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The following accounts detail the genocidal actions taken by the Indonesian 
military and the militia gangs. On 6 April 1998 Besi Merah Putih (BMP) militia, 
Indonesian armed forces and police surrounded the Liquiça church where 2000 people 
were seeking refuge. The police shot tear gas into the church and gunshots into the 
air. The people, sprayed by the tear gas, ran outside of the church. BMP massacred 
the people with arrows and spears. An eyewitness said "they shot and hacked at 
people as though they were killing animals. Even when people were raising their arms 
to surrender, they were still shot and hacked". 62 people were slaughtered. An 
Indonesian army spokesman gave his version of the Liquiça massacre: "five 
separatists were killed after opening fire at soldiers".42  
 
On 17 April 1998 a pro-autonomy rally in Dili was attended by a number of 
militia groups, the military and military commander, police representatives, the 
Governor and pro-autonomy civilians. Militia leader Eurico Guterres urged his 
followers to "conduct a cleansing of all those who have betrayed integration. Capture 
and kill them, if you need to".43 Following the rally and fearing attacks by the militia, 
Manuel Carrascalao, a pro-independence leader who was housing 143 refugees, asked 
an Indonesian military commander for help to guard his home. The Indonesian 
military commander, Colonel Suratman, flatly refused. "The military must remain 
neutral," he said.  Around 2pm a 100 militia stormed Manuel Carrascalao’s home. Up 
to 12 unarmed people were killed including Manuel’s 18 year old son.44  
 
A particular episode of genocide happened on 30 August 1999 after the UN-
sponsored referendum. After 78.5 percent of the registered electorate voted for a 
transition to independence, the Indonesian military and their pro-integration militia 
carried out a ‘scorched earth’ policy. Countless civilians were victims of murder, 
rape, and torture. The military forced people to flee, burning and looting civilian 
property. About 260,000 people, or 75 percent of the population, were abducted to 
West Timor, only a fraction of them militia or pro-autonomy supporters.45 During the 
following two weeks, Indonesian forces and militias destroyed 75 per cent of the 
                                                 
42 University of the West England, 1999, http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Yimor/death_squads1.htm.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid. 
45 See the HAK Foundation, and other UN reports in Da Costa, chapter 9.4, in Heijmans, Simmond, 
and van de Veen, 2004, 350. 
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buildings and almost the entire infrastructure in East Timor. The level of organization 
and efficiency of the violence was proof that the militias were not acting alone. Much 
effort was made during the post-referendum violence to draw FALINTIL into conflict 
with the militia and the TNI in order to portray the situation as a fulfilment of the 
repeated predictions that there would be a civil war if East Timor were to separate 
from Indonesia. Independence leader Xanana informed the UN that he had given strict 
orders to avoid contact with the other side, despite pressures on the ground to respond 
to the violence.46 
 Fernando Cardoso (27) killed and mutilated by Mahidi death squad at Manutasi.47  
Perceptual Level of Outrage 
 
4.2q Level of Outrage  
 
LEVOUT = evidence = yes 
 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 University of the West England, 1999, http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Yimor/death_squads1.htm.  
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As the scale of post-referendum violence and the role of the Indonesian army 
became clear, those who had argued for an international peacekeeping presence in 
East Timor, particularly the citizens and government representatives in Portugal and 
Australia, redoubled their appeals.48  In the early days of September 1999, hundreds 
of thousands of Australians took to the streets, marching under banners proclaiming 
“Indonesia out, peacekeepers in,” calling for the introduction of an international 
peacekeeping force into East Timor.49 In Portugal, there were vigils and 
demonstrations throughout the country demanding action. The Prime Minister himself 
participated in a human chain that snaked around the Lisbon embassies of the 5 
Permanent M of the Security Council.50 In the US, the NGO lobby on East Timor 
worked with its friends in Congress to press the Administration towards multilateral 
intervention.51 In fact, in an open session of the Security Council in New York in 
1999, no less than 50 delegations took the floor – a highly unusual total, including 
some who rarely spoke as non-members. Overall, the session was a powerful 
demonstration of international outrage and Indonesia’s growing isolation.52 The 
following graph summarizes the affects of the individual conditions identified in the 
framework on the attractiveness of multilateral intervention in the case of conflict in 
East Timor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 152. 
49 Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, 1. 
50 Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 154. 
51 Ibid., 155-6. 
52 Ibid., 157. 
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Figure 7: Summary of Conflict and Multilateral Intervention in East Timor - 
Measurements and Evidence of Structural and Perceptual Conditions 
Structural and 
Perceptual 
Conditions 
Measurement/
Evidence of 
Conditions 
                           Description 
DISPS          
        2 
The type of incompatibility between the disputants 
was over the territory of East Timor and 
independence from Indonesian annexation. 
FATAL         4 Ranging from tens of thousands acknowledged by 
Indonesia itself, to as many as 250,000. 
YRBEGIN  30 November, 1975 when Indonesia invaded East 
Timor. 
YREND Total duration: 
24 years 
October 1999 when the UN takes over administration 
and defence of East Timor as a non-self-governing 
territory - UNTAET.  
PHASE  
        4 
Intervention was initiated and undertaken during an 
escalation phase, when the violence in East Timor 
was extremely intense. 
MILCAP About 20,000 
personnel 
INTERFET: 10,000 peacekeeping troops from 16 
countries. UNTAET: 8,000 peacekeeping troops and 
1.640 civilian police personnel from 48 countries. 
ECOCAP AUS$476.8 
million 
UNTAET: 1 July 2001-30 July 2002 
MAGFIGHT          2 FRETILIN and Indonesia (and 20 odd Militia Gangs) 
TACSTRA          4  There were systematic negative uses of conflict 
resolution instruments by just the government. 
SUPEROS          1 US took an interest in the prospect of intervention 
IDENORG  
         1 
The key disputants in this conflict were identifiable 
and well organized, but the many militia gangs and 
the Indonesian military have often been confused. 
INITIATE          1 Intervention was requested after inducement by the 
sovereign authority. 
MAGFAIL  
         3 
Failure of state authority in a limited area of the 
country, for example, secession or rebel control of, or 
anarchic conditions in, one or several regions that do 
not include the core area of the country of its capital. 
ECWEALTH          3 Oil, gold, petroleum, natural gases 
SPILL          5 Over 500,000 IDPs and Refugees 
ECIMPORT          1 No economic importance of the state in conflict (East 
Timor) 
MEDIA         Yes Media coverage was extremely intense after the 
televised Santa Cruz massacre 
INTENVIRO         Yes Post Rwanda and Srebrenica 
REPUT         Yes In respect of ASEAN 
LIKESUCCESS          
 
          2 
There was no stalemate evident and there was no 
agreement between the two main parties, the 
Indonesian government and the East Timorese pro-
independence groups. But, the grassroots in East 
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Timor were desperate for peace because they were 
the main casualties in the conflict. 
CLEAR        Yes There was the existence of a clear exit strategy for 
the multinational force. 
REFCRISIS           2 A humanitarian crisis: over 600,000-700,000 IDPs 
and Refugees 
DEATHMAG          10 As many as 250,000 dead 
LEVOUT         Yes Medium to high level of outrage 
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4.3 Solomon Islands - Intervention 
 
4.3a Introduction 
 
In 1998 conflict in the Solomon Islands escalated very quickly due to existing 
ethnic tensions in this small state. It moved swiftly from the initial stages of violence 
to result in organized military activity and ultimately complete failure of the state. In 
July 2003, an international multilateral police and military force, led by Australia, was 
deployed to the Solomon Islands under Operation Helpem Fren. The deployment was 
the first stage of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), a 
longer-term ‘cooperative intervention’ to address the crisis of development and 
governance.53 Since the 2003 intervention, many rebels have surrendered their arms 
and participated in efforts to uphold a cease-fire.54 In this section the framework is 
used to determine whether it has predictive value when it comes to the likelihood of 
intervention in an internal conflict.  
 
4.3b Overview 
 
The Solomon Islands comprise over 900 islands spread over 1.6 million square 
kilometres of ocean territory.55 The islands include numerous indigenous cultural 
groups, each with distinct languages and territories.56 The 500 Islands became the 
Solomon Islands under British colonial rule during the early 1900s,57 achieving full 
independence in 1978.58  
                                                 
53 Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, ‘Australian Intervention in the Solomons: Beyond Operation 
Helpem Fren: An Agenda for Development in the Solomon Islands,’ August 2003, 
http://southpacific.arts.unsw.edu.au/reportfullfinal.pdf, accessed September 2005. 
54 For more information on the consequences of intervention into the Solomon Islands see Solomon 
Islands Broadcasting Corporation News, ‘PM Appeals to Donors,’ 20 November  2003, 
http://www.lifhaus.com/archive/nov2003.htm, accessed June 2005. Also, see ‘Former Militant 
Commanders Arrested,’ 24 December  2003, http://www.lifhaus.com/archive/dec2403.htm, accessed 
June 2005. See also David Shearer, ‘Between Bikinis and Balaclavas’, The World Today, London, 
56(11) November 2000, 22-24. 
55 All six main islands are greater than 1,000 square kilometres in area. Figures taken from Global IDP 
Project, www.db.idpproject.org. See Bob Pollard and Matthew Wale, ‘The Solomon Islands: Conflict 
and Peacebuilding’, chapter 10,4, Heijmans, Simmonds, and van de Veen, 2004, 581. 
56 There are currently sixty-eight living indigenous groups in the country, some with additional dialects. 
The consequence of this diversity is that languages are spoken by very small groups of people, often 
inhabiting very limited areas.  
57 Derek McDougall, ‘Intervention in the Solomon Islands’, The Round Table 93 (374), April 2004, 
213-223. 
58 Pollard and Wale, chapter 10,4, Heijmans, Simmonds, and van de Veen, 2004, 582. 
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A rapid urbanization process followed, which focused on the capital Honiara. 
This was due to a lack of services and very limited opportunities in the villages.59 
Honiara, based on Guadalcanal, became a magnet for migrants especially from the 
neighbouring island Malaita.60  Over two generations Malaitans came to dominate 
both Guadalcanal's agricultural economy and a large proportion of the jobs in 
Honiara, including the public service.61 The Indigenous people of Guadalcanal, 
especially the members of the younger generation, resented the acquisition of land by 
migrant Malaitans and their prominence in business.62 Anger at the consequent land 
loss was directed at the migrants who had brought, rented or were squatting on land 
they had hoped to own as theirs. In 1998 a group of Guadalcanal men, who later 
became known as the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), embarked on a campaign of 
violence against Malatian settlers. By mid 1999 around 20,000 people, most of whom 
were Malaitans, were evicted from their homes on Guadacanal.63 The violence 
escalated with confrontations between the IFM and the Royal Solomon Islands Police 
Force. In June 1999 the government declared a state of emergency.64 
In 2000 the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) emerged demanding compensation for 
the destruction caused by the IFM. Denied compensation by the government, the 
MEF, with the support of elements of the police, took over the police armory and 
staged a political coup in June 2000.65 They ousted Prime Minister Ulufa’alu and 
threatened a state of war unless a new national leader was installed.66 Manasseh 
Sogavare consequently became Prime Minister, but the IFM refused to recognize him 
as a legitimate authority. Subsequently, public services were disrupted, corruption in 
                                                 
59 Much of this migration has been from central and northern Malaita to Honiara and its environs. This 
has resulted over the years in the growth of considerable peri-urban settlements, largely on customary 
land of the northern coast of Guadalcanal. Pollard and Wale, chapter 10,4, Heijmans, Simmonds, and 
van de Veen, 2004, 582. 
60 Ibid. 
61 ASPI, http://www.aspi.org.au/22484solomons/directors.html. 
62 Ruth Liloqula and Alice Aruhe’eta Pollard, ‘Understanding Conflict in Solomon Islands: A Practical 
Means to Peacemaking,’ in State, Society and Governance in Melanesia (SSGM), Canberra, The 
Australian National University, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 2000, available at 
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/, accessed April 2006. 
63 Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, “Failed State” and the War on Terror: Intervention in the Solomon 
Islands, Working Paper no.72, March 2004, Hawai’i, East-West Centre. See also Dinnen, Sinclair, 
‘Winners and Losers: Politics and Disorder in the Solomon Islands 2000-2002’ The Journal of Pacific 
History, 37 (3), 2002, 285-298. 
64 Dinnen, 2002, 285-298. 
65 Kabutaulaka, March 2004. 
66 Dinnen, 2002, 285-298. McDougall, April 2004, 213-223. 
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government became the norm, the economy faltered, and systems of law and order 
collapsed.67 Despite repeated calls for multilateral intervention by the government, 
multilateral organizations refused to intervene. However, as Tarcisius Tara 
Kabutaulaka has argued, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, multilateral 
actors considered the possibility that the Solomon Islands could become a haven for 
international terrorist organizations,68  and multilateral intervention was considered a 
necessity. In 2003, under the authorization of the UN, RAMSI was deployed to the 
Solomon Islands.69  
Structural Costs and Risks 
 
4.3c Dispute Issues  
 
DISPS = 1, 2, 3 = Material and territorial issues, international power, and national 
power 
 
An issue underpinning the Solomon Islands conflict included the issue of 
migration which lead to population pressures and uneven development. In particular, 
the influx of Malaitans fuelled land disputes and resentment at their comparative 
success.70  The values of the different islanders often clashed,71 and the people of 
Guadalcanal felt they were being culturally marginalized in their own land.  
 
Another issue was the exhaustion of a large proportion of the country’s 
valuable natural resources, such as the large palm oil plantation of north-eastern 
Guadalcanal, without contributing to sustainable development.72 In particular, logging 
companies committed several forms of malpractice through which they deprived 
                                                 
67 ASPI, http://www.aspi.org.au/22484solomons/directors.html. 
68 Kabutaulaka, March 2004, 5, 8. McDougall, 2004, 213-223. 
69 Iroga, Robert L., ‘Solomons Rebels Demand Kemakeza Resign,’ Pacific Islands Report, East-West 
Centre, May 10, 2005, cited 27 May 2005, available from 
http://www.pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2005/May/05-10-01.htm, accessed July 2005. 
70 Pattrick Smellie, ‘The Semiautomatic Solution: In the Solomon Islands, an intercultural conflict 
explodes as rebels place the Prime Minister under house arrest (South Pacific)’, Time International 
155.24, June 19, 2000, 58. 
71 Land in Guadalcanal is matrilineally inherited, while in Malaita it is inherited through the male 
(patrilineal). Intermarriage between Malaitan men and Guadalcanal women sometimes resulted in 
frictions due to the extent of the man’s dominance in his wife’s land affairs. See Pollard and Wale, 
chapter 10,4, Heijmans, Simmonds, and van de Veen, 2004, 583. 
72 See Ibid.  
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landowners and governments of the revenues that ought to have accrued to them.73 
This resulted in relative deprivation in terms of the many investments on the island, 
most notably jobs and the provision of services.  
 
Moreover, ethnic tensions in the Solomon Islands resulted from different 
interpretations placed on the National Constitution and on Section 14, which granted 
freedom of movement. From the viewpoint of the people of Guadalcanal, their real 
grievance was the imposition on them of another island’s traditions, customs and laws 
by migrants.74 Since becoming one country Solomon Islanders failed to accept each 
other as one people, and there was no acknowledgement of citizenship. The widely 
expressed wish for the provinces to be given state governments illustrated the depth of 
separatist feelings.75  
 
The central problem became the issue of government control as it hardly had 
an income to exist, or manage the conflict.76 Fundamentally, the crisis which evolved 
was attributable to the failure of successive governments to provide effective 
mechanisms through which people were able to express their interests, exercise their 
rights and obligations, and sort out their differences.77   
 
4.3d Fatalities  
 
FATAL = 1 = Solomon Islanders use the term ‘the tensions,’ as an understatement for 
three years of neighbours killing neighbours, and hidden graves that could number in 
the tens, hundreds or thousands.78 No one seems to know for sure just how many 
people were killed during the Solomon Islands conflict but estimates vary between 
100 and 1,000,79 this converts to a crisis.  
 
                                                 
73 Liloqula and Aruhe’eta Polland, 2000. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Michael Fields, ‘Solomons: an invitation to disaster,’ The Press, Christchurch, Saturday, June 28, 
2003, World, B5. 
77 Liloqula and Aruhe’eta Polland, 2000. 
78 Philip Vine, ‘The Back of a Shark,’ Listener, August 31, 2002, 26-28. 
79 Graham Fortune, Secretary of Defence, New Zealand, Perspective on Asia-Pacific Security for the 
21st Century, Regional Security in Oceania and East Asia : Continuities and Discontinuities, 
September 12, 2005, http://www.defence.govt.nz/public_docs/sec-def-speech-asia-pacific.pdf, accessed 
October 2005. 
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4.3e Phase  
 
PHASE = between 5 and 6 = between de-escalation and the termination phase. 
 
Multilateral intervention took place in the post-crisis phase.  After signing the 
Townsville Peace Agreement, the Solomon Islands remained in a state of ‘latent 
peace’ – a situation where the potential for violence remained.80 According to Nick 
Warner, Special Coordinator of RAMSI, the timing for multilateral intervention was 
right due to the overwhelming political and, crucially, public support in the Solomon 
Islands. Had a multilateral intervention force been mobilised in 2000 at the time of the 
coup, and in the middle of ethnic tensions, he did not believe that it would have 
enjoyed public support. RAMSI would have risked being accused of taking sides and 
the deployment of forces would not have solved the land dispute. Multilateral 
intervention risked becoming open-ended, and diplomatic pressure was thought at that 
time to be more effective.81  
 
4.3f Economic Capabilities  
 
ECOCAP = Phase 1 = short-term one-year program of stabilisation = $97m 
= Phase 2 = long-term program of capability development = $78m    
    per annum for first two years 
  = $75m per annum thereafter 
The multilateral intervention effort will cost a total of $853 million over a 
decade.82 Australia will end up paying half the costs as the Australian government 
                                                 
80 Tara Kabutaulaka, ‘Political Reviews: Solomon Islands’, The Contemporary Pacific, vol.16, no.2, 
Fall 2004, 393-401, available at http://www.pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2004/November/tcp-
si.htm, accessed 4 December, 2004. See TPI – Intrastate Dispute Data-Sets, (58) Solomon Islands 
(civil/political dispute), 1978-present), http://faculty.uca.edu/~markm/tpi_narratives_asia.htm, accessed 
January 2006. 
81 Nick Warner, Special Coordinator of the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI), 
speech at the National Security Australia 2004 Conference, held in Sydney on March 23, ‘Operation 
HELPEM FREN: Rebuilding the Nation of Solomon Islands,’ Pacific Islands Report, Pacific Islands 
Development Program/East-West Center, with support from Center for Pacific Islands Studies/ 
University of Hawai’i, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2004/april/04%2D16%2Dana1.htm, 
accessed April 2005. New Zealand Herald, John Armstrong and Bronwyn Sell, ‘Good Rules Out 
Sending Troops to Solomons,’ 14 June 2000, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/features/story.cfm?c_id=621&ObjectID=140358, accessed June 2005. 
82 ASPI, http://www.aspi.org.au/22484solomons/directors.html. 
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announced a long term commitment of military and economic capabilities for ten 
years.83 
4.3g Tactics and Strategies adopted by Disputants  
 
TACSTRA = 2 = There were some attempts at positive uses of conflict resolution by 
both disputants but the government and other disputants also resorted to the use or 
threat of force or other negative modes of conflict resolution. 
 
The underlying feelings of injustice that fuelled the internal conflict in the 
Solomon Islands were not successfully addressed by the disputants. The existing 
avenues such as political forums for resolving the conflict were ineffective and the 
economic circumstances continued to perpetrate feelings of injustice. The evolving 
political culture was one of different factions consumed by their desires to gain and/or 
retain power or any other personal benefits, creating an unstable climate that made it 
impossible to develop or implement any long term positive conflict management 
policies.  Proactive leadership was also lacking.84  
 
The 2000 coup led by MEF intensified conflict and effectively cut off access 
to more diplomatic channels of dispute resolution. General lawlessness and thuggery 
throughout Guadalcanal and parts of Malaita paralyzed the government, the economy, 
and even traditional relations in central regions.85 Alternatives for addressing 
injustices within traditional society were not effectively used. Rather, under Prime 
Minister’s Sogavare’s peacemaking efforts, $10 million (Solomon Islands dollars) 
were paid out as compensation to militant representatives from MEF and IFM for a 
range of grievances and for their participation in peacemaking efforts. Not 
surprisingly Sogovare’s “cheque book approach to peace negotiations” contributed to 
the disorder, providing a source of blackmail for the disputants. 86  
 
                                                 
83 Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), ‘The proposed Australian-led 
intervention force’, http://www.acfid.asn.au/campaigns/solomons/Aus_intervention.pdf, accessed 
August 2005. 
84 Pollard and Wale, chapter 10,4, Heijmans, Simmonds, and van de Veen, 2004, 586-7. 
85 Ibid., 586. 
86 Dinnen, 2002, 285-298. 
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The various peace talks, declarations of cease-fires, and reconciliation 
ceremonies undertaken by the disputants failed to alleviate ethnic tensions, resulting 
in demands for further compensation instead. There were attempts by Fiji (1999) and 
the Commonwealth Special Envoy (2000) to mediate a resolution to the conflict. In 
fact several peace agreements were signed. In October 1999 a peace-monitoring group 
by Fiji and Vanuatu was established, while in October 2000, the Townsville 
Agreement led to the creation of an international peace monitoring team and 
establishment of a Peace and Reconciliation Commission. However, both disputants 
resorted to increased militancy throughout 2000.87 Although a weapons disposal 
process began after June 9, 2000, international peace-monitoring teams withdrew due 
to the deterioration of security.88 
 
The disputants’ modes of conflict resolution appear to have provided reason 
behind non-intervention during the earlier phases of conflict. While Eagles front-man 
Andrew Nori (7 June 2000) and the Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands (early 
2000) called for an international peacekeeping force, New Zealand’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Phil Goff said New Zealand would send in troops only if it 
was convinced that both groups of disputants were willing to negotiate and stop the 
violence. "We cannot impose a solution. If it is imposed, it won't be a solution. Until 
there is a willingness to make peace, there is no point sending in people who are the 
meat in the sandwich."89  
 
4.3h Resistance Levels to Intervention  
 
INITIATE = 1 = This was intervention by invitation. The Australian Associated Press 
said the vote “was unanimous in the Solomon Islands parliament, despite some 
criticism that the plan was an attempt to re-colonize the former British protectorate.”90 
There was no doubt that it was widely supported by its people, who viewed it as an 
                                                 
87 Pollard and Wale, chapter 10,4, Heijmans, Simmonds, and van de Veen, 2004, 587. 
88 TPI – Solomon Islands, http://faculty.uca.edu/~markm/tpi_narratives_asia.htm. 
89 New Zealand Herald, John Armstrong, ‘NZ considers peacekeepers for Solomons,’ 8 June 2000, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/feature/story.cfm?c_id=621&ObjectID=139784, accessed August 2005. 
90 New Zealand Herald, ‘Solomons Parliament approves intervention force,’ 11 July 2003, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/feature/story.cfm?c_id=621&ObjectID=3512134.  
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effective action for reducing the influence of the militias.91 Those with arms realized 
that it was inevitable and extorted as much money from the government as they could 
before the multilateral intervention forces arrived.92    
 
4.3i Status of Government  
 
MAGFAIL = 5 = complete collapse of state control or near failure of state authority. 
 
The Solomon Islands had virtually ceased to function as an effective national 
entity. The crisis had paralyzed the country's capital, Honiara, stifled its economy (the 
government's revenue base disintegrated as the economy stagnated—falling by 35% 
in 2001),93 disrupted government, discouraged aid donors, inflicted suffering and 
hardship on its people and hindered the peace process. The State was unable to ensure 
societal compliance with official laws, preserve stability, encourage societal 
participation in state institutions, or even provide basic services.94  It was widely, and 
largely correctly, seen as being subordinate to the interests of the Malaitan gangs.95  
Key members of the government even depended on former militants for their political 
and economic survival, while large sums were disbursed to political leaders, former 
militant leaders and their associates. It was this situation that led John Roughan, a 
prominent Solomon Islands citizen, to say that the “Solomon Islands is the Pacific’s 
first failed state.”96 The current Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, told the 
Federal Parliament:  
 
If we do nothing now and the Solomon Islands becomes a failed 
state…potential exploitation of that situation by international drug dealers, 
money launderers, international terrorism…will make the inevitable 
dealing with the problem in the future more costly, more difficult.97   
 
                                                 
91 Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, 2003. See also Pollard and Wale, chapter 10,4, Heijmans, 
Simmonds, and van de Veen, 2004, 587. 
92 Tara Kabutaulaka, 2004, 393-401, http://www.pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2004/November/tcp-
si.htm. 
93 ASPI, http://www.aspi.org.au/22484solomons/directors.html. 
94 Tara Kabutaulaka, March 2004. 
95 ASPI, http://www.aspi.org.au/22484solomons/directors.html. 
96 John Roughan, ‘Pacific First: A Failed State,’ Solomon Star, February 13, 2002, 5. 
97 Australian Broadcasting Corporation Asia Pacific News, 25 June  2003, ‘Australia Ready to Send 
Police and Troops to Solomons,’ http://www.goasiapacific.com/news/GoAsiaPacificBNP_888135.htm, 
accessed June 2005.  
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This draws attention to failed states not just as a humanitarian problem, but 
also as a major security concern.  
 
Structural Level of Outrage 
  
4.3j Nature of International Environment  
 
INTENVIRO = The nature of the international environment greatly affected the 
decision to intervene multilaterally in the Solomon Islands. This is especially relevant 
in terms of the Member State that substantially subsidized multilateral intervention, 
Australia. 
The June 2003 decision reflects a fundamental change in global security 
policies following the 11 September 2001 attacks on US territory. It illustrates the 
perception that trans-national terrorism has made it less possible to separate external 
and internal security. Global security issues and the ‘coalition of the willing’ ‘war on 
terror’ influenced the approach employed by RAMSI, especially its focus on 
strengthening a ‘failed’ state to prevent terrorists from manipulating it and threatening 
neighbouring states.98 It would have been tidier and cheaper to have intervened 
earlier.99  Consequently, it was not only on the basis of the invitation of the Prime 
Minister of the Solomon Islands that the multilateral intervention was undertaken. In 
2003 multilateral actors perceived their collective security interests to be directly 
under threat by a failed Solomon Islands state post Bali-bombing (12 October 2002) 
and post 11 September 2001. The cost of multilateral intervention in the Solomon 
Islands was perceived to be significantly less than the costs of potential terrorist 
attacks on Pacific neighbours. A failed Solomon Islands was a threat to other 
Melanesian and Pacific States as these were perceived as easy targets for terrorist 
cells.100 The appointment of Mr. Nick Warner, the newly appointed ambassador for 
                                                 
98 Tara Kabutaulaka, March 2004, 2. 
99 Alfred Sasako, ‘Peace Operation Brings Hope and Optimism People speaking Freely and Openly,’ 
Pacific Magazine, September 2003, available at 
http://www.pacificislands.cc/pm92003/pmdefault.php?urlarticleid=0050, accessed May 2005. 
100 ACFID, http://www.acfid.asn.au/campaigns/solomons/Aus_intervention.pdf. 
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counter-terrorism, as leader of RAMSI, reflects the way this deployment has been 
framed within the so-called ‘war on terror.’101 
Perceptual Costs, Risks, and Benefits 
 
4.3k Likelihood of Success  
 
LIKESUCCESS = 1 = There was a perception that there was a high 
probability of success in respect of the multilateral intervention. The civil society in 
the Solomon Islands had resolved to ‘take on’ government and militia on issues of 
justice and accountability,102  the fighting officially ended with the Townsville Peace 
Agreement of October 2000,103 and by mid 2003 the conflict had reached an 
intolerable ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, with citizens on all sides having come to the 
view that their country was on the verge of collapse. The conflict was "ripe" for an 
intervention supported by the general population.104 
 
4.3L Any Clear Exit Points  
 
CLEAR = evidence = Clear exit points were considered in the decision to intervene in 
the Solomon Islands. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, interviewed on 
National Radio (16 July 2003), said there was an exit strategy. Mr Downer declared 
that military forces to be deployed in the Solomon Islands could be quickly reduced 
after the operation got underway. Mr Downer continued, "The police will be there for 
quite some time but once the Solomons police are up and running more effectively, 
and are able to do the job, then we can be downsizing the police presence".105 
 
Perceptual Connectivity 
 
4.3m IDP/Refugee Crisis 
                                                 
101 Mary Louise O’Callaghan, ‘Terror supreme sent to Honiara,’ The Australian, 19-20 July 2003. 
102 Pollard and Wale, chapter 10,4, Heijmans, Simmonds, and van de Veen, 2004, 591. See Sasako, 
2003. 
103 ASPI, http://www.aspi.org.au/22484solomons/directors.html. 
104 Warner, 2004.  
105 New Zealand Herald, ‘Downer says troop deployment could be reduced quickly,’ 16 July 2003,  
5.30pm, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/feature/story.cfm?c_id=621&ObjectID=3512941, accessed August 
2005. 
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            UPMCRISIS 
            IDPs = 12,806 within Guadalcanal, 12,676 to Malaita, 6,339 to  
Honiara106 
= Refugees = A few refugee families of mixed parentage did go to 
Australia.107 
= 4 = Total = According to the Norwegian Refugee Council/ Global IDP 
Project in May 2002, an estimated 35,000 persons (9 per cent of the national 
population) were forced from their homes during the 1998-1999 conflict.108  
 
By 2000, rural Guadalcanal had been essentially cleared of all migrants. The 
cost was the closure of all industries, the closure of almost every school, and 
deprivation of access to medical facilities for most Guadalcanal people. Thousands of 
Malaitans were forced to return to a ‘home’ they had never known. This in turn led to 
many internal problems and tensions in Malaita.109  
 
4.3n Genocide/Politicide  
 
DEATHMAG = 1-2 = less than 300 annually or between 300-1000 at the most 
annually. There were no specific events of genocide or politicide. Yet according to 
Graham Fortune, New Zealand’s Secretary of Defence, “At the height of the crisis in 
the Solomon Islands, the rate of ethnic cleansing through dislocations on the island of 
Guadalcanal was proportionally higher to that seen in the Balkans”.110  Whether this 
case was state terror or ethnic cleansing is difficult to determine.111 
 
                                                 
106 Fortune, 2005. 
107 See Graeme Dobell, ‘Solomon Islands Disaster Looms’, The World Today Archive, Thursday 22 
August 2002, ABC News, http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s656174.htm, accessed April 
2006; Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/gdp.htm. 
108 Global IDP Project, www.db.idpproject.org.  
109 Pollard and Wale, chapter 10,4, Heijmans, Simmonds, and van de Veen, 2004, 584. 
110 Fortune, 2005.  
111 For accounts on some of the atrocities committed see New Zealand Herald, O’Callaghan, ‘Solomon 
Islanders plead for help,’ 4 July 2003, 
http://www.nzhearld.co.nz/feature/stroy.cfm?c_id=621&oBJECTid=3510868, accessed August 2005; 
New Zealand Herald, ‘Solomons villagers beheaded,’ 3 July 2003,  
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/feature/story.cfm?c_id=621&ObjectID=3510637, accessed August 2005; 
Liloqula and Aruhe’eta Polland, 2000; Sasako, 2003. 
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Figure 8: Summary of Conflict and Multilateral Intervention in the Solomons - 
Measurements and Evidence of Structural and Perceptual Conditions 
Structural  
and 
Perceptual 
Conditions  
Measurement/
Evidence of 
Conditions 
                           Description 
DISPS    1, 2 and 3 Material and territorial issues, international power, 
and national power. 
FATAL          1 100-1,000 dead 
YRBEGIN        1998  Violent conflict in Solomon Islands began in 1998 
when Members of the Guadalcanal Revolutionary 
Army (Isatabu Freedom Movement - IFM) attacked 
Malaitan settlers on Guadalcanal island in September 
1998.  
YREND        2003 (July 2003: intervention) total duration = 5yrs 
PHASE         5-6 Intervention took place between de-escalation and 
termination phases 
MILCAP  
2,000 military 
and police 
personnel 
The intervention mission involved over 2,000 
military and police personnel from Australia, New 
Zealand and five Pacific Island nations. Regional 
contributions included more than 470 police and 
troops from New Zealand, PNG, Tonga and Fiji. 
Both IFM and MEF had access to weapons, and 
recruitment was not a problem that contributed to 
their ability to pursue a strategy of conflict. 
ECOCAP AUS$853 
million 
Over a decade. 
MAGFIGHT          5 7 or more disputants. Yet two disputants remained 
dominant to every process, the IFM and MEF. IFM 
had strong links to the police force. 
TACSTRA          2 Various peace talks, coup, general lawlessness 
SUPEROS          2 A Superpower remained neutral and inactive to the 
conflict resolution process and intervention decision. 
IDENORG          2 Limited organization and identifiability 
INITIATE          1 Intervention was by invitation 
MAGFAIL          5 Complete collapse of state control 
ECWEALTH          
         2 
The Solomon Islands are rich in underdeveloped 
mineral resources such as lead, zinc, nickel, and gold, 
all which could be of potential benefit to the 
interveners. 
SPILL          4 35,000 (9 percent of population) 
ECIMPORT          1 The state in conflict was not highly integrated in the 
international market, did not have a strong and 
important trading partner, or membership in 
important trading agreements. The economy had 
collapsed with the internal conflict. GDP fell by 14% 
in 2000 and 10% in 2001. Exports had fallen 60% 
between 1996 and 2001. GDP per capita halved in 
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real terms since independence in 1978. By mid 2003 
the country’s debt was registered at A$352 million, 
more than three times the country’s annual budget. 
 
MEDIA      Limited   Coverage of the conflict in the regional and 
international media was sporadic and did not generate 
any of the domestic political resonance that coverage 
of the violence in East Timor did in 1999. Three 
incidents raised the profile of the conflict, including: 
the August 2002 killing of a Government Minister 
allegedly by militant Harold Keke; the February 2003 
murder of Sir Fred Soaki, formerly the first locally 
appointed Police Commissioner; and the May 2003 
beheading of Australian Seventh Day Adventist 
missionary Lance Gersbach. 
INTENVIRO        Yes Post September 11th attacks and post-Bali = reaction 
REPUT    Limited The possibility of gaining negative reputations did 
not hinder intervention. Both the Australian Prime 
Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer 
rejected any accusations that the policy towards the 
Solomon Islands crisis represents a form of neo-
colonialism 
LIKESUCCE
SS 
         1 The conflict was ‘ripe’ for an intervention 
CLEAR         Yes  Possibility of quick reduction of substantial military 
and police numbers 
REFCRISIS          1 Less than 50,000 refugees and IDPs. Consequently it 
is not termed a humanitarian crisis. 
DEATHMAG         1-2 Less than 300 deaths annually – between 300-1000 
over the course of the conflict 
LEVOUT      Limited There is not wide evidence of a large level of 
regional and international outrage in terms of the 
Solomon Islands conflict. But a survey published by 
The Australian newspaper in early August 2003 
found that 87 percent of Australians supported the 
intervention in the Solomon Islands. This suggests 
that audience cost may have been considered when 
intervention was made an option 
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4.4 The Philippines – Non-Intervention 
 
4.4a Introduction 
 
 In this section the framework is used to determine whether it effectively 
captures the conditions that make multilateral non-action (non-intervention) an 
attractive policy. In the Philippines, a predominantly Christian country, conflict is 
concentrated in the southern Mindanao-Sulu region where a predominantly Muslim 
population has campaigned for a separate Muslim homeland for four decades.112 The 
disputants have demonstrated that they view settlement as more costly than violence. 
Consequently, this conflict can be described as an active intractable conflict, with 
violence being a sporadic but permanent feature of conflict since late 1969. This 
conflict meets the criteria of an internal conflict that has yet to be intervened in by a 
multilateral organization.  
 
4.4b Overview 
  
In the provinces of the Sulu archipelago and Mindanao, Spanish control 
(1565–1898) came late. Muslim state formation resisted alien rule, Muslim sultanates 
only becoming fully incorporated into the Philippines under the aegis of American 
colonialism (1898–1946). The Moros had hoped for an autonomous region when the 
Philippines were granted independence from the US at the end of World War Two. 
Instead, their incorporation with the Philippines, together with the government’s 
policies of repression and integration fuelled insurrection in the Mindanao-Sulu 
region. Mass migration, accelerating through the 1950s and 1960s, from the Christian 
North to the Mindanao frontier fundamentally altered the demographic balance in the 
South, leaving Muslim majorities in only five of the region’s twenty-five provinces. 
Tensions between the Christian settlers and the Muslim farmers coincided with a 
revival of Islamic consciousness beginning in the 1950s.113 These events gave rise to a 
transcendent, multi-tribal ‘Moro’ identity.   
                                                 
112 Heijmans, Simmond and van de Veen, 2004, 13-14. 
113 Internal Displacement, ‘Continued instability in Mindanao threatens IDP rehabilitation,’ Profile 
Summary, http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/92660204BB5EDFEE802570BA0055A9C2/$fil
e/Philippines+-September+2005.pdf, accessed July 2005. R.J. May, The Moro Conflict and the 
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The event that catalysed the establishment of the Moro nationalist movement 
was the Jabida massacre in 1968 when a number of Muslims were shot for refusing to 
undertake a military mission.114 No one was charged for the deaths, resulting in 
widespread resentment from the Moro community. This resentment led to organized 
demonstrations and militia skirmishes. Catholic elites responded by launching an anti-
Moro movement which culminated in the June 19, 1971 massacre of some 70 
Muslims in a mosque. This led to the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) under the leadership of Nur Misuaru,115 with the goal of the ‘liberation of the 
Moro homeland’. President Ferdinand Marcos cited this disorder in imposing martial 
law on the country in September 1972. By early 1973, the armed forces were locked 
in full-scale civil war with the secessionist MNLF.116 
 
Realising the necessity to manage this rebellion, Marcos initiated a peace 
process which culminated in the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in December 1976. 
This agreement provided for “the establishment of autonomy in the Southern 
Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic 
of the Philippines.”117 However, Marcos failed to fulfil his end of the agreement and 
fighting resumed in 1977. Soon after this, second in command, Hashim Salamat broke 
away from MNLF forming the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).118 Another 
                                                                                                                                            
Philippine Experience with Muslim Autonomy, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 
Australian National University, 2002, cited 12 May 2005, available from 
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/conflict/may_moro.pdf, accessed June 2005. Syed Serajul Islam, ‘Ethno-
communal Conflict in the Philippines: The Case of Mindanao-Sulu Region,’ in R. Ganguly and I. 
Macduff, eds., Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South and Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, 
Solutions, New Dehli, Sage Publications, 2003. 
114 Abubakar, Carmen A., ‘Moro Ethnic-Nationalist Movement’, in K. David and S. Kadirgamar, ed., 
Ethnicity, Identity, Conflict and Crisis, Hong Kong, Arena Press, 1989. See also Islam in Ganguly and 
Macduff, 2003. 
115 Islam in Ganguly and Macduff, 2003. 
116 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global IDP Database, ‘Profile of Internal Displacement: 
Philippines. Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian 
Refugee Council, as of 23 September 2005, http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/92660204BB5EDFEE802570BA0055A9C2/$fil
e/Philippines+-September+2005.pdf, accessed April 2006. Also available at http://www.idpproject.org.  
117 The Tripoli Agreement, The Accord: Conciliation Resources, 1976, [cited 16/05/2005], available 
from http://www.c-r.org/accord/min/accord6/tripoli.shtml, accessed August 2005. 
118 MILF sought complete independence and the establishment of an Islamic state. Macapado A. 
Muslim, and Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, Mindanao: Land of Promise, The Accord: Reconciliation 
Resources, 1999, cited 16 May 2005, available from http://www.c-
r.org/accord/min/accord6/index/shmtl, accessed August 2005. 
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split occurred when an extremist party – the Abu Sayyaf group – led by Abdul Razzak 
Jan Jalani emerged.119 
 
A ‘final’ agreement for autonomy, mediated by Jakarta in 1996, embraced all 
five Muslim-majority provinces, but has failed to satisfy the demands of the three 
main armed factions.120  In 2000 MILF completely withdrew from the peace process, 
while Abu Sayyaf intensified their campaign with bombings and the kidnapping of 
foreigners. At the end of 2001, MNLF and MILF agreed to forge peace together in the 
Mindanao-Sulu region due to a lack of development in Moro communities while Abu 
Sayyaf became a target of the US-led anti-terrorism campaign.121 Despite setbacks the 
peace process took positive steps forward in 2004 and 2005 with the resumption of 
peace talks between MILF and the Filipino government (April 2005) after MILF 
signed a ceasefire in 2003.122 Yet after decades of conflict complex issues still hinder 
the peace process. 
  
Structural Costs and Risks 
 
4.4c Dispute Issues  
 
DISPS = 1, 2, 3 = There are numerous dispute issues. The primary issue concerns the 
right to religious and territorial self-determination.  
 
The roots of the conflict have been the clash of interests in land and other 
natural resources; inequalities and unmet needs based on Moro identity; and the 
identity issues emerging from the de facto second-class status of much of the Moro 
population.123 Territory, or a separate Islamic state, for the Moros in the southern 
Filipino region of Mindanao - consisting of the Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan, and Palewan 
                                                 
119 Islam in Ganguly and Macduff, 2003. 
120 Internal Displacement Monitoring, ‘Background to the Moro Struggle in Mindanao,’ 
http://www.internal-
displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/ADF1440329017D2E802570B005AAF5
2?OpenDocument, accessed July 2005. 
121 Islam in Ganguly and Macduff, 2003. 
122 BBC News, ‘Philippines peace talks resume,’ April 18, 2005, cited 18 May 2005, available from 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4455425.stm, accessed July 2005. 
123 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global IDP Database, 2005. See also Muslim and 
Cagoco-Guiam, 1999. 
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islands, appears to be the single most important issue in the peace negotiations.124 Of 
particular concern has been the high level of migration into Mindanao by Filipino 
Catholics that has resulted in a significant reduction in the number of localities in 
which Muslims once comprised a majority. During the first decade of the last century, 
settlers in Mindanao were very successful in growing crops like rice, corn, and 
coconuts, on productive agricultural lands.125 Today due to land scarcity and the 
monopoly of prime land in the hands of big agribusiness, not only the Moro but 
Christian and Lumad (non-Christian indigenous groups) farmers have become 
impoverished.126  
 
Furthermore, a number of writers cite deep religious animosities and ethnic 
prejudices between Christian-dominated central government and the minoritized 
Muslim groups as one of the triggers of the internal conflict.127 Members of the 
Muslim population have sought to end what they perceive as systematic government 
discrimination or “crimes against Muslims”, particularly in claims of Christian 
confiscation of Muslim land in southern Mindanao, and the disparity of wealth, 
services, schooling, and representation between Christians and Muslims. The Moro 
communities have also faced cultural insecurity due to multiple attempts at forced 
integration. Government policies have repeatedly denied recognition of their values, 
belief and traditions based on their identity.128   
 
4.4d Fatalities  
 
                                                 
124 Al Jacinto, ‘MILF optimistic on resumption of peace talks,’ Sun.Star, Friday, 6 January 2006, 
available at 
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/zam/2006/01/06/news/milf.optimistic.on.resumption.of.peace.talks.ht
ml, accessed February 2006. 
125 United States Institute of Peace, ‘The Mindanao Peace Talks, Another Opportunity to Resolve the 
Moro Conflict in the Philippines,’ February 2005, Special Report, no.131, 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr131.html, accessed 10 September 2005. 
See also Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, 1996, 11-13. See also Cagoco-Guiam, Child Soldiers in Central 
and Western Mindanao: A Rapid Assessment, Geneva, International Labour Office, 2002, available at 
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/philippines/ra/soldiers.pdf., accessed April 2006. 
126 Islam in Ganguly and Macduff, 2003, 201. Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Fighting Armed Conflict with 
Conflict Transformation: Agenda for Human Rights Workers in Southeast Asia, Peace Information 
Center, Foundation for Democracy and Development Studies Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat 
University, http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/2002/SathaAnand_Conflict.html, accessed 
August 2005. 
127 See, for example, the works of B.R. Rodil, Samuel K. Tan, and Macapado A. Muslim cited in the 
Resources section of B.R Rodil, The Minoritization of the Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and 
the Sulu Archipelago, Davao City, Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, 1994, 51. 
128 May, 2002; IDMC, Global IDP Project, 2005. 
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FATAL = 4 = more than 10,000 fatalities, this converts to war. Conflict in the 
Mindanao-Sulu region of Southern Philippines has reportedly claimed between 
65,000 to 120,000 lives since the violence began in the early 1970s.129 The Philippine 
Government alone has estimated 100,000 casualties.130  
 
4.4e Military Capabilities  
 
MILCAP = Philippines = 9 = undetermined 
     = MNLF = 30,000 armed members 
                = MILF = 15,000 members, 12,000 of them armed 
    = Abu Sayyaf = more than a thousand guerrillas with 2-5,000  
    members 
 
There has been no shortage of weapons supply for the Filipino armed forces or 
the armed Moro disputants. MNLF has sourced weapons from Libya and through a 
Malaysian political leader from Sabah, and has a substantial army of around 30,000 
fighters.131  MILF now numbers around 15,000 members, consisting of more than 
12,000 armed fighters, trained in Afghanistan from the Al-Qaeda network, in 13 
major camps and 33 satellite enclaves.132 The Philippine military has estimated Abu 
Sayyaf partisans at more than a thousand guerrillas with 2-5,000 members.133 The 
supply of guns, military training and ready recruits has enabled the disputants to 
sustain their military campaign and has provided confidence for each disputant in 
their ability to achieve their aims through conflict.134 
                                                 
129 BBC News, ‘Country Profile: The Philippines,’ 6 April 2005, cited 12 May 2005, available from 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1262783.stm, accessed July 2005; 
Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, ‘Assessment for Moros in the 
Philippines,’ Minorities at Risk Data, 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=84003, accessed April 2006; IDMC, 
Background to the Moro struggle in Mindanao, 
http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewCountries/45EB949167E42875
C125706F0054A23F. M. Jegathesan, ‘Philippines and rebels hail ‘breakthrough’ in peace talks,’ 20 
April 2005, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVIU-
6BMK5X?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=phl, accessed May 2005. 
130 Rodil, 1994, 51. 
131 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror, London, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003. 
132 Meta-religion, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, cited 19 May 2005, available from http://www.meta-
religion.com/Extremism/Islamic_extremism/moro_islamic_liberation_front.htm, accessed July 2005. 
133 John Gershman, ‘Moros in the Philippines’, (revised October 2001), 
http://www.fpif.org/selfdetermination/conflicts/philippines_body.html, accessed September 2005. 
134 Uppsala University conflict database, 2003. 
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4.4f Number of Disputants  
 
MAGFIGHT = 3 = 4 main disputants 
 
Names of the parties: 
Party A: Government of the Philippines; Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP); Philippine National Police (PNP), civilian militia units; 
Party B: Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF);  
            Party C: The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); 
 Party D: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG); 
Other participating disputants: 
 Party E: The MNLF-RG (Reformist Group); 
Party F: ‘Christian defenders groups’ which are sponsored by Manila, the most 
notorious being the Illaga Movement.135  
 
Founded in 1969 MNLF has remained the largest group, and is recognized as 
such by the Philippine government.136 It has accepted talks on autonomy within the 
Philippine state. MILF, founded in 1984, emphasises Islam to a greater degree than 
MNLF.  MILF is supported by many Muslim religious leaders as well as containing 
its own powerful military wing, the Bangsa Moro Islamic Armed Forces (BMIAF).137 
Founded in the mid 1980s, ASG aims to propagate Islam through jihad, purposefully 
attacking the Christian population.138 ASG has splintered into different factions, and 
its activities are driven more by banditry and kidnapping than political struggle. For 
example, it has issued no definitive policy statements. Successive governments have 
refused to negotiate with this group, asserting that it is a terrorist organization.139  
 
4.4g Tactics and Strategies adopted by Disputants  
 
                                                 
135 Bilveer Singh, ASEAN, Australia and the Management of the Jemaah Islamiyah Threat, Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Canberra, 2003, 13. 
136 Ibid., 13-14. 
137 Gershman, http://www.fpif.org/selfdetermination/conflicts/philippines_body.html. 
138 Singh, 2003, 13-14. 
139 CIDCM, Minorities at Risk Data.  
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TACSTRA = 2 = There have been some attempts at positive uses of conflict 
resolution by both disputants but the government and opposition occasionally return 
to the use or threat of force to pursue their aims. 
 
Since 1972 secessionist disputants have confronted the government forces 
with a strong and organized armed resistance resulting in full-scale-war in Mindanao, 
while the government’s approach to the conflict has been one of ‘carrot and stick’, in 
which the stick — instruments of violence — has received more emphasis. The 
Philippine government has generally mobilized troops or withdrawn from the peace 
process to counter, or in retaliation of, disputant’s attacks or bombings. State 
repression of the Moros to ‘neutralize their resistance’ has included the destruction of 
property, arrests, saturation police/military presence, intimidation, terror tactics, and 
the destruction of suspected rebel areas. This use of military might has only sustained 
and intensified the armed struggle.140 
The carrot, designed to entice Moro mujahideen (fighters) and their 
sympathizers to return to the fold, has included amnesty, offers of government posts 
to their leaders, grandiose development programmes for Mindanao, and funds for 
livelihood projects.141 Santos notes that from 1996 to 2000, the government and MILF 
entered into a total of 39 agreements, joint communiqués, acknowledgments, and 
resolutions, 16 agreements on the implementation of the cease-fire pact (organization 
of committees, repositioning of government and MILF troops, return of evacuees, and 
safety and security guarantees), 13 on the framework of the talks, 6 on procedural 
matters, and 4 on recognition and verification of MILF camps. Yet throughout this 
period no resolution on the substantive issues was reached.142  
Immediately after assuming office, President Arroyo sent emissaries to MILF 
to resume talks, named Mindanawons to her newly formed cabinet, and appointed an 
all-Mindanawon peace panel to negotiate with MILF.143 From November 2000 to 
February 2003, negotiations resulted in the forging of numerous agreements and 
                                                 
140 For examples see Cagoco-Guiam, chapter 9.6.2 in Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 
491. 
141 Ibid., 488. 
142 United States Institute for Peace, 2005. 
143 Cagoco-Guiam, chapter 9.6.2 in Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 489-90. 
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guidelines, including the 2001 Tripoli Peace Agreement.144 The ceasefire agreed in 
July 2003 between the government and MILF has been holding relatively well in the 
past two years and the absence of any major clashes has allowed for the return of the 
vast majority of the estimated 400,000 people displaced in 2003. In October 2005, the 
Government agreed in principle to allow a Bangsamoro government to draft its own 
charter, impose its own tax system, form and maintain legal and financial institutions 
necessary for the development of an expanded, progressive Muslim Mindanao region. 
Time will tell whether this goes ahead or not.145  
 
4.4h Status of Government  
 
MAGFAIL = 2 and 3 = Manila = Adverse regime change with no substantial  
weakening of state institutions or persistent collapse of public 
order. 
= Mindanao-Sulu = Failure of state authority in a limited part of 
the country, for example, secession or rebel control of, or 
anarchic conditions in, one or several regions that do not include 
the core area of the country or its capital. 
 
Since independence in 1946, the Philippine state has been relatively weak, 
plagued by insurgencies, economic mismanagement, and widespread corruption. The 
Philippines have experienced incidences of adverse regime change during the end of 
the Marcos era and in 2003 with a coup d’etat. It has also struggled to deal with a 
secessionist conflict in the case of the Moros and a revolutionary war in the case of 
the communist movement. Furthermore, a few dozen powerful families continue to 
play an overarching role in politics and hold an outsized share of land and corporate 
wealth. The Philippines was ranked 102 out of 146 countries surveyed in 
Transparency International’s 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index.146 Fiscal difficulties 
                                                 
144 United States Institute for Peace, 2005. 
145 Gerry Lirio, ‘Philippines grants MILF own Gov’t charter: An Agreement in principle’, first posted 
October 13, 2005, Inquirer News Service, published on page A1 of the October 12, 2005 issue of the 
Philippine Daily Inquirer, http://news.inq7.net/nation/index.php?index=1&story_id=53162, accessed 
November 2005. 
146 Freedom House, Country Report, ‘Philippines 2004’, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2004&country=3008, accessed April 
2006. 
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have persisted and the country’s balance of payments has eroded.147 The Filipino state 
has demonstrated weakness, inadequate legal institutions and inability to maintain law 
and order at critical points in the conflict, undermining the credibility of the 
government.  
 
Structural Benefits 
 
4.4i Economic Wealth of the State  
 
ECWEALTH = 3 = Mindanao represents 48 per cent of gold production, 63 per cent 
nickel and 18 per cent charcoal in the country’s total reserves. The Philippines has the 
capacity to produce 8 barrels of oil and natural gas every day and as much as 500 to 
600 barrels of crude oil every day. More than 60 per cent of these resources can be 
found in Mindanao. Mindanao is characterized by fertile soil suitable to cultivate a 
variety of crops and has a timberland of nearly 39 per cent of nation’s forest cover. 
These areas, especially those within the MILF camps have potentials for super 
profits.148  
 
Structural Connectivity 
  
4.4j Economic Importance of the State in Conflict  
 
ECIMPORT = 3 = The Philippines is an important regional and international 
economic player. Despite the country's recent political and economic difficulties, 
there remain opportunities for international businesses in a number of sectors, 
particularly in the development of infrastructure projects including power, transport, 
water, construction, oil and gas and environmental technology.149 It is a member of 
many international organizations including the UN, ASEAN, Asia Pacific Economic 
                                                 
147 Michael J. Montesano, ‘The Philippines in 2003: Troubles, None of them New’ Asian Survey, 44(1) 
The Regents of the University of California, 2004, 93. 
148 IDCM, Background to the Moro struggle in Mindanao, 
http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewCountries/45EB949167E42875
C125706F0054A23F. 
149 United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country Profile: Philippines, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007
029394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1019041569115, last renewed 31 March 2006, accessed April 
2006. 
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Co-operation (APEC), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Non Aligned Movement (NAM), Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
(Observer), World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), World Health Organisation 
(WHO), World Trade Organisation (WTO), and World Bank.150 
 
Structural Level of Outrage 
 
4.4k Nature of International Environment  
 
INTENVIRO = Limited = It is extremely difficult to determine whether the 
international environment has, in the past five years, influenced multilateral policies 
of non-intervention in the case of conflict in the Philippines. What can be determined 
is that the government has, after the 11 September 2001 attacks on US territory, been 
incredibly willing to support any venture made by the ‘war against terror’. This has 
presented President Arroyo with an internationally legitimate reason to harden her 
policy towards Abu Sayyaf rebels and against MILF, who her administration suspects 
of harbouring Abu Sayyaf members. The ‘war on terror’ has extended to the 
Philippines with ASG’s high profile attacks on civilian targets. Consequently, the 
Muslim struggle for autonomy has been recast as part of the ‘war on terror’, 
politicizing international interest and overshadowing humanitarian concerns.151   
 
Perceptual Costs, Risks, and Benefits 
 
4.4L Likelihood of Success  
 
LIKESUCCESS = 1 = There is a possibility of multilateral actors perceiving any 
multilateral intervention policy in this case of conflict to have a medium to high 
probability for success.  
 
                                                 
150 Ibid. 
151 Refugees International, ‘Forgotten People: Muslims of Mindanao,’ Philippines, 21 October 2003, 
http://www.refintl.org/content/article/detail/914/, accessed November 2005. 
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There are existing peace agreements from which to work from if multilateral 
intervention should ever take place. The Tripoli Peace Agreement (July 2001) for 
instance sets a broad framework and guidelines on security and the conduct of 
negotiations on the substantive aspects of the conflict. Other agreements152 have 
established local cease-fire monitoring teams, affirmed the disputants observance of 
international humanitarian law, provided guidelines for the rehabilitation and 
development of areas affected by conflict, and stipulated guidelines for isolating 
criminal activity within MILF areas.153  
 
Civic groups, including religious leaders, the media, women and indigenous 
communities, among others, in favour of a peaceful settlement of the conflict, with 
their different agendas and styles, continue to act both individually and collectively in 
the struggle for peace. Their tactics include working to enlarge spaces for peace in 
communities, 154 working quietly to establish ‘backdoor’ linkages with both the 
government and MILF, or holding conferences to craft a common peace agenda.155  
 
While the conflict has been labeled ‘intractable’, the conflict has matured to 
the point where the disputants see more advantages to ending it than to continuing the 
armed conflict.156 The major wars of 2000 and 2003 did not bring the disputants any 
tactical advantage and were costly in terms of human casualties and civilian 
dislocations.  The stalemate between the Philippine government and insurgent 
disputants has created an environment conducive to a resolution.157  Yet Alexander 
Martin Remollino argues that, despite the climate of optimism surrounding the talks 
between the government and the MILF, there is no guarantee that third party talks will 
be successful. There are some formidable obstacles along the path to a settlement.158 
                                                 
152 Including Implementing Guidelines of the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Peace Agreement, August 
7, 2001; Implementing Guidelines of the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the 
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153 United States Institute for Peace, 2005. 
154 Carolyn O. Arguillas, ‘Enlarging spaces and strengthening voices for peace: 
civil society initiatives in Mindanao,’ Conciliation Resources, http://www.c-
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155 Cagoco-Guiam, chapter 9.6.2 in Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 493. 
156 United States Institute for Peace, 2005. 
157 Ibid.  
158 Alexander Martin Remollino, http://www.bulatlat.com/news/5-46/5-46-moro.htm, accessed January 
2006. 
 133 
In particular, since 1997, the peace process has been constantly derailed because of 
charges and countercharges of cease-fire violations.  
 
Perceptual Connectivity 
 
4.4m Humanitarian Concern in terms of Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons  
 
UPMCRISIS = 2 = more than 50,000 IDPs or refugees 
 
Based on figures provided by the Philippines Department of Social Welfare 
and Development (DSWD), a total of 1,824,435 people have been displaced by the 
armed conflict in the five last years (2000-June 2005).159 Other figures of IDPs vary 
from 200,000 to 500,000.160 Cycles of displacement and return, however, are 
constant, and the actual number of Filipinos displaced at any one time is estimated to 
be much higher.  Almost all of the IDPs and refugees are Muslim.161 85 percent of the 
victims stated that the perpetrators of the violence that led to displacement were either 
the army, the Philippine Constabulary or the Police.162 The government generally 
acknowledges its responsibility vis-à-vis IDPs,  assisting them through the DSWD, 
the Office of Civil Defence, the National Red Cross and local authorities. However, 
the UN Secretary-General's Representative on Internal Displacement has noted that 
there are often gaps between positive intentions and statements made by the 
government on behalf of the evacuees and their practical implementation.163 
                                                 
159 IDMC, http://www.internal-
displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/AFB5F697D6EA4A8D802570B8005AA
F8A?OpenDocument.  
160 Rodil, 1994, 51. TPI-Intrastate Disputes Data Sets, (53) Philippines. Continued instability in 
Mindanao threatens IDP rehabilitation http://faculty.uca.edu/~markm/tpi_narratives_asia.htm, accessed 
January 2006; IDMC, http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/92660204BB5EDFEE802570BA0055A9C2/$fil
e/Philippines+-September+2005.pdf. See also Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, 1999; IDMC, September 
2005, http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/92660204BB5EDFEE802570BA0055A9C2/$fil
e/Philippines+-September+2005.pdf. Also available at http://www.idpproject.org. Elizabeth Jems, 
‘Peace, Security and the Movement of People in the Post-Cold War Era’ chapter 6 in Clements, 1993, 
167. 
161 Refugees International, http://www.refintl.org/content/article/detail/914/. 
162 Jems, chapter 6 in Clements, 1993, 168. 
163 CHR, 3 February 2003, 12 in IDMC, Global IDP Database, 23 September 2005, 
http://www.internal-
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Conditions in evacuation centers are generally described as inadequate, with 
insufficient food, poor medical facilities and sanitation, resulting in health risks for 
the most vulnerable.164 
 
4.4n Genocide/Politicide  
 
DEATHMAG = 9 = between 65,000 and 120,000 deaths. While there are plenty of 
theories about the actions of the Philippines Government and its repression tactics, 
there have been no serious allegations of genocide or politicide in this conflict. At 
least there have been no single incidents of concentrated mass murder. Rather, there 
have been attacks by both sides of disputants using varying violent tactics and 
strategies, leading to massive human rights abuses. The Philippines is a functioning 
democracy, with a flourishing civil society and lively media. It has acceded to all the 
core UN human rights treaties, and many of these rights are incorporated into 
domestic law. But the rule of law is not necessarily respected in the Philippines. 
Reports of arbitrary and unlawful arrest or detention in harsh prison conditions, 
disappearances, kidnappings, extrajudicial killings, and abuse of suspects and 
detainees continue. Members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) are regularly 
described by the official Commission on Human Rights as the country’s worst rights 
abusers.165 At the height of the ‘Moro insurgency’ in the mid 1970s, about 80 percent 
of the entire Philippine military force was deployed in Muslim-dominated areas in 
Mindanao.166 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/92660204BB5EDFEE802570BA0055A9C2/$fil
e/Philippines+-September+2005.pdf. Also available at http://www.idpproject.org.  
164 Mindanews, 19 February/2 September 2005 and Notre Dame University & Commission on 
Population, January 2004, 34 in Ibid.  
165 Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/gdp.htm. 
166 Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, ‘Mindanao,’ 16 in Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 488. 
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Figure 9: Summary of Conflict and Multilateral Non-Intervention in the 
Philippines – Measurement and Evidence of Structural and Perceptual 
Conditions 
Structural and 
Perceptual 
Conditions  
Measurement/
Evidence of 
Conditions 
                           Description 
DISPS    1, 2 and 3    Primary issue: the right to religious and territorial 
self-determination. 
FATAL         4  Between 65,000 and 120,000 since 1970s. 
YRBEGIN      1968  
YREND      9999 Ongoing conflict. Four decades of conflict: deep 
rooted. 
PHASE        3-6 Between hostilities and termination or post-
hostilties. 
MILCAP    
Disputants: 
47,000 
members 
The Military capabilities of the Philippines 
Government is largely undetermined, MNLF: 
30,000 armed members; MILF: 15,000 members, 
12,000 of them armed; Abu Sayyaf: more than a 
thousand guerrillas with 2-5,000 members 
ECOCAP          9 No basis for judgement 
MAGFIGHT          3 3-4 main disputants with a number of unrecognized 
groups 
TACSTRA          2 Some attempts at positive uses of conflict 
resolution by both parties but the government and 
opposition occasionally return to the use or threat 
of force. 
SUPEROS           
 
 
 
         2 
High likelihood that the Superpower would be 
opposed to any intervention decisions due to the 
Philippines' so-called 'special relations' with the US 
dating from colonial times.  The US and Philippine 
militaries cooperated in 2002 and 2003 to engage in 
combat operations against Abu Sayyaf.167 US-
Philippine 'special relations' were calibrated after 
Arroyo became the first Asian leader to openly 
support the American government policies on 
terrorism. 
IDENORG       
 
         2  
Some of the disputants are well organized and 
easily identifiable such as the Government, MNLF 
and MILF, yet ASG remains limited in its 
organization and identifiability. MNLF and MILF 
have established where their aims differ and where 
they agree. 
INITIATE           
         9 
There have been no concerted efforts by any of the 
disputants or civil society/grassroots communities 
to call for intervention or resist intervention by 
actors such as the Organization of Islamic 
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Countries (OIC). 
MAGFAIL  
 
 
        
        2-3 
Manila: Adverse regime change with no substantial  
weakening of state institutions or persistent 
collapse of public order. 
Mindanao-Sulu: Failure of state authority in a 
limited part of the country, for example, secession 
or rebel control of, or anarchic conditions in, one or 
several regions that do not include the core area of 
the country or its capital. 
ECWEALTH          3 Potential to be profitable 
SPILL          5 200,000-500,000 IDPs and Refugees 
ECIMPORT          3 Highly integrated and important economically 
MEDIA      Limited In the early 1990s, increased international attention 
was directed towards Mindanao, as there were 
several incidents of high-profile kidnappings.168 
However, there has yet to be any sustained regional 
and international attention on the conflict itself. 
INTENVIRO      Limited War on Terror has extended to the Philippines and 
ASG 
REPUT          No No evidence of reputational interest in decision to 
not intervene. 
LIKESUCCESS           1 Strong civil society, stalemate and agreement 
CLEAR          No No evidence of any clear exit points.  
REFCRISIS           2 200,000 to 500,000: A Humanitarian Crisis 
DEATHMAG           9 Between 65,000 and 120,000 
LEVOUT      Limited Muslim Diaspora substantial 
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4.5 West Papua – Non-Intervention 
 
4.5a Introduction 
 
While the conflict in East Timor succeeded in gaining multilateral 
intervention, the situation in West Papua has been largely ignored by multilateral 
actors since Indonesia occupied it in 1963 and annexed it in 1969. The absence of 
peace today stems from the denial of Papuan aspirations for self-governance.170 
Conflict in West Papua has lasted for forty-years, resulting in estimated deaths 
between 30,000 and 10,000.171 To some extent, it is a conflict in the conventional 
sense in that there are clashes between armed separatists and government forces. But 
conflict in West Papua also exists in the structures of injustice that affect every aspect 
and every section of society. West Papuans have been under systematic political 
abuses and economic repression since occupation by Indonesia.172   
 
4.5b Overview 
 
In the 1950s the Dutch government began the process to relinquish control of 
West Papua, promising independence.173 On 19 December 1961, with the aim of 
establishing its sovereign claim to all Dutch East Indies territories, first President of 
Indonesia, Sukarno, announced a military plan for the “return” of West Papua. The 
US stepped in to broker a settlement, seeking to keep Jakarta out of the Soviet axis 
during the Cold War period. Under this deal – the New York Agreement – West 
Papua was placed under interim UN administration in October 1962.174 The territory 
was transferred to Indonesian administration in May 1963 with the agreement that a 
UN-supervised referendum would allow the people of Papua to determine whether 
they would become part of Indonesia or form their own independent nation in 1969. 
This referendum was called the Act of Free Choice.175 To carry out the Act of Free 
                                                 
170 Yohanis G. Bonay with Jane McGrory, ‘West Papua: Building Peace through an Understanding of 
Conflict’ chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 438. 
171 Minorities at Risk (MAR Project), Risk Assessment, University of Maryland, 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=85005, accessed April 2006. 
172 Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 438. 
173 Ibid.  
174 known as the UN Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (UNTEA). 
175 Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 438-9. 
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Choice, Jakarta appointed a consultative council that could represent the West Papuan 
nation. Faced with intimidation by gunpoint and coercion, the handpicked council 
returned a unanimous result in favour of integration with Indonesia. Brutality and 
terror silenced those protesting the way Papuans were cheated of their right to self-
determination.176 The majority of Papuans oppose Indonesian rule and view 
Indonesia’s annexation of Papua as illegitimate. In response, the Indonesian 
government has resorted to violence.  
 
The situation in West Papua today is characterised by political intolerance for 
aspirations of independence. While state violence has been somewhat curbed by 
greater media freedom, vocal civil society organizations, and reforms for special 
autonomy, structural violence of indigenous communities is largely intact. Murder of 
the independence leader Theys Hiyo Eluay by the Indonesian Military illustrates that 
the brutality of the armed forces remains unchanged. Several factors suggest the 
likelihood of the continuation of this state of perpetual conflict. These include the 
ongoing repression of West Papuans by the Indonesian Military, West Papuans’ 
territorial concentration, their high degree of group cohesion and organization, the 
unstable regime of Indonesia over the past 5 years, and the continual exploitation of 
West Papua’s natural resources, while the area’s development is neglected.177 
 
Structural Costs and Risks 
 
4.5c Fatalities  
 
FATAL = 4 = more than 10,000 fatalities, this converts to war. Estimates of fatalities 
tend to be between 30,000 to at least 100,000 as a result of Indonesian occupation.178  
 
4.5d Military Capabilities  
 
                                                 
176 Ibid., 439. 
177 MAR Project, Risk Assessment, 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=85005.  
178 John Wing with Peter King, Genocide in West Papua? The Role of the Indonesian state apparatus 
and a current needs assessment of the Papuan people, a report for the West Papua Project at the Centre 
for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, and ELSHAM Jayapura, Papua. August 2005, 
19. See also Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 439. 
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MILCAP = There are currently 15,000-20,000 Indonesian military and police  
    personnel in West Papua.179 
    = The Free Papua Movement (TPN/OPM) personnel, which openly  
    promotes restoring independence from Indonesia, are estimated at 1,600,180  
    including a number of units pursuing non-violent means.181 
 
4.5e Tactics and Strategies adopted by Disputants  
 
TACSTRA = 4 = There have generally been more systematic negative uses of conflict 
resolution instruments by just the government than positive uses of conflict resolution 
instruments.  
 
Previously insurgents staged relatively small-scale hit and run attacks on 
Indonesian military posts and, on a few occasions, took hostages to draw attention to 
their cause. However guerrilla fighters now pose a serious challenge for Indonesia.182 
The government’s strategies have diversified, but in often taking a hard-line approach, 
none have succeeded in moderating the demands for independence or addressing the 
grievances of Papuan people.183 There are four dimensions of violence in this conflict: 
open armed conflict between armed disputants and the Indonesian military; state 
violence against ordinary citizens as a consequence of military operations and violent 
responses by the state to civilian resistance; structural violence through the systems of 
economic, political, social, and cultural injustice that marginalize ethnic Papuan 
communities and secure the dominance of Indonesian authority; and communal 
conflict between different religions, ethnic, and sub-ethnic groups.184  
 
                                                 
179 C. Richards, ‘Military Madness,’ New Internationalist, West Papua Special Edition no. 344, April 
2002. See Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 440. 
180 The Diary of Online Papua Mouthpiece (Do-OPM), http://www.melanesianews.org/DoOPM/, 
accessed April 2006. See also Papua Post, August 11, 2003, http://www.papuapost.com/, accessed 
April 2006. See Bonay with McGrory, in chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 
440. 
181 Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 440. 
182 IDMC, Armed resistance, human rights abuses and displacement in Papua (1998-2000), 
http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpEnvelopes)/D6FF85088E20A75B802570B8005A73F5?Op
enDocument, accessed April 2006. 
183 Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 446. 
184 Ibid., 440. 
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Since June 2000, the government has banned peaceful expressions of support 
for Papuan independence, security forces have moved aggressively against 
independence demonstrators, and key Papuan leaders and prominent civil society 
groups have been arrested or have been subjected to increased surveillance and 
harassment.185 While peaceful dialogue is frequently called for by Papuan groups, the 
TNI has shown no willingness to forego security operations in order to achieve peace 
in the province. The government has even blocked attempts from Papuans to 
undertake a negotiated settlement or dialogue mediated by a third party.186  
 
At the same time, the government sought to tackle the problem with a massive 
welfare program and policies of ‘special autonomy’ (October 2001) intended to 
convince Papuans of the benefits of being part of the Indonesian state. 187 According 
to the Chairman of the Dewan Adat Papua, Tom Beanal, ‘special autonomy’ has 
given nothing, and symbols of Papuan nationalism, such as the Morning Star flag and 
anthem (Hai Tanakuh Papua), which were promised in the Special Autonomy law of 
2001, have been removed.188 Eighteen months after the implementation of ‘special 
autonomy’, only 10 percent of reforms have been implemented.189 The government’s 
proposal for an all-Papuan upper house of the local parliament has greatly diluted the 
powers envisaged for it in 2001.190 Additionally, new troop deployments of up to 
15,000 are being planned for 2005-2009, mainly for the PNG border area, the 
highlands and large towns.191  
 
4.5f Resistance Levels to Intervention  
 
INITIATE = 2, 3 = Multilateral intervention has been requested or consented to by the 
opposition group and the civil society/grassroots community, while there has been 
resistance by at least one of the disputants (in this case the Government). 
                                                 
185 IDMC, Armed resistance, human rights abuses and displacement in Papua (1998-2000), 
http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpEnvelopes)/D6FF85088E20A75B802570B8005A73F5?Op
enDocument.  
186 Wing with King, 2005. 
187 Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 447. 
188 Interview, 5 February 2005 in Ibid. 
189 See Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 447. 
190 Wing with King, 2005, 13. 
191 Tiarma Siboro, ‘Army to station extra division in Papua,’ Jakarta Post, 19 March 2005. 
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Several prominent actors in West Papua have repeatedly called for multilateral 
intervention. In late 2003 Resistance leader Yustunus Murib pleaded for international 
intervention in what he believed to be policies of ethnic cleansing. His appeal was 
broadcast on Australian television and sent to the UN. He was brutally executed in a 
Kopassus raid on 4 November 2003 that left eleven others dead.192 The next day, his 
corpse was displayed by Indonesian troops and a raid was launched against his 
followers, which left another ten dead.193 Petrus Tabuni, another OPM leader, also 
pleaded for international dialogue in 2003 in a televised address. His calls remain 
unanswered and the whereabouts of his clan of several hundred men, women and 
children are unknown.194  
 
Pleas for multilateral intervention had come as early as 1969. In May 1969 
two members of the West Irianese Provincial Assembly, Clemens Runaweri and 
William Zongganau, crossed the border into Manus Island, the Australian 
administered territory of Papua and New Guinea, asking the authorities to help them 
get to the UN. The men carried documents proving Indonesian repression, important 
evidence which may have had a significant bearing on the Papuan case. Not only were 
they refused help to travel, they were prevented from leaving Manus Island. On a 
request from Adam Malik, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, the Australian, Dutch and 
US government conspired to deny travel documentation for their international 
movement between the period June-August 1969.195 
 
Structural Benefits 
 
4.5g Economic Wealth of the State  
 
                                                 
192 SBS Dateline, ‘West Papua’, November 5, 2004, available at 
http://news.sbs.com.au/dateline/index.php?page=archive&daysum=2003-11-05, accessed 27 April 
2006. 
193 Wing with King, 2005, 25-26. 
194 Ibid., 19. 
195 See John Saltford, UNTEA and UNRWI: United Nations Involvement in West New Guinea During 
the 1960’s, PhD Dissertation, University of Hull, 2000, Chapter 9, (available on Papuaweb). Wing with 
King, August 2005, 1-3. 
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ECWEALTH = 3 = West Papua is home to one of the world's biggest gold mines, and 
under its jungles lie oil, gas and minerals. In particular, West Papua is home to kwila 
timber.196 
  
Perceptual Costs, Risks, and Benefits 
 
4.5h Likelihood of Success  
 
LIKESUCCESS = 2 = There is no stalemate evident or substantial agreement from 
which to base a multilateral intervention policy on. Yet there is a strong civil 
society/grassroots element willing for peace in West Papua. At least 140 NGOs and 
numerous community-based organizations are operating in Papua, with 72 involved in 
peace-building. Today, a healthy variety of civil society strategies can be identified, 
including initiatives responding to state violence; patterns of engagement and 
confrontation with the government and security apparatus; and initiatives from the 
heights of international diplomacy to the grassroots of Papuan communities. 197  
 
Perceptual Connectivity 
 
4.5i Humanitarian Concern in terms of Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons  
 
UPMCRISIS = 1 = not a humanitarian crisis = there are varying estimates of  
IDPs and refugees but the minimum number recorded stands at  
20,000 up.198 
= IDPs: 15,000 (est. January 2000) numbers fluctuate and are  
difficult to confirm.199  
= Refugees: Bonay and McGrory state that there are  
some 6,000 refugees in PNG (est. 2000); and an estimated 150  
political exiles in other countries.200 Whilst, King and King  
                                                 
196 MAR, Risk Assessment, http://www.cidcm.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=85005.  
197 See Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 448-449. 
198 See Wing with King, 2005. 
199 Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDPs Report, August 2002, pp. 117. 
200 See Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 439. 
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state that TNI operations have created over 11,000 refugees during 
2003-5. 201 It was also noted that some 12,000 West Papuans fled as 
refugees to Papua New Guinea between 1984 and 1987.202 
 
Male eyewitness testimony in Mulia refugee situation, 10 January 
2005:  
…volunteers are coming here and giving us aid, but the government 
hasn’t given us anything…This is proof the government doesn’t care about 
us…Why is the government not concerned about the suffering? They say 
there is all this money available but we haven’t seen any of it! Who is 
getting the money?…We hear the rice aid from through the governor…is 
one thousand tonnes. We hear about that but we did not receive it…No-one 
from parliament has been here…And at the moment there’s no food, no 
aid. So from the 21st until now, the people haven’t eaten.203  
 
4.5j Genocide/Politicide  
 
DEATHMAG = between 8-9 = between 30,000 to at least 100,000.204 There are no 
specific dates of confirmed genocide or politicide. If there is genocide or politicide 
occurring it is being done ‘silently’.  
 
When West Papuan resistance leader Tom Beanal was interviewed on 4 
February 2005, he was asked, Why do you think the international community does not 
care about what is happening here, if genocide is taking place? Genocide is a strong 
term to use isn’t it?”205 He replied,  
 
I already told the UN, and Yale University had its own report 
charging genocide. If people kill with guns, and others kill with injections 
[with HIV], and in the highlands there are no teachers, no hospitals, no 
clinics…children have no skills, no knowledge, that’s Genocide!206 
                                                 
201 Wing with King, 2005, 12. 
202
 TPI- Indonesia  
http://faculty.uca.edu/~markm/tpi_narratives_asia.htm. Ian Kakarere, West Papua Refugees in Papua 
New Guinea Having a Touch Time 18 Years on, Pacific Islands Development Program/ East-West 
Center, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2002/january/01-15-17.html, accessed 17 May 2005. Ian 
Kakarere, First Wave of Papua Refugees Resettled in PNG, Pacific Islands Development 
Program/East-West Center, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2004/october/10-06-16.html., accessed 
16 May 2005. 
203 Wing with King, 2005, 25-26. 
204 Ibid., 19. Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 439. 
205 Wing with King, 2005, 47. 
206 Ibid.  
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Researchers at Yale University’s Law School concluded in a report released in 
November 2003 that the issue of genocide has become serious in Papua, with 
xenophobia and racism contributing to a lack of inclusion of Papuans within the 
Indonesian Republic. The current situation is often referred to as a ‘silent 
genocide.’207 The state security apparatus has sought to eliminate and silence 
opponents of Indonesian rule through restrictions on freedom of expression and 
political organization, forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest, 
detention, torture, execution, domestic spying, rape, insufficient food supply, 
saturation of military presence, and unstrained forces used against protesters, burning 
down of their livestock, houses, and churches.208 The systems of structural violence 
create conditions of economic, political, social, and cultural disadvantage for Papuan 
communities.209  
 
From 1963 onwards Indonesia worked assiduously to remove any sense of 
Papuan identity from the community, implementing a process of ‘Indonesianization,’ 
using ‘anti-subversion’ measures legislated in Presidential Decrees No. 8 and 11 of 
1963. The government banned the singing of the Papuan national anthem, traditional 
Papuan apparel, the raising of the Morning Star flag and all political assembly or 
activity, declaring expressions of cultural identity as being punishable by torture or 
even death.210 The Indonesian government and security apparatus have sought to 
“civilize” Papuans, whom they stigmatise as “primitive people”, using terms of 
denigration, for example, that Papuans are animals, in particular, monkeys.211 
Furthermore, of the issue HIV/AIDS has never been seriously handled, even though 
the Province of Papua records the highest number of victims in Indonesia. The 
military is even involved as pimps bringing in HIV/AIDS affected prostitutes from 
Indonesia.212  
                                                 
207 Ibid. 
208 MAR, http://www.cidcm.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=85005.  
209 G. Harris and N. Lewis, ‘Structural Violence, Positive Peace, and Peace building,’ in Harris, ed., 
Recovery From Armed Conflict in Developing Countries: An Economic and Political Analysis, 
London, Routledge, 1999, 29-30. See Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and 
van de Veen, 2004, 442. 
210 Wing with King, 2005, 1-3. Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de 
Veen, 2004, 442. 
211 See Peter King, West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto: Independence Autonomy or Chaos?, 
University of New South Wales Press, 2004, 33. 
212 Wing with King, 2005, 1-11. 
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Despite being one of the richest provinces in terms of natural resources, West 
Papua has one of Indonesia’s highest rates of poverty. Major businesses are generally 
owned by investors from outside Papua and migrants dominate the local commercial 
sector. Papuan’s socio-economic system has been further undermined by the seizure 
of traditional lands and the degradation of indigenous cultures.  Papuans have lower 
access to education, health services, and the media than their counterparts in 
Indonesia. In addition, there has been very low representation of Papuans in executive 
and legislative arms of government, as well as in the military and police force.213  
 
Freedom of movement is being severely restricted in Papua. This restriction 
has been compared to the system of apartheid in South Africa during the year before 
democratic elections and self-rule. People have to have a travel permit when 
travelling to their home villages; people are detained with no clear reason for 
unspecified periods and tried with no clear charges; Papuans who are members of the 
military apparatus will sometimes not be given any arms to equip themselves to 
handle crowds, whereas those coming from Indonesia will always be fully equipped 
with rifles, and/or pistols; the Indonesian newcomers to Papua looking for jobs can 
easily get one, often within a week, while Papuans have to wait for years.214  
 
Furthermore, there are reports of Indonesia undertaking militia training and 
recruitment and moving illegal arms to West Papua by local informants: 
 
…[The TNI] have opened two bases in Manokwari... At…one [base] in 
SB7, in the year 2000, there were weapons delivered by ship which were 
brought ashore at Pasi Putih beach…I am convinced that the TNI is 
preparing militias in these two places and that at some stage these militias 
will become a force used to attack the community as happened in East 
Timor… someone caught an Ambonese in the act of bringing in weapons 
for these people…someone reported this to the district police. [The police] 
caught the person involved and asked him to be processed by the police, 
but what they found when they got there was the security forces [who] said 
                                                 
213 International Crisis Group, ‘Ending Repression in Irian Jaya,’ ICG Asia Report no.23, September 
20, 2001, available at www.crisisweb.org/projects/asia/indonesia/reports/a400414-20092001.pdf, 
accessed November 2005, 6. Bonay with McGrory, “chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de 
Veen, 2004, 442. 
214 Ibid. 
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the matter should be left up to them and they would follow it up. But to 
date there has been no further news concerning this case.215 
 
4.5k Level of Outrage  
 
LEVOUT = yes 
 
Thirty-five years after the event, the international community has finally come 
to question the validity of Jakarta's takeover of West Papua and the ongoing human 
rights abuses. In March 2004, 88 members of the Irish Parliament urged UN Secretary 
General Annan to review the UNs' role in the 1969 Act of Free Choice. On 28 June 
2004, nineteen U.S. Senators sent a letter to Annan urging the appointment of a 
Special Representative to Indonesia to monitor the human rights situation in West 
Papua. A news poll out on 19 April 2006 revealed that more than 75 per cent of 
Australians support self-determination or independence for West Papuans. This is not 
reflected in the Australian Government’s current hard-line asylum policy for West 
Papuans. The Government asylum policy is seen as a direct response to Indonesian 
anger over Australia’s granting asylum to some Papuans.216 The PIF has been a 
sympathetic voice for the plight of Papuans on the international stage.217 Member 
States Nauru and Vanuatu have been significant driving forces behind regional 
attention for the struggle,218 lobbying for West Papua to be put back on the UN’s 
decolonization list and a review of the legality of the Act of Free Choice by the 
International Court of Justice. The government in Port Vila has also allowed the PPC 
and OPM to set up representative offices in Vanuatu. 219  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
215 Wing with King, August 2005, 1-8. 
216 Pacific Magazine, ‘AUSTRALIA: UN Warns Not To Punish Refugees,’ Wednesday 19 April 2006, 
http://www.pacificislands.cc/pina/pinadefault2.php?urlpinaid=21520, accessed 26 April 2006. 
217 Ibid., 35. See Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 446. 
218 See Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 446. 
219 Port Villa Presse, ‘Vanuatu Wants West Papua Back on Decolonization List,’ September 25, 2002. 
See Ibid.  
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Figure 10: Summary of Conflict and Multilateral Non-Intervention in West 
Papua – Measurements and Evidence of Structural and Perceptual Conditions 
Structural and 
Perceptual 
Conditions 
Measurement/
Evidence of 
Conditions 
                           Description 
DISPS          2 The greatest grievance is regarding West Papua’s 
independence and the end of illegitimate Indonesian 
occupation of Papua. 
FATAL          4 Between 30,000 and 100,000 deaths as a result of 
Indonesian occupation 
YRBEGIN   May 1965          President Sukarno decides that there will be no self-
determination for Papuans. 
YREND       9999 Conflict Ongoing: 41 years in total duration. 
PHASE            
         4 
Currently, the conflict is still in the conflict or 
escalation phase, something that has not changed since 
January 1, 1976. 
MILCAP 15,000-20,000 
Indonesian 
forces; 
TPN/OPM 
forces estimate 
at 1,600 
This was the number of forces in West Papua on April 
2002. The figure for TPN/OPM includes a number of 
units pursuing non-violent means 
ECOCAP         9 No basis for judgement 
MAGFIGHT         3 3 main groups of disputants: Indonesia, OPM, and TPN 
TACSTRA          
        4 
There have generally been more systematic negative 
uses of conflict resolution instruments by just the 
government than positive uses of conflict resolution 
instruments. 
SUPEROS       
        2    
Superpower remains neutral and inactive to the conflict 
resolution process and any multilateral intervention 
decisions. 
IDENORG         2 limited organization and identifiability of West Papuan 
disputants 
INITIATE      
 
     2 and 3 
Multilateral intervention has been requested or 
consented to by the opposition group; while there has 
been resistance by at least one of the disputants (in this 
case the Government), it has been requested/welcomed 
by the civil society/ grassroots community. 
MAGFAIL          3 Failure of state authority in a limited area of the 
country, for example, secession or rebel control of, or 
anarchic conditions in, one or several regions that do 
not include the core area of the country of its capital. 
ECWEALTH          
         3 
There are some exceptionally scarce and valuable 
resources such as oil, rare timber, gas and minerals – 
has the potential to be of economic benefit. Home to 
one of the World’s biggest gold mines. 
SPILL         
 
IDPs: 15,000 (est. January 2000) numbers fluctuate and 
are difficult to confirm. Refugees: Bonay and McGrory 
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          5   
state that there are some 6,000 refugees in PNG (est. 
2000); and an estimated 150 political exiles in other 
countries. Whilst, King and King state that TNI 
operations have created over 11,000 refugees during  
2003-5. It was also noted that some 12,000 West 
Papuans fled as refugees to Papua New Guinea 
between 1984 and 1987.  
ECIMPORT           1 West Papua is not highly integrated in the regional and 
international market, is not a strong and important 
trading partner, with membership in important trading 
agreements. Papua remains ranked the second lowest in 
the Indonesian Human Development Index of 2004. 
This is despite its Gross Regional Domestic Product 
(GRDP) being ranked the third largest in Indonesia 
based upon income from the trading of their rich 
natural resources. 
MEDIA          No No evidence of concentrated media attention on the 
West Papua conflict. 
INTENVIRO          No There is no evidence on how this might impact on the 
attractiveness of non-intervention. 
REPUT           
         No 
There is no concrete evidence to suggest that 
reputational interests have effected the decision not to 
intervene in West Papua. 
LIKESUCCESS           2 There is no stalemate evident or substantial agreement 
from which to base an intervention on. Yet there is a 
strong civil society/grassroots element willing for 
peace. 
CLEAR          No No evidence of any clear exit points. 
REFCRISIS    
         1 
Not a humanitarian crisis. There are varying estimates 
of IDPs and refugees but the minimum number 
recorded stands at 20,000 up. 
DEATHMAG        8-9 Between 30,000 to 100,000 dead. A “silent genocide” 
LEVOUT  
 
 
 
       yes 
International NGOs – Amnesty International, TAPOL, 
Human Rights Watch, the World Council of Churches, 
the International Crisis Group, and the International 
Catholic Migration Commission – are prominent 
campaigners on issues of peace and justice in Papuan 
on the international level. Additionally, international 
solidarity movements, in particular in Australia, the 
UK, and the Netherlands, are active in raising the 
international profile of the Papuan struggle. The 
Papuan Diaspora in Australia and the Netherlands also 
work to raise the awareness of human rights abuses and 
issues of self-determination. 
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                                   Chapter Five 
 
 
 
A Comparative Analysis of the Primary Conditions that Attract 
Multilateral Intervention or Non-Intervention 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 In this chapter the descriptive, the predictive and the prescriptive value of the 
framework will be analyzed with regard to the cases of multilateral intervention in 
East Timor and the Solomon Islands, and with regard to the cases of multilateral non-
intervention in the Philippines and West Papua. Chapter Four indicated that many of 
the structural and perceptual conditions identified under the framework were present 
in all four cases, and some conditions were found to correlate strongly with a 
particular multilateral decision to intervene or to not intervene. Yet will these strong 
correlates be maintained as relevant when all of the cases are compared? This chapter 
defines the primary conditions found in each case, compares the results, and examines 
the primary conditions that are prevalent in both decisions to intervene and to not 
intervene.  
 
5.2 Primary Conditions that Attract Multilateral Intervention 
 
5.2a East Timor 
 
In the case of East Timor, the role of the media, which focused on fatalities, 
the IDP and refugee crisis, and evidence of genocide of the East Timorese people, was 
critical in cultivating an environment conducive to high levels of outrage and the 
audience costs necessary to stir multilateral actors towards intervention.1 With its 
reputation undermined by humanitarian abuses, Indonesia had little leeway with the 
                                                 
1 See Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 162. 
 150 
international community when there was so much concrete and sustained media 
evidence of brutality that the Indonesian state and its military had undertaken.  
 
Secondly, the nature of the international environment influenced the 
multilateral response to the East Timor conflict. The failure to intervene previously in 
high profile internal conflicts such as Rwanda and Srebrenica had almost crippled the 
usefulness and reputation of the UN and ASEAN. This suggests that the issues of 
timing or significant events on the world stage are important in attracting multilateral 
intervention. Gaining the consent of the Indonesian government (even if it was 
induced), the economic wealth of East Timor (the Timor Sea oil supply), and the 
existence of a clear exit strategy also proved valuable conditions that determined 
multilateral intervention. Consequently the media, the humanitarian crisis (in respect 
of UPMs and genocide), the international environment, the consent of the sovereign 
state, potential economic benefits, and a clear exit strategy were all determining 
factors leading to multilateral intervention in East Timor. 
 
5.2b Solomon Islands 
 
 In the case of conflict in the Solomon Islands, the role of state failure and the 
nature of the international environment were also pivotal in attracting multilateral 
intervention. Undermined by corruption, the weakened Solomon Islands state 
demonstrated an inability to maintain law and order. After the terrorist attacks in New 
York (11 September 2001) and Bali (October 2002), this weakness was viewed as a 
threat to collective and individual security. Secondly, the short duration of conflict (5 
years), the perception of a likelihood of success, the fact that the phase was post-
conflict at the point of intervention, the invitation to intervene, and the possibility of a 
quick reduction of substantial military and police numbers, implied a high probability 
of a successful intervention with low risks and few costs. In addition, an interested 
Member State, and neighbour Australia, was willing to subsidize the intervention 
effort for over a decade. Therefore, state failure, the international environment, the 
high likelihood of success due to favourable conditions, and a self-interested investor 
contributed to multilateral intervention in the Solomon Islands. See figure 11 to gain 
an understanding of how two conditions were essential in making the other primary 
conditions significant in attracting multilateral intervention.  
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Figure 11: Diagram of the Primary Conditions for Multilateral Intervention 
 
 
 
5.3 Primary Conditions that Deter Multilateral Intervention 
 
5.3a Philippines  
 
 The results of the multilateral non-intervention cases are harder to determine 
and this, unfortunately, leads to less accurate conclusions. Many of the dynamics 
identified under the framework were present in the case of the Philippines (Mindanao-
Sulu) conflict. The primary conditions that have made multilateral intervention 
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unattractive to this case of conflict have been the long duration of the conflict (40 
years) which has made it highly entrenched; the attempts at positive uses of conflict 
resolution by both disputants, even though they have both generally resorted to force 
or the threat of force; the fact that there have been no concerted efforts calling for 
multilateral intervention; the lack of clear exit points or sustained media coverage; the 
Philippines’ important presence in the international market; and currently the ASG’s 
role in the ‘war on terror’. Each of these conditions either suggests a possible solution 
between the disputants in the near future, so that there would be no need for 
multilateral intervention, or illustrates the potential high risks and costs for any 
multilateral actor considering intervention.  
 
5.3b West Papua 
 
In the case of conflict in West Papua, many of the results from the framework 
look very like those found in the East Timor case, but whereas these conditions led to 
multilateral intervention in East Timor, it appears that the same conditions are 
affecting multilateral non-intervention in West Papua. This has made the examination 
of the West Papua conditions extremely difficult. How does one explain a multilateral 
action in one case when there is a similar case that produced a completely different 
multilateral response? There is particularly convincing evidence of the lack of media 
attention in failing to attract a high level of regional and international level of outrage. 
Yet recently there has been a medium level of concern; whether this will encourage 
higher media attention and, consequently a greater level of international opposition 
has yet to be seen. Other important conditions hat have influenced a policy of non-
intervention in this case of conflict include the long duration of the conflict (41 years), 
that during the majority of the time the conflict has been escalating, and the resulting 
fact that there have been no clear exit points. See figure 12 to gain an understanding 
of which conditions have proved essential in deterring multilateral intervention. 
 
Figure 12: Diagram of the Primary Conditions for Multilateral Non-Intervention 
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Given the presence of both primary structural and perceptual causes in all of 
the cases, it is concluded that the framework adequately demonstrates why 
intervention has not happened in the internal conflicts in West Papua and the 
Philippines and why it has occurred in East Timor and the Solomon Islands.  Table 13 
compares the measurement and evidential results of the four cases of conflict in an 
effort to determine and analyze the primary conditions that correlated with a particular 
response and to determine which primary conditions were prevalent in cases that led 
to a different response. For other graphs that attempt to compare the results in further 
detail see the Appendix. 
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Table 13: Summary Comparison of the Four Case Studies: Measurement and 
Evidence of Structural and Perceptual Conditions 
 
 East 
Timor 
Solomon 
Islands 
The 
Philippines 
West 
Papua 
Structural and 
Perceptual Conditions 
             Measurement or Evidence of Conditions 
DISP       2    1,2,3      1,2,3        2 
FATAL       4        1         4        4 
YRBEGIN    1975     1998       1968     1965 
YREND    1999     2003       9999     9999 
PHASE       4      5-6        3-6        4 
MILCAP 20,000 UN 
and 
Member 
State 
personnel      
2,000 UN 
and 
Member 
State 
personnel  
Disputants: 
47,000 
members 
and 
Government 
Forces 
Disputants: 
15,000-
20,000 
Indonesian 
forces; 
TPN/OPM 
forces: 
1,600 
ECOCAP AUS$476.
8 million 
over a year 
AUS$853  
million 
over a 
decade 
     
       9 
   
      9 
MAGFIGHT       2       5        3        3 
TACSTRA       4       2        2        4 
SUPEROS       1       2        2        2 
IDENORG       1       2        2        2 
INITIATE       1       1        9       2-3 
MAGFAIL       3       5       2-3        3 
ECWEALTH       3       2        3        3 
SPILL       5       4        5        5 
ECIMPORT       1       1        3        1 
MEDIA      Yes   Limited    Limited       No 
INTENVIRO      Yes      Yes    Limited       No 
REPUT      Yes    Limited        No       No 
LIKESUCCESS        2       1         1        2 
CLEAR       Yes     Yes       No       No 
REFCRISIS        2        1         2        1 
DEATHMAG       10       1-2          9       8-9  
MNTBEGIN/MNTEND       No        No        No       No 
LEVOUT      Yes     Limited    Limited       Yes 
 
5.4 Results in Comparison 
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This comparison of the results implies that there are no exact correlates 
between the structural and perceptual conditions and the attractiveness of multilateral 
intervention. It must, consequently, be considered that multilateral intervention and 
non-intervention may amount to self or collective political interest and a group of 
particular primary conditions which affect political will. The selection bias is obvious. 
Yet it is still important to note and examine the primary conditions that did attract 
intervention and non-intervention in order to understand these multilateral policies 
and to predict future multilateral interventions and non-interventions of other internal 
conflicts. The next section examines the conditions that were found to be of primary 
importance to a particular multilateral decision to intervene or to not intervene and 
which were not prevalent in the cases of a different multilateral response. The section 
that follows examines the primary conditions that were prevailing in cases of both 
multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene.  
 
5.5 Assessing the Value of the Non-Overlapping Conditions: The Conditions of 
Primary Importance to the Multilateral Decision to Intervene or to Not 
Intervene 
 
5.5a Duration  
 
The duration of the conflict is significant for both multilateral decisions to 
intervene and to not intervene. Previous studies have argued that the duration of a 
conflict is an indication of conflict entrenchment.2 This study illustrates that the 
shorter the duration the less the perception of an entrenched internal conflict. To 
increase the expected utility of providing assistance, multilateral actors pursuing 
multilateral intervention will become involved earlier rather than later in internal 
conflicts. Whilst the longer an internal conflict continues, as the two non-intervention 
cases validate (40 years or more), the higher the disincentives and complexities for 
getting involved. Long duration of an internal conflict decreases the perception of a 
high likelihood of intervention success, thereby increasing the disincentives of such a 
multilateral policy.3 As the intensity of fighting escalates in a conflict of long 
duration, the level of multilateral assistance that must be offered to influence the 
                                                 
2 Bercovitch and Langely, 1993, 676. 
3 Ibid.  
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conflict rises.4 Duration would however, as diagrams 10 and 11 illustrate, only be a 
primary condition if it were accompanied by other primary conditions such as a lack 
of sustained media coverage or high resistance levels to a multilateral intervention 
policy.  
 
5.5b Consent or Resistance to Multilateral Intervention  
 In the literature, whether the disputants consent to multilateral intervention or 
not are considered important conditions for or against intervention.5 The cases of 
conflict examined in this project illustrate that the level of resistance (high or low) by 
the State in conflict to the idea or suggestion of multilateral intervention is a 
significant condition for both multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene. 
Sovereignty has been the rock of international relations for 350 years, and the guiding 
framework around which the UN is organized.6  It remains deeply important to most 
UN Member States. This means that any efforts to interfere in domestic affairs 
continue to face strong opposition. Yet the UN document, ‘In Larger Freedom’, gives 
the impression that Member States not only benefit from the privileges of sovereignty 
but also accept their responsibilities to protect their citizens.  
Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system 
first gave rise to the notion of State sovereignty, today it clearly carries 
with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own people and 
meet its obligations to the wider international community. But history 
teaches us all too clearly that it cannot be assumed that every State will 
always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own 
people and avoid harming its neighbours. And in those circumstances, the 
principles of collective security mean that some portion of those 
responsibilities should be taken up by the international community, acting 
in accordance with the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, to help build the necessary capacity or supply the necessary 
protection, as the case may be.7 
Sovereignty still matters. There have not been many cases, with the possible 
exception of South Africa, in which multilateral actors have been willing to intervene 
on humanitarian grounds when an existing government has resisted multilateral 
                                                 
4 Pence, http://www.indiana.edu/~iupolsci/bio_pence.html, 9. 
5 Akashi cited in Burci, chapter 9 in Sellers, 1996, 250-1.  
6 Mark Turner, ‘UN ‘Must Never Again Be Found Wanting on Genocide’’ Financial times, September 
16, 2005, http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/humanint/2005/0916unsummit.htm, accessed 20 March 
2006. 
7 UN, Larger Freedom, http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/executivesummary.pdf, 3-4. 
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intervention.8  Despite the human rights justifications for intrusion in the four case 
studies examined, multilateral intervention was undertaken only with the consent of 
the sovereign state; with the cases that did not attract intervention, the sovereign states 
have not called for such a policy.  
The case of East Timor presents an interesting relationship between 
sovereignty and multilateral intervention. Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty over East 
Timor was not recognized by the UN and a majority of its Member States, yet the 
international community deemed Indonesia’s consent to be an essential condition for 
multilateral intervention even if such consent was induced. The International 
Community was not prepared to destroy its relationship with Indonesia by acting 
without its consent – let alone to have to fight its way into East Timor against the 
Indonesian army. The discomfort of multilateral actors in overriding claims of 
sovereignty continues to set limits on norms relating to multilateral intervention.9 In 
the case of Sudan, the government has, at the time of writing, succeeded in blocking 
the creation of a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, despite US allegations of 
‘genocide.’ The decision has come as a setback to many of the UN Member States 
who have seen the dispatch of UN forces as the best chance of saving thousands of 
lives.10 
5.5c Nature of the International Environment  
 
Previous studies have argued that the nature of the international environment 
may be a significant determinant for whether a multilateral intervention takes place or 
not. 11  Vertzberger argues that at any point in time particular multilateral actors have 
fewer or greater opportunities and incentives to intervene, depending on the prevailing 
external conditions.12 The case studies examined validate this argument for the 
attractiveness of both multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene.  All the 
responses to the case studies, with the exception of West Papua (only due to the lack 
of concrete evidence), have been influenced to a high degree by the nature of the 
international environment. The intervention into East Timor and the Solomon Islands, 
                                                 
8 For examples see Donnelly, 1993, 636. 
9 Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 160. 
10 The Press, In Brief, World B3, Monday, March 13, 2005. 
11 Heraclides 1990; Regan 2000. 
12 Vertzberger, 1996, 143. 
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and non-intervention in the Philippines validate the idea that these responses are a 
consequence of the changing political, economic, or security collective interests in the 
international environment. Intervention in East Timor was the result of a period of 
“enormous euphoria” post-Cold War when international and regional organizations 
were finding their footing after so much focus on one major inter-state conflict, and as 
a result of the failures to act in the face of ethnic cleansing and genocide in Rwanda 
and Bosnia.13  
 
With the Philippines and the Solomon Islands it has been the threat of, or 
reaction to, terrorism that has led to such varied multilateral responses. The terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington, D.C., brought with 
them a glimpse of the potential for renewed collective security.14 For many, those 
events and their aftermath have suspended the international community’s concern 
about the plight of individuals in situations of humanitarian emergency, and placed 
more fundamental concerns about survival at the top of the policy agenda. As 
Canadian Ambassador to the UN Paul Heinbecker put it, while the interventions in 
East Timor and Kosovo were all about protecting the vulnerable ‘other, in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and the Solomon Islands, the motivation was protecting ‘self’.15 It 
can also be argued that the motivation was in protecting the ‘collective’. Furthermore, 
the experiences of 11 September and the requirements of the ‘war on terror’ may have 
dampened Member States’ enthusiasm for criticizing the treatment of civilians within 
other sovereign jurisdictions. Interestingly, States such as the Philippines that were 
previously subject to international criticism for internal repression have skilfully 
deflected attention by labelling their actions as ‘counter-terrorist’.16  
 
5.5d Status of Government  
 
Recently, complete state failure has become a strong justification for 
multilateral intervention, especially with the intervention in the Solomon Islands. 
Where the State in question has failed or collapsed, with no government effectively 
                                                 
13 Andrew Thompson, ‘Interview on Ideas’, National Radio Programme, after the 11am news Sunday 
19 March. 
14 UN, Larger Freedom, http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/executivesummary.pdf, 3-4. 
15 Paul Heinbecker cited in Welsh, 2004, 181. 
16 Welsh, 2004, 181. 
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able to exercise the sovereign responsibility of protecting its people, the principle of 
multilateral non-intervention has less force.17 Even while there remains very little 
literature on whether state failure attracts multilateral intervention or non-intervention, 
the importance of state failure as a condition that attracts intervention is validated by 
the Solomon Islands intervention. Invoking for the first time the (October 2000) 
Bitekawa Declaration governing intervention in the affairs of its Member States, the 
Pacific Island Forum said in 2003 that the consensus on intervention was a reflection 
of the severity of the Solomon Islands crisis.18 But considering that the crisis had 
limited fatalities, was in the early stages of conflict and was not technically a 
humanitarian crisis, the Forum must have meant the severity of state collapse in the 
Solomon Islands. Without an effective government upholding the rule of law and 
controlling its borders, the Solomon Islands risked becoming “a petri dish in which 
trans-national and non-state security threats could develop and breed”.19  The fact that 
the Solomon Islands Government was bankrupt meant that it was vulnerable to 
external influence by both state and non-state actors. There was a perception among 
multilateral actors that this weakness could lead to such external schemes as the 
dumping toxic waste; money laundering; drug smuggling; gun-running; identity 
fraud; people smuggling; providing a transit point for trans-national crime and 
terrorism; the selling of sovereignty; or resorting to the use of mercenaries to restore 
control in some areas in exchange for extraction rights.20 
This mattered for two reasons. First, this kind of legal, political, economic and 
military vacuum could have made Australia, New Zealand, Southeast Asia and the 
rest of the Pacific in particular, significantly more vulnerable to trans-national 
criminal operations based in or operating out of Solomon Islands. This would be a 
result of the Solomon Islands' limited capacity to monitor the movement of people. 
Secondly, there may have been a high likelihood that such problems would prove 
contagious to other states in the region. Collapse in Solomon Islands may have made 
it all the harder for other weak states to maintain their political systems. If 
transnational criminals had become established in Solomon Islands, it would have 
                                                 
17 ICISS, http://www.iciss-ca/menu-en.asp, 19. 
18 New Zealand Herald, Greg Ansley, ‘Forum Decides on Armed Rescue Force,’ 1 July 2003, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/featrue/story.cfm?c_id621&ObjectID=3510256, accessed June 2005. 
19 ASPI, http://www.aspi.org.au/22484solomons/directors.html. 
20 Ibid. 
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been that much easier for them to penetrate and expand operations in regional 
neighbouring States.21 Yet it must be considered that there are many failing states that 
have not attracted multilateral intervention. Somalia has not has a government in 15 
years.22 What does this say about the importance of a failed state in attracting 
multilateral intervention? Does it just mean that there is a necessity for other primary 
conditions to be prevalent in attracting this multilateral response? These question need 
to be considered by future researchers in order to explain the full importance of the 
status of government as a determinant for intervention or no-intervention decisions.  
5.5e Any Clear Exit Points or an Exit Strategy  
 
The high or low perception of clear exit points or the evidence of an exit 
strategy is significant for both multilateral decisions to intervene and to not intervene. 
Multilateral intervention in the conflicts in the Solomon Islands and East Timor were 
made more attractive with the possibility of a quick reduction of forces, with no 
obvious quagmires to combat. In the Solomon Islands, there were clear exit points due 
to the low intensity levels, illustrated by the low number of fatalities and the generally 
positive tactics and strategies of the disputants. The lack of evidence of clear exit 
points appears to be a primary condition in the cases of multilateral non-intervention, 
portraying the possibility of high costs and high risks associated with multilateral 
intervention decisions.23 Member States always want to know what the strategy is for 
getting their troops out of a conflict situation and bringing them home alive.24  
 
Unfortunately the perception of clear exit points or evidence of an exit 
strategy at the time of multilateral intervention does not necessarily equate with 
reality. In any conflict a clear exit point may subsequently need revision. In 2006 riots 
broke out in both the Solomon Islands and East Timor and the level of deployment of 
multilateral intervention had to increase substantially in both countries.  
 
5.5f Reputation interests  
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 TV3 News, Television New Zealand, 2 April, 2006, 6pm. 
23 Viggo Jakobsen, 2000, 131-143. 
24 Honourable Lee H. Hamilton, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 
‘Intervention,’ US Institute of Peace, May 2, 
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=director.speeches&resource_id=4617, accessed July 2005. 
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The high or low perception of reputational interests at stake within a case of 
conflict is significant for the multilateral decision to intervene. Vertzberger suggests 
that interveners may be concerned that by not taking constructive action they may risk 
adverse effects to their reputation.25 The case of East Timor validates this in respect of 
ASEAN and the UN. After their failure to act in other internal conflicts, both 
organizations faced harsh criticism and lost credibility prior to the decision to 
intervene in East Timor. However, in the Solomon Islands conflict, the multilateral 
actors were aware of the likelihood that any successful policy approach would require 
much deeper engagement which risked being seen as a step towards ‘neocolonialism’. 
This situation caused much debate about the costs and risks between Member States.26 
Yet this did not deter multilateral intervention. It was in the collective interests of 
both organizations to recover their reputation.  Suffering a negative reputation is not 
detrimental to multilateral intervention when collective interests overrule any negative 
feedback an intervention may generate. 
5.5g Economic Importance of the State in Conflict  
 
The economic importance of the target state in conflict has been a condition 
ascertained as important in the literature. Usually considered important for unilateral 
interventions,27 in the case of the conflict in the Philippines economic importance was 
important in influencing multilateral non-intervention. Multilateral actors do not wish 
to upset an important economic state with intervention and consequently, the 
economic importance of the state in conflict will make an option of non-intervention 
an attractive policy. John Pilger points out that were it not for ‘western’ business 
interests in Indonesia, more decisive action could have been taken earlier and more 
lives could have been saved in East Timor.28 The Philippines case illustrates that 
being an important regional and international economic player, and a member of 
many important economic organizations, despite economic difficulties, will shape the 
collective and self interests of an organization such as the UN and ASEAN and their 
individual Member States.  
 
                                                 
25 Vertzberger, 1996, 401-404. 
26 ASPI, http://www.aspi.org.au/22484solomons/directors.html. 
27 R. Cooper and M. Berdal, ‘Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts’ Survival 35, 1993, 118-42. 
28 Shah, 2000. 
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5.5h Media Coverage  
 
While media coverage did not prove decisive for multilateral intervention into 
the Solomon Islands, it proved an essential element in the case of intervention in East 
Timor with the focus on ‘real-time television’. The ‘CNN-lead’ explosion of global 
news coverage increased public awareness of the human dimension of internal 
conflict in East Timor, contributing to regional and international pressure on 
multilateral actors to take immediate and constructive action.29  Supporters of the 
‘CNN effect’ argue that the media drives multilateral conflict management by forcing 
organizations to intervene in humanitarian crises against their will.30 However, in the 
case of the conflict in East Timor, other primary conditions were also necessary to 
make intervention attractive, such as the international environment, consent, and 
economic benefits. Organizations cannot be forced to intervene against their will.31 
Consequently, the ‘CNN effect’ is only effective in exceptional circumstances when 
multilateral actors believe that they can be undertaken with the consent and legitimacy 
of the sovereign State, with some benefits and in an environment that necessitates 
such an intervention policy.32 There was little collective or national interest in 
managing the East Timor case. When national interests are not perceived to be at 
stake the ‘CNN effect’ is necessary to mobilize pressure on multilateral 
organizations.33 
 
5.5i Phase of Conflict  
 
There are some phases of conflict that are more predisposed to multilateral 
interventions than others. Multilateral interventions will more often be considered 
once the most violent phase of conflict has passed, a cease-fire has been negotiated, 
and the disputants are trying to find ways to reconcile their differences. In the 
                                                 
29 For example, In July 2000 H. E. Mr. Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary-General of ASEAN stated, 
“People’s humanitarian impulse with respect to armed conflict has been intensified by the entry into the 
world’s living room of images, in living colour, of rotting corpses, starving babies, stumps of limbs 
hacked off or blasted away, streams of desperate refugees, the physical and human devastation. 
Graphic descriptions and passionate advocacy on the internet have had the same effect. Severino, 2000, 
http://www.aseansec.org/3221.htm. See also Harff and Gurr, 2004, 189. 
30 Viggo Jakobsen, 2000, 131-2. 
31 For analysis arguing that the importance of the CNN effect is exaggerated see Gowing, 1994b; 
Natsios in Rotberg and Weiss, 1996; Strobel, 1997. 
32 Viggo Jakobsen, 2000, 136. 
33 Viggo Jakobsen, 1996, 205-215. 
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Solomon Islands case the phase when intervention was taken, between de-escalation 
and termination or the post-conflict phase was a primary condition for multilateral 
intervention. Once the most violent phases of the conflict had passed it was perceived 
that Member State and public consensus on an intervention policy could be 
achieved.34 It was during this phase that the Solomon Islands public had had enough 
time to be weary of the conflict and welcome intervention. Table 14 provides a 
summary of the above primary conditions that are not prevalent in a different 
multilateral response. 
 
Table 14: Summary Comparison of Non-Overlapping Primary Conditions that 
Attract Multilateral Intervention or Non-Intervention Decisions 
 
 
Intervention Non-Intervention Primary Conditions 
                                  Evidence 
Duration Within 5yrs for early 
intervention or up to 24 
years maximum 
40 years or more 
Sovereign consent or 
appeal for intervention 
East Timor: Induced 
sovereign  
consent  
Solomon Islands: 
intervention by sovereign 
invitation 
No sovereign consent or 
appeal for intervention 
 
Nature of International 
Environment 
East Timor: Post-Rwanda 
and Srebrenica 
Solomon Islands: Post 
September 11 and Bali 
bombing 
Philippines: War on Terror 
has extended to the 
Philippines and ASG 
West Papua: no evidence 
on how this might impact 
on the attractiveness of 
non-intervention 
State Failure Solomon Islands: Failed 
State 
No complete state failure 
Clear Exit Points Solomon Islands: The 
possibility of a quick 
reduction of substantial 
military and police 
numbers.  
No clear exit points in both 
conflicts 
                                                 
34 Regan, 2000, 110. 
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East Timor: A clear exit 
strategy 
Reputation East Timor: ASEAN No evidence of 
reputational interest in the 
decision not to intervene in 
either case 
Economic Importance of 
the State in Conflict 
Both places of conflict 
were not highly 
integrated in the regional 
and international market; 
not strong and important 
trading partners; and 
neither had membership 
in important trading 
agreements. 
Philippines: is highly 
integrated in the regional 
and international market, a 
strong and important 
trading partner, with 
membership in important 
trading agreements. 
Media Coverage East Timor: Media 
coverage was extremely 
intense  
No evidence of concerted 
media attention in either 
conflicts 
Phase of conflict Solomon Islands: de-
escalation-termination 
phase 
Philippines: hostilities 
phase – termination phase; 
West Papua: Escalation 
phase 
 
5.6 Assessing the Primary Conditions that were Prevailing in Both Multilateral 
Decisions to Intervene and to Not Intervene.  
 
5.6a Introduction 
 
Some conditions determining a multilateral response were of primary 
importance in some cases, but were prevalent in another case study that led to an 
opposing outcome. This raises the question, why was a multilateral action not taken 
when it was in other instances with the same conditions? Perhaps political will does 
control multilateral action but certainly there are still some conditions that make 
multilateral intervention or non-intervention attractive policies. What it does suggest 
is that there are some conditions which are very important in influencing decisions to 
intervene or to not intervene, and there are various conditions which are sufficient but 
not essential for these decisions to be influenced.35 Perhaps the application of the 
framework on these four case studies has illustrated the need for criteria that ascertain 
                                                 
35 For more information about necessary and sufficient conditions see Benjamin A. Most and Harvey 
Starr, Inquiry, Logic and International Politics University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, South 
Carolina, 1989. 
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what conditions should be prevailing for multilateral decisions to intervene or to not 
intervene. It appears that multilateral interventions are taken on an ad hoc basis – 
without much thought to other internal conflicts or past multilateral acts.  
 
5.6b Escalation Phase  
 
 The escalation phase may be characterized by significant armed violence or its 
spread, generating not only direct casualties but also human rights abuses, 
humanitarian crises, refugees, and IDPs. There will also be a significant hardening of 
disputant positions as the violence increases. Multilateral actors must develop 
strategies that seek not only to defuse conflict, but also to limit its escalation, 
terminate it, and lessen the effects that may complicate peace negotiations and 
eventual peace-building. In the Solomon Islands conflict, while the post-conflict 
phase was found to attract multilateral intervention, the escalation phase was found to 
decrease the attractiveness of a multilateral policy of intervention in the conflict in 
West Papua. Yet it was during the escalation phase that multilateral intervention in 
East Timor occurred. Consequently, this condition is only a sufficient condition for 
multilateral non-intervention decisions it is not an essential condition. In the literature, 
it is the escalation phase that is perceived to cause high costs and high risks. 
Multilateral actors are unlikely to view escalation as an appealing phase to intervene. 
In East Timor, this condition with its costs and risks was overshadowed by the other 
primary conditions such as the potential for negative audience costs. 
 
5.6c Tactics and Strategies of Disputants  
 
The type of tactics and strategies employed by disputants in an internal 
conflict, as indicated by the East Timor case, is significant for the multilateral 
decision to intervene. However the evidence of this same condition in the case of 
conflict in the Philippines indicates that it is not an essential condition to the decision 
to intervene. Strategies and tactics, such as those of repression, conciliatory gestures, 
or terrorism, elevated the visibility of both of these conflicts.  
 
While a lack of measured attempts by the government to settle the conflict was 
a condition for multilateral intervention in East Timor, the lack of positive action by 
 166 
the Indonesian Government in the case of West Papua had no such effect. This 
discrepancy has been found in other cases. While Haiti was considered a suitable 
candidate for multilateral intervention because of its military regime’s lack of 
democratic respect, Burma, whose military regime is at least as repressive as was that 
of Haiti’s General Cedras, was not. 36 Furthermore, the case of conflict in the 
Philippines illustrates that when positive uses of conflict resolution are undertaken by 
both government and disputants this appears to deter multilateral decisions to 
intervene. Multilateral actors may perceive that a policy of intervention would create 
further difficulties to the negotiating process. While this condition is of primary 
importance to the Philippines non-intervention, it was also present in the Solomon 
Islands case where multilateral intervention took place.  
 
5.6d Economic Wealth of State in Conflict  
 
An interesting finding is the importance of material interests in determining 
the response of Member States to internal conflict. Edward Mortimer argued on New 
Zealand’s National Radio, “countries do not intervene unless they have material 
interests”, Wednesday 18 January 2006, 5.30pm.37 The presence of economic interests 
in East Timor increased the potential gains for the intervener(s), and thus Member 
States were willing to invest greater resources toward multilateral intervention.38 This 
finding would tend to support the realist theory of international relations which 
stresses the importance of Member States as rational actors, seeking to maximize their 
share of limited resources. Yet both the Philippines and West Papua have 
exceptionally scarce and valuable resources, all of which would be perceived by 
multilateral actors as a potential benefit to any intervention policy. Consequently, the 
economic wealth of the state in conflict is a sufficient condition for multilateral 
decisions to intervene but is not an essential condition for this response. 
 
5.6e No Concerted Media Coverage 
                                                 
36 The Canadian Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations and the Centre for Criminal 
Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, ‘States Without Law: The Role of Multilateral Intervention 
to Restore Local Justice Systems’ December 1995, 
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/States.pdf, accessed 20 March 2006, 2.  
37 Edward Mortimer, ‘Places that Change the World, discussion about the United Nations,’ National 
Radio, Wednesday 18 January 2006, 5.30pm. 
38 Kapral, 2004. 
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The media is selective when it comes to the level of reporting and analysis of 
internal conflicts.39 Multilateral non-intervention in West Papua and the Philippines 
can be partly explained by the lack of concerted media coverage that has resulted in 
low to medium levels of international outrage. Yet a lack of media coverage in the 
Solomon Islands failed to deter multilateral intervention. With organizational policy-
makers set on a particular course of action, as they were in the Solomon Islands, 
critical media coverage is unlikely to influence multilateral policy. Multilateral actors 
are, instead, more likely to work harder to promote their chosen course of action 
through press briefing and public announcements.40 When national and collective 
interests are perceived to be at stake, as they were in the Solomon Islands case, 
multilateral actors will work hard to mobilize international and domestic support. In 
this scenario, the ‘CNN effect’ becomes diluted.41 
 
5.6f Likelihood of Success  
 
The decision to intervene is also a function of the multilateral actors’ 
subjective estimate of the likely outcome of the internal conflict and the effect of 
multilateral intervention on that outcome. Political fortunes may also be tied to the 
outcome of a given multilateral policy. A failed multilateral intervention may come 
with high political costs while a multilateral organization may reap considerable 
political rewards from a successful intervention.42 The perception of a successful 
policy was a primary condition in the Solomon Islands multilateral intervention, yet 
the possibility of a successful policy is also evident in the Philippines. In the case of 
conflict in the Philippines, a strong civil society is willing and working for peace, 
there is an emotional, economic, and military stalemate between some of the 
disputants, and there are some agreements which to work from. Perhaps there remains 
uncertainty in how to confront the conflict in the Philippines especially when the 
tactics and strategies of the disputants are generally positive. Uncertainty over how to 
                                                 
39 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, http://www.iciss-ca/menu-en.asp.  
40 Robinson, 2000, 613. 
41 Viggo Jakobsen, 1996, 205-215. 
42 Regan, 2000, 23. 
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deal with a particular internal conflict would show up as a declining probability of 
multilateral intervention.43   
 
5.6g Refugee or IDP Humanitarian Crisis  
 
In the literature, UPMs are increasingly seen as a condition that generates 
multilateral interventions.44  According to MacFarlane, the rapid rise in numbers of 
persons displaced within and between countries has dramatically altered the interests 
of organizations vis-à-vis internal conflicts.45 In respect of East Timor, the IDP and 
refugee humanitarian crisis provoked a multilateral decision to intervene, but only 
after the media attention provided evidence of this crisis. In the conflicts in the 
Philippines and in West Papua, both have similar UPM numbers, yet this condition 
has failed to attract such a multilateral response.46  
 
5.6h Genocide/Politicide  
 
In considering whether and where to intervene, the question that has assumed 
talismanic significance is: Is it genocide? In the words of the international tribunal for 
Rwanda, genocide is the “crime of crimes.”47  Such a finding has become a signal for 
the world to act. Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), Member States have agreed that 
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under 
international law which they will undertake to prevent and punish. Since then it has 
been understood that genocide anywhere is a threat to the security of all and should 
never be tolerated.48  
 
Consequently, it may be assumed that genocide or politicide might be 
important criteria for multilateral intervention, and in the case of East Timor it was a 
primary condition. Yet blatant genocide and/or politicide are prevalent in West Papua 
                                                 
43  Ibid., 56. 
44 Loescher 1992, 3. 
45 MacFarlane, 2002, 51-53. 
46 ACFID, http://www.acfid.asn.au/campaigns/solomons/Aus_intervention.pdf. 
47 David Bosco, ‘Crimes of Crimes’ Washington Post, March 6, 2005, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/humanint/2005/0306crime.htm, accessed 20 March 2006. 
48 UN, In Larger Freedom, http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/executivesummary.pdf, 65. 
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which has yet to attract intervention. Nicholas J. Wheeler argues that “the West’s 
conception of humanitarian intervention is so ideologically biased that the ‘silent 
genocide’ of death through poverty and malnutrition is rendered natural and 
inevitable.”49  What does this say about the priorities of multilateral organizations? 
Should genocide and politicide still be considered pivotal conditions for intervention?  
Multilateral intervention in East Timor can best be explained in terms of the human 
rights, or what has been considered a genocide/ politicide, disaster that unfolded. In 
West Papua, although similar human rights violations and situations continue to 
occur, the lack of current major commercial multilateral interests coupled with the 
presence of current major commercial interests in Indonesia has made the status quo 
the focus for Multilateral policy.50  
 
5.6i Level of Outrage  
 
High levels of outrage were an important condition in respect of the decision 
to intervene in East Timor, but there is now a growing level of outrage regarding the 
situation in West Papua. The levels of international and regional outrage felt 
regarding an internal conflict, Janzekovic argues, often equate to the severity of 
multilateral response. The greater the outrage the more likely multilateral actors will 
intervene. Small atrocities, he continues, do not have the same impact as large 
atrocities. The moral impetus to act is dependent on the degree of outrage felt and the 
immediacy of the act itself.51  The case of East Timor illustrates that high levels of 
international concern contributed to the pressure on multilateral organizations to 
intervene. This level of outrage was fuelled by the mass media which maintained high 
levels of concern. This medium to high level of outrage is growing in respect of the 
situation in West Papua, but not to the same extent as with East Timor. Perhaps the 
lack of sustained coverage and critical analysis is why this condition has yet to prove 
important in attracting multilateral intervention in West Papua. Claiming a common 
human empathy between people on different parts of the globe does not mean, it 
appears, that such perceived values are boundless. They are very selectively applied 
                                                 
49 Nicholas J. Wheeler cited in John Tirman, ‘The New Humanitarianism: How Military Intervention 
Became the Norm,’ Boston Review, December 2003/January 2004, Global Policy Forum, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/humanint/2004/01newhumanitarianism.htm, accessed 20 March 
2006. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Janzekovic, The Australasian Journal of Human Security, vol.1, no.1, 2005, 20. 
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depending on what the other primary conditions are and whether they affect political 
will.52 Table 15 examines the tendency for primary conditions in one multilateral 
response to be also prevalent in another response entirely. 
 
Table 15: Summary Comparison of the Four Case Studies – Measurement and 
Evidence of the Primary Conditions that determine whether Multilateral 
Organizations Decide to Intervene or to Not Intervene: The Conditions that are 
Prevalent in Both Cases of Multilateral Intervention and Non-Intervention  
 
Intervention Non-Intervention Primary Conditions 
                              Evidence 
Phase: primary condition 
for Solomon Islands and 
the Philippines 
Solomon Islands: de-
escalation-termination 
East Timor: escalation 
Philippines: hostilities 
phase-termination 
West Papua: escalation 
Tactics and Strategies 
adopted by Disputants: 
primary condition for East 
Timor and the Philippines 
East Timor: There 
have just been 
negative uses of 
conflict resolution by 
just the government 
Solomon Islands: 
There have been some 
attempts at positive 
uses of conflict 
resolution by both 
parties but the 
government and 
opposition 
occasionally resort to 
negative instruments 
of conflict 
management 
Philippines: There have 
been some attempts at 
positive uses of conflict 
resolution by both parties 
but the government and 
opposition occasionally 
resort to negative 
instruments of conflict 
management 
West Papua: There have 
just been negative uses of 
conflict resolution by just 
the government 
Economic Wealth of State: 
primary condition for East 
Timor 
Exceptionally scarce 
and valuable resources 
– potential to be a 
profit 
Both the Philippines and 
West Papua have 
exceptionally scarce 
resources that may be of 
potential profit 
Media Coverage: primary 
condition for East Timor, 
the Philippines, West Papua 
East Timor: media 
coverage was 
extremely intense 
The Philippines: 
coverage was directed 
towards high profile 
kidnappings only 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 24-25. 
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West Papua: no evidence 
of concentrated media 
attention on this conflict 
Likelihood of Success: 
primary condition for the 
Solomon Islands 
Solomon Islands: the 
conflict was ‘ripe’ for 
intervention 
Philippines: Strong civil 
society, stalemate and 
agreement 
Refugee or IDP 
humanitarian crisis: 
primary condition for East 
Timor 
East Timor: 600,000-
700,000 IDPs 
Philippines: 200,000 to 
500,000 IDPs and 
refugees 
Genocide/Politicide: 
primary condition for East 
Timor 
East Timor: 250,000 
dead 
West Papua: between 
30,000 – 100,000 dead: a 
silent genocide 
Philippines: between 
65,000-120,000 dead 
Level of Outrage: primary 
condition for East Timor 
East Timor: medium 
to high level of 
regional and 
international outrage 
Philippines: substantial 
Muslim diaspora; West 
Papua: medium level of 
regional and international 
outrage  
 
5.7 Costs, Risks, Benefits, Connectivity and Level of Outrage  
As a first attempt at identifying what conditions attract multilateral decisions 
to intervene or to not intervene this thesis offers some tentative conclusions. The cases 
indicate that the main components underlying the framework – costs, risks, benefits, 
level of connectivity and level of outrage – do matter when multilateral actors choose 
their intervention or non-intervention policies. Since multilateral interventions are 
inherently political, there are costs, risks and benefits; a degree of connectivity; and 
certain amounts of international and regional outrage that derive from an internal 
conflict and a policy of intervention or non-intervention. These components are rooted 
in a combination of certain structural and perceptual conditions. None of the structural 
and perceptual conditions by themselves would have been credited with multilateral 
intervention or non-intervention policies. There must be a combination of conditions 
that trigger or deter political will that can influence these policies. These conditions 
justify such a response multilaterally – even if merely to the individual Member States 
and other multilateral actors.  This is not to suggest that other combinations of 
conditions may not also amount to these responses.  
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5.7a Multilateral Intervention 
Broadly speaking, as ascertained by the two cases that led to multilateral 
intervention, this response will only be undertaken if there are low to medium costs 
and few major risks, some benefits, especially in terms of international, regional and 
national security, and the perception or actuality of a high level of outrage that raises 
any costs of inaction. 
Risks and costs 
Even if there is a high complexity to the conflict, as was the case with East 
Timor, multilateral intervention will occur in an internal conflict if the risks of leaving 
a failing state outweigh the risks of multilateral intervention; if there is sovereign 
consent to intervene (even if it is induced); if there is an interested investor(s) who can 
sustain intervention until the goals are completed; if there is the perception of a high 
likelihood of a successful intervention; and if there is the perception of a clear exit 
strategy.  
In particular, multilateral interventions will more often be considered once the 
most violent phase of the conflict has passed, a cease-fire has been negotiated, and the 
disputants are trying to find ways to reconcile their differences. Once the most violent 
phases of the conflict have passed it is increasingly likely that a multilateral 
organization can achieve consensus on an intervention policy. Yet the East Timor 
conflict illustrated that multilateral intervention may still occur, even during the 
escalation phase if there are sufficient audience costs for inaction that make 
intervention an attractive alternative to high levels of public outrage.  
Benefits 
Benefits that result from multilateral intervention can be found in numerous 
quarters, including both domestic and international factors. Multilateral intervention 
will occur if there are actual economic benefits for the intervener(s), for example the 
presence of oil, or if intervention is perceived to bring regional and global stability.  
In both cases of multilateral intervention, multilateral actors contemplating 
intervention had agendas that were considerably more complex than simply stopping 
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the fighting between the disputants. These complex goals covered a wide range of 
political outcomes. The overriding goal was to ensure regional stability. 
Connectivity 
 Connectivity (or a stake in the conflict) to an internal conflict can influence 
multilateral intervention policies. The case of intervention in East Timor suggests that 
humanitarian crises which spill-over (for example in terms of UPMs and audience 
costs) make inaction an unattractive option. These consequences of conflict can make 
multilateral organizers perceive that they have a stake in the conflict. Yet the case of 
conflict in the Solomon Islands suggests that a humanitarian crisis is not a necessity 
for multilateral intervention to occur. 
Level of Outrage 
The evidence from the East Timor case has made it clear that the international 
public do see a legitimate role of multilateral organizations, the UN in particular, in 
relieving some of the social and regional stresses caused by internal conflicts. This 
confirmation indicates that multilateral organizations respond to pressures over 
humanitarian issues. It clearly suggests that multilateral intervention will occur if 
there is a high level of sustained media coverage that portrays a humanitarian crisis 
which may produce audience costs and if the international environment or a 
significant world event makes multilateral intervention an attractive option.  
Interestingly there was no significant threshold in the number of fatalities from 
which multilateral parties decide to intervene. The Solomon Islands case had about 
300 fatalities while the case of conflict in East Timor had as many as 250,000. It 
appears that it is not about intensity in terms of fatalities that attracts multilateral 
intervention but whether there are audience costs associated with a multilateral policy 
of non-intervention that determines an intervention decision, or a change in the nature 
of the international environment that makes intervention necessary for collective or 
self interests. Domestic and international constituencies do seem to matter in these 
types of policies. 
5.7b Multilateral Non-intervention 
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 Upon review of the two cases that have not attracted a multilateral policy of 
intervention, it appears that multilateral non-intervention is likely to occur if there are 
medium to high costs with quite a few risks involved, some benefits but not enough to 
outweigh the costs and risks involved, a degree of connectivity but only in respect of 
deterring multilateral intervention, and a perception by multilateral actors that there is 
a low level, or a controllable level, of outrage that will not provoke too many 
unmanageable audience costs. 
Risks and costs 
 Multilateral actors will decide to not intervene if there are risks and costs 
signified by: the long duration of the conflict (35+ years), an escalation phase, a lack 
of any clear exit points, and no sovereign consent. Furthermore, generally positive 
tactics and strategies by some of the disputants, while lowering the costs and risks 
involved with any multilateral intervention efforts, appear to decrease the appeal or 
need for such intervention attempts. Each of these conditions has intensified the 
conflict situation, enhancing the Member States’ perception of a lack of ability to 
pursue any efforts to change the status quo on the ground.  
Benefits 
 
 Even if there are potential benefits to a multilateral policy of intervention, in 
particular economic benefits, any benefits of this policy will prove to be unattractive 
if there are high costs of any such actions. It is unlikely that a multilateral actor 
confronted with a choice over whether to intervene in an internal conflict will choose 
to intervene when the costs for intervening far-outweigh any potential benefits from 
doing so. The Philippines and West Papua conflicts have offered benefits for 
multilateral intervention but they also offer high costs for any potential multilateral 
actor.  
 
Connectivity 
 The case of conflict in the Philippines demonstrates that multilateral 
intervention will not occur if there is a certain amount of connectivity between the 
Member States’ economies and the economic importance of the state in conflict. 
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Member States are reluctant to damage their economic investments in a state in 
conflict, or intrude on an important economic player. Perhaps this can account for the 
years during which East Timor (and West Papua remains) was not intervened in 
multilaterally. Indonesia remains an important economic player and neighbour to key 
multilateral Member States such as Australia. 
Level of Outrage 
 The political nature of multilateral intervention policies implies audience costs 
for multilateral actors. When contemplating intervention, multilateral actors have to 
weigh the competing demands of various groups, who will often be at odds over 
policy. The cases of non-intervention indicate that multilateral intervention will fail to 
occur if there are no potential audience costs for inaction. No potential audience costs 
can be perceived when there is a lack of media coverage or consequent lack of high 
levels of outrage. 
5.7c ‘Multilateral Non-Intervention – though considered Intervention’ 
 One major weakness of this thesis is that it does not look at a timeline of the 
cases to see if the primary conditions were evident during an earlier phase of each of 
the conflicts. This thesis does, however, monitor the reasons behind the failure to take 
up intervention earlier when the Government requested intervention. The Solomon 
Islands case illustrates that while sovereign consent or intervention by invitation is a 
condition that makes multilateral intervention an attractive option, it was not a 
decisive factor. Earlier attempts by the Solomon Islands Government to call for 
multilateral intervention were rejected by multilateral actors. Instead, the change in 
the international environment and the failed status of the Solomon Islands 
Government were the essential conditions that were needed to attract this multilateral 
response. 
5.7d Political Will 
Finally, intervening multilaterally in internal conflicts requires both 
opportunity and Member State willingness to do so. A direct route to opportunity 
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(structural environment) and willingness (perceptions) is through self and collective 
interest which, this thesis has determined, are affected by a number of conditions.  
5.8 Conclusion 
The use of a data-based framework has enabled the ability to understand the 
conditions that influence multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene in 
internal conflicts. The framework has been of descriptive value in describing each 
case of internal conflict and the conditions conducive to a particular multilateral 
policy. While there were many reasons for multilateral intervention into East Timor 
and the Solomon Islands, it remains difficult to decipher the ad hoc nature of non-
intervention decisions. In particular, there is no doubt that there is an urgent need to 
understand why some internal conflicts have not attracted intervention when they 
have the same conditions that are prevalent in cases where multilateral actors have 
intervened. The framework has provided conditions that do appear to have determined 
multilateral decisions of non-intervention in West Papua and the Philippines. But 
what about the primary conditions that were apparent in decisions of both intervention 
and non-intervention? This raises many unanswered questions. In particular, how can 
genocide not determine multilateral intervention in West Papua? Until there is a 
greater understanding of past and current multilateral intervention or non-
interventions decisions or a greater interest in ascertaining guidelines that – in 
principle at least – help determine when multilateral intervention should occur, these 
policies will remain ad hoc and erratic. Consequently, this will make it much harder to 
understand how to achieve a successful multilateral intervention policy. 
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Chapter Six 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
Imagine for one moment that, in those dark days and hours leading up to 
the genocide, there had been a coalition of states ready and willing to act in 
defence of the Tutsi population, but the [Security] Council had refused or 
delayed giving the green light. Should such a coalition then have stood idly 
by while the horror unfolded? 
                                                                     
                                                                    UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan1 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Internal conflicts have become increasingly widespread in the Asia-Pacific 
region, creating an “arc of instability” around the southern rim of the region, 
stretching from Indonesia in the west, through East Timor, Papua New Guinea, the 
Solomon Islands and the other parts of the Pacific, to Fiji in the east. As these types of 
conflicts continue to threaten stability and peace, the study of internal conflicts and 
their peaceful resolution is more crucial than ever. Additionally, as the numbers of 
multilateral interventions into internal conflicts appear to be increasing, the study of 
this multilateral response has developed into a major field in international relations. 
There continues, however, a need to draw attention to, and understand, why these 
multilateral occurrences take place – or why they fail to take place when the 
consequences of internal conflicts encroach on both individual state practices and 
international relations.  
Currently, some scholars, practitioners and international bodies are supporting 
the establishment of various combinations of guidelines that should be met, or should 
help multilateral actors decide whether to intervene or not. However, to date there 
have not been any attempts to accurately establish what essential structural and 
                                                 
1 The Secretary-General’s Annual Report to the General Assembly, September 20, 1999 (UN Press 
Release SG/SM 7136 and GA 9596). Also published as ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty,’ Economist, 
September 18, 1999. 
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perceptual conditions are currently determining multilateral responses to internal 
conflicts. In particular, the numerous conditions offered by scholars to understand the 
multilateral decision-making process lack a suitable framework from which to 
examine and evaluate their individual significance. The question: ‘Why do 
international and regional communities intervene in some internal conflicts, yet not in 
others?’2 remains unanswered. 
The focus of this thesis has been on the identification of the primary 
conditions that attract or deter multilateral intervention into internal conflicts in the 
Asia Pacific region. The framework developed conceptually defines and operationally 
measures particular structural and perceptual conditions under the guiding 
components of costs, risks, benefits, connectivity, and level of outrage. The 
framework was applied to four cases of internal conflict in an attempt to observe what 
roles twenty-two structural and perceptual conditions have played in determining why 
multilateral intervention was initiated in two of the cases, and why multilateral 
intervention failed to be initiated in the other two cases. It assisted in revealing the 
conditions which were of primary significance to a particular response of multilateral 
intervention or multilateral non-intervention.  
 
 This study differs from the numerous other attempts made by scholars in the 
field. It focuses on conditions that can lead to a particular multilateral response. This 
is a departure from a focus on the subjective motivations of unilateral decision-makers 
and the unilateral decision-making process. It also examines perceptual conditions 
that have been determined as significant in the literature but whose extent of influence 
has not been clearly established.  
 
6.2 Summary of Findings  
 
The application of the framework has demonstrated that multilateral decisions 
to intervene or to not intervene eventuate as a result of a combination of both 
structural and perceptual conditions. The results confirmed that not only are there 
certain structural and perceptual conditions that influence the multilateral decision to 
intervene or to not intervene, but that these policies are also a result of collective and 
                                                 
2 Rioux, 2003. 
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self political interest. The results illustrate the extent of selection bias evident in, and 
the ad hoc basis, of current multilateral intervention policies. Figures 16 and 17 
categorize the conditions found to be of particular influence in the decisions to 
intervene or to not intervene within four categories, the conditions which are essential, 
significant, marginal, and insignificant.  
 
Figure 16: Determinants for Decisions to Intervene: A Scale of Importance 
 
Conditions Essential Significant Marginal Not 
Significant 
High level of 
international and 
regional level of 
outrage – often as 
a result of Media 
coverage 
       
 
      yes 
   
Collective and Self 
Political Interest 
to intervene 
  
      yes 
   
Nature of 
International 
Environment that 
makes intervention 
an attractive policy 
  
       
      yes 
   
Self-Interested 
Member State(s) 
who are willing to 
invest long-term in 
an intervention 
policy 
         
 
 
       yes 
   
State Failure          yes   
Perception of 
medium to high 
likelihood of 
Success 
  
 
        yes 
  
Humanitarian 
abuses – UPMs 
and/or 
genocide/politicide 
        
        yes 
  
Consent (even if 
induced) 
         yes   
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The Economic 
Wealth of the State 
in Conflict as 
 a potential benefit 
   
        yes 
  
The existence of 
an exit strategy 
and clear exit 
points 
  
       yes 
  
A post-hostilities 
phase 
        yes   
A short duration 
(less than 24 
years) 
  
       yes 
  
Dispute issues         yes  
Fatality numbers         yes  
Capabilities of 
Intervener(s) and 
the disputants 
   
      yes 
 
The number of 
disputants 
        yes  
Superpower 
support 
        yes  
Idenitifiable and 
organized 
disputants 
   
      yes 
 
Strategies and 
Tactics employed 
by the disputants 
   
      yes 
 
Economic 
Importance of the 
State in Conflict 
    
       yes 
  
Figure 17: Determinants for Decisions to Not Intervene: A Scale of Importance 
 
Conditions Essential Significant Marginal Not 
Significant 
A lack of an exit 
strategy and clear 
exit points  
       
      yes 
   
Collective and Self 
Political Interest 
to not intervene 
  
      yes 
   
Nature of 
International 
Environment that 
makes intervention 
an unattractive 
  
       
      yes 
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policy 
No sustained 
media coverage 
leading to low 
levels of 
international and 
regional levels of 
outrage 
         
 
 
       yes 
   
The Economic 
Importance of the 
State in Conflict  
         
        yes 
  
Entrenchment of 
the conflict as a 
result of conflict 
duration 
  
 
        yes 
  
Generally positive 
Strategies and 
Tactics employed 
by the disputants 
        
        yes 
  
No Concerted 
calls for 
Intervention and 
high resistance 
levels to this 
option by the State  
         
 
       yes 
  
An escalation 
phase  
        yes 
  
  
No Self-Interested 
Member State(s) 
who are willing to 
invest long-term in 
an intervention 
policy 
  
       yes 
  
A long duration 
(more than 25 
years) 
  
       yes 
  
Dispute issues         yes  
Fatality numbers         yes  
Capabilities of 
Intervener(s) and 
the disputants 
   
      yes 
 
The number of 
disputants 
        yes  
Superpower 
opposition 
        yes  
Non-Idenitifiable 
and unorganized 
disputants 
   
      yes 
 
Perception of low     
 182 
to medium 
likelihood of 
failure 
      yes  
Humanitarian 
abuses – UPMs 
and/or 
genocide/politicide  
   
       yes 
         
State Failure            yes 
The Economic 
Wealth of the State 
in Conflict as 
 a potential benefit 
    
        yes 
 
The research found that multilateral organizations will accept some of the 
risks and costs associated with an intervention policy if there are certain structural and 
perceptual conditions evident which influence the political interests of the individual 
Member States and the collective interests of the organization. Consequently, 
particular conditions make the option of intervention an attractive and viable option. 
These conditions are: a favourable or significant international environment or 
international event(s); the consent of the sovereign state (even if it is induced); 
sustained and critical regional and international media coverage which leads to a 
strong international identification of perpetrators and victims; a complete collapse of 
the state in conflict tainting it with the term ‘failed state’ (which leads to high 
perceived regional stakes); a high probability of success; potential economic benefits; 
a humanitarian crisis (in respect of UPMs and genocide/politicide); the possibility of a 
clear exit strategy; and a self-interested and capable Member State who can greatly 
subsidize an intervention.  
 
In both cases of multilateral intervention perhaps the most important condition 
was the willingness of a capable regional actor – the Government of Australia – to 
take the lead in intervening in both situations to end the hostilities. Australia’s 
willingness to do so was itself the result of a range of the above conditions. When 
multilateral interventions do occur, they will be based firstly on a strongly perceived 
national and collective interest and the calculations of a reasonable chance of success 
at acceptable costs. But decisions to intervene multilaterally may also eventuate if 
there is the perception that multilateral inaction could lead to unacceptable political 
economic, military, security, reputational, humanitarian and audience costs.  
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Individually these conditions would probably not attract a similar multilateral 
response without evidence of a number of essential and significant conditions. In 
particular, by itself a humanitarian imperative does not appear to be very influential. 
The humanitarian imperative has not attracted multilateral intervention into the 
gradually evolving genocide in Burundi or the current ‘silent genocide’ in West 
Papua. Even the possibility of a successful multilateral intervention may not be a 
deciding factor to influence political self and collective interest. The amalgamation of 
the above conditions and how they affected this political will is precisely why they 
proved significant.  
 
While the framework provided a useful guide for conditions that influenced 
multilateral intervention decisions, deciphering why a multilateral action has not 
taken place in another conflict proved much more ambitious. Multilateral non-
interventions, it appears, are driven by a lack of sustained and critically analyzed 
media coverage on conflict issues and consequences, generally positive tactics and 
strategies adopted by disputants, conflicts of a long duration, and an unfavourable 
international environment. In addition, economic factors unfavourable to intervention, 
resistance levels to intervention or a failure to call for multilateral intervention, a lack 
of any clear exit points, and an escalation phase were also influential. However, these 
conditions need to be examined in respect of other internal conflicts that have failed 
to attract multilateral interventions in order to assure their relevance. 
 
The Solomon Islands conflict undeniably illustrates how some essential 
conditions can be evident – in particular, the consent of the sovereign state – but that 
if other essential conditions are lacking, the process can be seen as unattractive to the 
Member States and collective interests. An earlier intervention by multilateral actors 
may have proven far less costly, in terms of direct and indirect costs, but it was only 
when the Solomon Islands began to be seen as a ‘failed state’ that multilateral 
intervention proved a necessity. This ‘failed state’ status was also seen as a security 
threat in light of the changing perceptions of threat in the international environment. 
 
 While the costs, risks and benefits are distributed across all Member States, 
they still act as a powerful influence on the attractiveness of a particular multilateral 
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policy. What can be ascertained in both cases of conflict in East Timor and the 
Solomon Islands is that the specific goals of the regional and international 
organizations determine the extent to which they will accept direct and indirect costs 
of an intervention policy. If the goals are included in an organization’s rationale, the 
perceived benefits increase. In the case of the Solomon Islands, this goal meant 
stopping a potential threat to regional and international stability; with East Timor, this 
goal meant fulfilling the humanitarian objectives of the organizations involved.  
 
 The components of connectivity and level of outrage provided other useful 
headings for the framework. In particular, depending on its nature, the level of outrage 
generated by the media, the international environment and the levels of concern 
expressed by international and regional communities can influence multilateral 
decisions to intervene or to not intervene. It appears that the moral and political 
impetus to act is dependent on the degree of outrage or shock felt, the extent of the 
atrocities on regional and international stability, and the immediacy of the act itself 
after a significant world event(s). Both cases of non-intervention illustrate that such 
levels of outrage are not boundless. These vocal concerns are frequently very 
selectively applied. Constant priming by the mass media is required to maintain levels 
of concern and even levels of interest. 
 
6.3 The Implications of the Findings  
 
The framework developed in the thesis attempts to provide clarity to a highly 
multifaceted issue by systematically accessing the significance of individual 
conditions. It provides a means to draw numerous generalizations from a small 
number of case studies. The framework provides multiple possible combinations of 
conditions that may result in a particular multilateral response. Furthermore, it 
suggests an insight into why multilateral interventions have not occurred to date in 
other internal conflicts. It also indicates that the conditions once thought to be of 
significance in determining multilateral intervention have lost their appeal. One 
particularly interesting finding is that there is no threshold of fatalities that determines 
a multilateral response. Fatalities often reflect the seriousness of the conflict, the 
extent to which it is entrenched in the society, and the extent it is visible to the global 
community. But fatality numbers appear to matter only in respect of whether it is a 
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‘humanitarian crisis’ or whether low fatalities indicate the possibility of a successful 
intervention policy. 
  
The framework is of particular descriptive worth in constructing data on 
current internal conflicts. Additionally, if it is accepted that structural and perceptual 
conditions contribute to the decisional calculus, then the framework developed can be 
useful in formulating hypotheses about whether one might expect multilateral 
interventions into internal conflicts, or even when such a response is necessary. 
Consequently, the framework is of predictive and prescriptive value. While it may be 
limited in its scope, especially in terms of the limited number of cases, the framework 
offers useful conditions for further analysis, extending the current international debate 
on such a multifaceted subject matter. It incorporates conditions not previously 
examined, including the impact of disputant strategies and tactics adopted and the 
impact of the level of identification and organization of the disputants, and 
accordingly challenges their previous invisibility. If the data collection was expanded 
to include a larger number of cases and to varying responses to situations of internal 
conflict, the value of the framework may be increased.  
 
A further collection of data from the processes of multilateral decision-making 
is necessary for full analysis of the primary conditions. Future researchers could look 
into what conditions determine each modality of intervention or non-intervention 
decisions. For example, what determines or fails to determine a particular economic, 
military or diplomatic response? Similarly, there needs to be some way to distinguish 
the various multilateral responses of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement – which conditions determine which response? Conditions including the 
likelihood of success and genocide/politicide need more expansion, and the reliability 
of their codings improved. Moreover, other conditions warrant consideration but are 
not given significant emphasis in the framework, for example the importance of 
ethnicity needs to be ascertained as a determining condition of multilateral 
intervention or non-intervention. There is also a need for some new measurements 
when it comes to some of the conditions, especially the perceptual conditions in order 
to gain accurate findings.  
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Certainly, identifying the conditions that influence multilateral intervention 
policies serves as a useful yardstick from which to create such policies. Furthermore, 
understanding the conditions under which multilateral actors will intervene or not 
intervene in internal conflicts is central to the ability to evaluate the effectiveness of 
past and current multilateral interventions or non-interventions. This debate has 
become more significant with discussions about the 2001 report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) entitled ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect,’3 and in the current international climate as a result of the 
escalation of the ‘war on terror’.  
 
6.4 Recommendations 
 
There is a current academic idea that applying certain criteria to multilateral 
decisions of intervention might help to increase the chances of success and secure 
support for such an intervention policy.4 Yet much of this criterion is based on the 
moral responsibility of intervention or justifying intervention actions, and does not 
take into account the individual and collective interests of Member States. The 
findings of the case studies suggest that multilateral actors are reluctant to take risks 
and costs when political will, for the collective and the self, is not provoked. A 
primary reason for the failure to respond to the ‘silent genocide’ in West Papua has 
been the perception, by those most capable of stopping the atrocities, that West Papua 
has not represented a compelling collective and national security issue. How does this 
impact on the guidelines set out by some scholars, practitioners and international 
bodies?  
 
One recommendation is that certain conditions need to be considered in 
respect of any guidelines established by international bodies. Other recommendations 
include the empowerment of a non-governmental organization such as the World 
Court with the task of deciding when an internal conflict required a particular type of 
multilateral intervention; the appointment of a mixed military-civilian committee to 
establish whether multilateral intervention is viable and necessary and how it should 
                                                 
3 ICISS, 74-5, http://www.iciss-ciise.gc.ca. 
4 CSS Strategic Briefing Paper, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Definitions and Criteria’ 3(1) June 2000, 
http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/briefing_papers/Humani.html, accessed 20 March 2006. 
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be carried out; and the creation of a permanent rescue team of mediators, diplomats 
and military personnel from a large number of countries to be deployed in real time, 
whenever and wherever needed. This thesis will, however, focus only on the 
development of guidelines.  Although the recommendations are utopian, it will be 
helpful to shift the intellectual agenda from conditions that should allow multilateral 
interventions to the design of appropriate guidelines that reflect the conditions 
influencing collective and self political will. 
 
Political interest is determined by the changing perceptions of multilateral 
leaders that multilateral intervention is a necessary and viable option. This sense of 
necessity and viability is triggered by blatant evidence of significant structural and 
perceptual conditions. Criteria established in the literature provide no accountability 
of political interests of multilateral actors. Criteria or other guidelines established by 
ICISS or any other international body will not be influential in guiding multilateral 
intervention policies unless this component is considered significant.   
 
This is not to declare that there is no common ground between established 
guidelines and the conditions illustrated as significant in the cases studied. The 
perception of a successful policy and the consent of the sovereign state have been 
included in most criteria set out by international bodies. The following sections make 
contributions to the search for common criteria, by which to decide whether to 
intervene or whether to not intervene in an internal conflict. It attempts to compile 
two sets of guidelines that reflect both important current guidelines and certain 
conditions found in the case studies to be of influence. This is an attempt to reflect the 
importance of self and collective political interests in any multilateral policy.  
 
While this chapter moves this thesis from being an empirical paper looking at 
determinants of intervention or non-intervention decisions to discussing normative 
issues (when multilateral actors should intervene), these two areas are related. 
Without a clear understanding of the reality behind the decisions of multilateral 
organizations, there can be no effective implementation of conditions as determinants 
of multilateral intervention or non-intervention decisions.  
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6.4a Institutionalizing the Duty to Protect: New Criteria for Multilateral 
Decisions to Intervene  
 
1. When there is a significant international environment or world event that makes 
multilateral intervention appear an attractive option. 
 
2. When there is consent by the sovereign state (even if it is induced) and/or consent 
by the general majority of the grassroots community (willing to work for peace) and 
the other disputant(s). Coercive external intervention may simply trigger a much 
larger conflict, multiplying the human fatalities involved. 
 
3. When there are perceived audience costs for inaction. This can be reflected in an 
existing medium to high level of public outrage. 
 
4. When it is a failed State that has the potential of, or is affecting, its region 
negatively, in respect of UPMs, arms, people and drug trafficking, economic distress, 
and as a potential ‘haven’ for terrorist groups.  
 
A state fails when it lacks the ability to maintain control in the face of some 
type of threat which could compromise its authority such as an internal conflict. In a 
climate void of state control, disputants are able to pursue conflict without hindrance 
from a strong state military force and are likely to remain unwilling to reach a 
settlement while the possibility for political power and economic gain remains. This 
scenario creates the potential for intractable conflict, rendering civilian populations to 
the mercy of militias, warlords, and criminal gangs, and the possibility of creating 
regional and international instability.5 
 
5. When there is a medium to high probability of success, something which can be 
perceived by multilateral actors when there is a stalemate evident, an agreement from 
which to work from, a grassroots community or strong civil society willing to work 
for peace, and possible clear exit points or strategies.  
 
The chance for success must be seriously weighed before a multilateral 
intervention can take place. This perception can be formulated in various ways 
depending on the definition of ‘success’. “Does the intervention preserve or revert to a 
status quo that is grossly abusive? Are perpetrators left in positions of authority? Will 
civilians remain at risk once international forces depart?” Multilateral actors have a 
                                                 
5 This notion of a ‘failed state’ has, of course, been prominent before the 1990s. It just has not 
previously gained this much spoken importance as a condition for multilateral intervention as it is 
currently. The Canadian Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, December 1995, 
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/States.pdf, 2.  
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responsibility to determine in advance that there is a good chance the intervention will 
improve rather than worsen the situation.  
 
6. When there is the possibility of a self-interested Member State/neighbour(s) who 
can provide substantial economic, military and political capabilities to the multilateral 
intervention effort. 
 
7. When the sovereign in conflict is only adopting negative modes of conflict 
resolution (strategies and tactics) towards the other disputants.  
 
8. When the conflict involves the actual or apprehended action of genocide, 
politicide, large scale loss of life, with genocidal intent or not, and ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
by either disputant.  
 
The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to protect 
genocidal acts or other atrocities such as large-scale violations of international 
humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing. These can be considered a threat to 
international security and as such should provoke action by multilateral organizations, 
especially the Security Council. One of the major difficulties with the term ‘genocide’ 
is that it is defined as a crime of specific intent – it requires that the guilty disputants 
intended to destroy all or part of an ethnic, racial, national or religious community.6 
Identifying that intent can be a difficult struggle and has in the past led to many 
debates about the evidence of such intent. Furthermore, identifying and classifying the 
victims is a further complication. 
 
9. When there is a degree of connectivity between the organization and the state in 
conflict. The multilateral actors have a stake in the positive outcome of the conflict. 
This might be in terms of UPMs, a humanitarian crisis, or global and regional 
stability. 
 
10. When there is a perception of controllable costs and manageable risks 
undertaking a multilateral intervention policy. Costs and risks of such an intervention 
policy can be both indirect and direct.  
 
11. When such an intervention policy is the last resort. Has every non-intervention 
option, including negotiations, diplomatic attempts, internal mediation, for meeting 
                                                 
6 M. Locke and J. Ladnier, ‘Criteria for Military intervention in Internal Wars: The Debate,’ The Fund 
for Peace: Regional Responses to Internal War, no.2, December 2001, 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/publications/reports/ffpr-criteria_debate.pdf, accessed 20 March 2006. 
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the threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that the 
other measures will not succeed? 7 
 
12. The purpose is clearly explained to the public involved in the conflict and the 
international community. 
 
13. Proper Purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed intervention 
is to halt or avert the threat in question, for example, the cessation of hostilities 
between the disputants, whatever other purposes or motives may be involved? The 
purpose is limited to stopping the human rights abuses and when administration is 
necessary, for instance if it is a ‘failed state’. 
 
14. There is support of, or involvement by, regional organizations in the 
peacemaking, peacekeeping or peace enforcement policies.8 
 
15. The use of force should be proportional to achieving the multilateral goals  
 
6.4b Institutionalizing the Barriers Against Intervention: New Criteria for Non-
Intervention Decisions 
 
1. When there is a significant international environment or world event that makes 
multilateral intervention appear an unattractive option. 
 
2. High resistance levels by the State in conflict to a policy of multilateral 
intervention, or at least, no substantial calls for intervention by the civil society or 
grassroots within the state in conflict. There is also no political will within the 
multilateral organization to attempt to induce the State’s consent. 
 
3. When there are no perceived audience costs for inaction.  
 
4. When there is a medium to high probability of failure, something which can be 
perceived by multilateral actors when there is no stalemate evident, no agreement 
from which to work from, a civil society that is not willing to work for peace, and no 
clear exit points or strategies. 
 
5. When there is not the possibility of a self-interested Member State/neighbour(s) 
who could provide substantial economic, military and political capabilities to the 
multilateral intervention effort. 
 
                                                 
7 Tension exists between those who argue that military intervention can legitimately occur only when 
peaceful remedies have been exhausted. Some analysts have suggested that all peaceful alternatives 
should be “considered” rather than “exhausted” prior to the use of forceful intervention. Stanley 
Hoffman, The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention, South Bend, Indiana, University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1997, 39. 
8 Dickens and Wilson-Roberts, 2000, http://aus-cscap.anu.edu.au/NonInterv.pdf. 
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6. When the sovereign in conflict is adopting generally positive modes of conflict 
resolution (strategies and tactics) towards the other disputants. 
 
7. When the conflict does not involve the actual or apprehended action of genocide, 
politicide, large scale loss of life, with genocidal intent or not, and ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
by either disputant. 
 
8. When a degree of connectivity between the organization and the state in conflict. 
The multilateral actors do not have a stake in the positive outcome of the conflict is 
lacking.  
 
9. When there is a perception of uncontrollable costs and unmanageable risks 
undertaking a multilateral intervention policy.  
 
10. When such an intervention policy is not the last resort. 
 
11. When there is no support of, or involvement by, regional organizations in the 
peacemaking, peacekeeping or peace enforcement policies. 
 
12. When Self and collective political interest makes a multilateral policy of 
intervention an unattractive policy. 
 
6.4c The Question of Evidence 
 
Even if consensus is reached on the types of conditions or situations which 
might warrant multilateral intervention, it will still be necessary in each case to 
determine whether events on the ground do in fact meet the criteria presented. 
Defining when abuses are ‘grave’ or when there is a ‘disaster’ is highly subjective and 
the nature of the decision, whether it is made by the UN Security Council or another 
multilateral organization, would still invariably be highly politicized.9 In many cases 
competing ‘facts’ and versions of events will be produced. These are often created for 
the specific purpose of misleading multilateral opinions. Obtaining fair and accurate 
information is difficult but essential. One significant actor has been regional and 
international media coverage, but this has also been selective in terms of its 
application. The ICISS has suggested the International Committee for the Red Cross 
(ICRC) as a possible monitoring candidate. 10 
 
6.4d Difficulty in Gaining a Consensus 
 
                                                 
9 CSS Strategic Briefing Papers, June 2000, 
http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/briefing_papers/Humani.html. 
10 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, http://www.iciss-ca/menu-en.asp.  
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The difficulty of reaching a new consensus on certain guidelines that might (in 
principle) determine multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene must never 
be under-estimated. Questions remain over how a consensus on guidelines would be 
reached, who would set out such criteria, and who would oversee their 
implementation. Presumably the UN would have a major role in this process, but not 
all its Member States share the same views. 
 
From a legal point of view, it would be possible to attempt to codify situations 
where multilateral intervention would be and would not be allowed. However, 
perhaps it is more realistic to look at these multilateral decisions in the same way as 
“necessity” under national law. Normally necessity is not codified; rather its very 
nature is such that it can be identified when it occurs. The alternative could be to 
codify criteria outside the Charter, such as through regional organizations. But Article 
103 provides that, “in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members 
of the UN under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”11 
This means that even if attempts were made to codify situations where multilateral 
intervention could or should be undertaken, there remains the problem of a possible 
conflict with the Charter of the UN. 
 
An obvious obstacle to creating guidelines comes from Member States who 
are unwilling to subscribe to multilaterally agreed codes of conduct. In such an 
application of guidelines, Member States would agree to limit their freedom and even 
to take on the obligation to participate in a type of humanitarian ‘International Fire 
Brigade’. But Member States may have direct interests in preventing what may be 
perceived as interference. Is there a danger that, by softening the principle of non-
intervention, the UN and other regional organizations may get on a slippery slope of 
forcible interference?12 As Jane Stromseth argues, the current system reduces this 
                                                 
11 Daniele Archibugi, ‘Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention’, Italian National 
Research Council, Rome, 2 October 2002, available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/seminar/03/Archibugi_HumanitarianIntervention.rtf, accessed 5 
May 2006. 
12 Semb, 2000, 469. 
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probability because “states engaging in humanitarian intervention know that they have 
an extraordinarily [sic] high burden of justification.”13  
 
The major problem in creating criteria is that, by putting energy into 
establishing firm criteria, attention is diverted from the heart of the problem: how 
states and organizations operationalize conditions. Even supposedly clear guidelines 
such as ‘large scale’, or ‘extreme emergency’ are not foolproof; they are ultimately 
subject to political judgement as ascertained in the analysis of the four cases studied.14  
The unruly process of argument and discussion within the Security Council and other 
multilateral organizations, and within the military councils of individual states, may 
remain the key factors determining the future incidences of interventions for 
humanitarian purposes. At an Asiaweek-PECC roundtable, Allen Hawke argues that 
“the reality is that you’re going to have to deal with situations on an ad hoc basis. I 
doubt very much if you’re going to be able to have a priori formulation of principle 
which is going to satisfy every situation.”15  
 
6.4e Mobilizing International Political Will 
 
The analysis of the four cases suggests that the key to influencing multilateral 
intervention is to mobilize domestic, regional and international support or outrage for 
a situation of internal conflict, or at least to neutralize domestic, regional and 
international opposition.  The Secretary-General’s routine activities and interaction 
with the Security Council, and his international profile with Member States and the 
media, give him a unique opportunity to mobilize international support for a particular 
multilateral decision. In respect of the media, there is no question about the effect that 
exceptional reporting, well-argued opinion pieces and in particular ‘real time’ 
transmission of images of suffering have in generating both domestic and 
international pressure to act. But this ‘CNN effect’ can be unbalanced in its impact, 
with similarly troubling crises not always receiving similar attention.16 
 
                                                 
13 Stromseth, 2003, 257 cited in Welsh, 2004, 180-1.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Allen Hawke, ‘Asiaweek-PECC round tables considers the regional impact of the East Timor 
situation,’ http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/99/1112/nat.forum.html, accessed August 
2005.  
16 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, http://www.iciss-ca/menu-en.asp, 38-39. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has attempted to develop policy-relevant generalizations from a 
useful framework which conceptually defines and operationally measures 22 
structural and perceptual conditions. The framework and cases examined illustrate 
whether multilateral organizations decide to intervene in internal conflicts or leave the 
conflict to its own devices as a result of an amalgamation of structural and 
perceptual conditions, with humanitarian concerns being only one of these conditions. 
Furthermore, the analysis has established that multilateral policies, like other major 
decisions, are made with considerations of the structural (environment) and perceived 
risks and costs involved in such an undertaking, the possible benefits of action versus 
inaction, the perceived or actual degree of connectivity in the internal conflict, and the 
extent to which there is an actual or perceived high level of international outrage felt 
regarding the situation. Upon review there will always be some structural or 
perceptual conditions that attract a particular response, but how these conditions 
trigger a particular response is determined by the political self and collective interests 
of multilateral actors. 
 
However, some of the primary conditions that influenced the multilateral 
policies of intervention in the Solomon Islands and East Timor are also prevalent in 
the cases of the Philippines and East Timor. This unequal distribution of multilateral 
responses suggests an ad hoc nature and selection bias within each decision to 
intervene or to not intervene. In light of the shift in attitude at the UN World Summit 
in September 2005 that the World Body has a “responsibility to protect”, this is of 
grave concern.  
 
It should be recognized that there are limits to multilateral intervention. It is 
not advisable in every circumstance, and any guidelines need to reflect the political, 
financial, ethical, and operational constraints. Given some conditions such as the 
characteristics of the conflict and the orientation of the disputants, sometimes the best 
strategy is not to intervene. Intervening, it may turn out, simply increases the level of 
conflict without any reasonable prospect of achieving a desired outcome.  
 
 195 
Forcing Member States to define in advance the parameters under which they 
would consider multilateral intervention might introduce a measure of predictability 
and accountability into this multilateral process. It could also have a deterrent effect 
on future violators of human rights. Such criteria could also provide a tangible focus 
for discussion on the issue of multilateral intervention by offering an analytical lens 
through which to examine and evaluate ongoing or past instances of multilateral 
intervention. Moreover, clear guidelines hedge against arguments about double 
standards and accusations that interventions are only for self-serving reasons. In 
particular, criteria could expose the rhetoric of some states who use human rights as a 
false justification for intervening in the affairs of their neighbours, or those that use 
sovereignty as a convenient shield to hide behind while massacring their own civilian 
populations. It would be easier to reach expeditious intervention decisions in 
multilateral organizations if there were agreed guidelines stating clear positions on the 
circumstances under which each organization’s peacekeeping, peacemaking and 
peace enforcement operations would be warranted or not.   
It is apparent that the debate over when it is ‘right or wrong’ to use 
multilateral intervention to stem internal conflicts and their humanitarian 
consequences has now taken on a new urgency. Millions of human beings remain at 
the mercy of internal conflicts, insurgencies, state repression and state collapse. What 
is at stake here is the delivering of practical protection for ordinary people whose lives 
are at risk, because their states are unwilling or unable to protect them. The 
experience and aftermath of Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo, as well as 
multilateral interventions or non-interventions in the current cases of East Timor, the 
Solomon Islands, the Philippines, and West Papua provide a clear indication that the 
ad hoc basis and selectivity of multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene 
need now to be comprehensively reassessed. 
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                                          Appendix 
 
Figure 16: Summary Comparison of Case Studies: Evidence of Structural and 
Perceptual Conditions Extended 
 
Assumption Conditions East Timor Solomon 
Islands 
Philippines West 
Papua 
Structural 
Costs and 
Risks 
 
   DISP 
International 
power - 
decolonizati
on 
Material or 
Territorial, 
Internationa
l power, and 
National 
Power 
Material or 
Territorial, 
Internationa
l power, and 
National 
Power 
Internat-
ional 
power 
   FATAL 10,000 to 
250,000 
100-1,000 65,000-
120,000 
30,000-
100,000 
 Total 
Duration 
24 years 5 years 40 years: 
ongoing 
41 years: 
ongoing 
  PHASE Escalation  De-
escalation-
Termination 
Hostilities 
phase-
Termination 
Escalation 
   
 
  MILCAP 
20,000 
personnel 
2,000 
personnel 
Disputants: 
47,000 
members 
15,000-
20,000 
Indonesia
n forces; 
1,600 
Disputant 
forces 
 ECOCAP AUS$476.8 
million for a 
year 
AUS$853 
million over 
a decade 
No basis for 
judgement 
No basis 
for 
judgement 
  
 
MAGFIGHT 
2 Groups of 
Disputants 
but included 
20 odd 
militia gangs 
7 of more 
Disputants 
but IFM and 
MEF 
remained 
dominant 
3-4 main 
disputants 
3 main 
disputants 
  
 
TACSTRA 
There have 
just been 
systematic 
negative 
uses of 
There have 
been some 
attempts at 
positive 
uses of 
There have 
been some 
attempts at 
positive 
uses of 
There 
have just 
been 
systematic 
negative 
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conflict 
resolution 
instruments 
by just the 
government 
conflict 
resolution 
by both 
disputants 
but the 
government 
and 
opposition 
occasionally 
resort to 
negative 
instruments 
of conflict 
managemen
t 
conflict 
resolution 
by both 
disputants 
but the 
government 
and 
opposition 
occasionally 
resort to 
negative 
instruments 
of conflict 
managemen
t 
uses of 
conflict 
resolution 
instrument
s by just 
the 
governme
nt 
  
 
 
 
 SUPEROS 
Superpower 
takes a direct 
interest in 
the 
resolution of 
the internal 
conflict and 
supports 
intervention 
Superpower 
remains 
neutral and 
inactive to 
the conflict 
resolution 
process and 
intervention 
decision 
Superpower 
remains 
neutral and 
inactive to 
the conflict 
resolution 
process and 
non-
intervention 
decision 
Superpow
er remains 
neutral 
and 
inactive to 
the 
conflict 
resolution 
process 
and non- 
interventi
on 
decision 
  
 IDENORG 
The 
Disputants 
were well 
organized 
and 
identifiable 
Limited 
Organizatio
n and 
Idenitifiabili
ty of 
disputants 
Limited 
Organizatio
n and 
Idenitifiabili
ty of 
disputants 
Limited 
Organizati
on and 
Idenitifiab
ility of 
disputants 
  
 
 
  
  
  INITIATE 
Intervention 
was 
requested or 
consented to 
by the 
central 
government 
(even if it 
was induced) 
Intervention 
was by 
invitation 
No 
concerted 
efforts to 
call for 
intervention 
Interventi
on was 
requested 
by the 
opposition 
and 
grassroots 
communit
y, but 
resisted by 
the central 
governme
nt  
  Failure of 
state 
authority in a 
Complete 
collapse of 
state control 
Adverse 
regime 
changes 
Failure of 
state 
authority 
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 MAGFAIL 
limited area 
of the 
country, for 
example, 
secession or 
rebel control 
of, or 
anarchic 
conditions 
in, one or 
several 
regions that 
do not 
include the 
core area of 
the country 
of its capital. 
with no 
substantial  
weakening 
of state 
institutions 
or persistent 
collapse of 
public order 
in Manila; 
Mindanao-
Sulu: failure 
of state 
authority in 
a limited 
part of the 
country, i.e. 
succession 
in a 
limited 
area of the 
country, 
for 
example, 
secession 
or rebel 
control of, 
or 
anarchic 
conditions 
in, one or 
several 
regions 
that do not 
include 
the core 
area of the 
country of 
its capital. 
Structural 
Benefits 
 
 
ECWEALTH 
Exceptionall
y scarce and 
valuable 
resources – 
potential to 
be a profit 
Some 
important 
resources – 
potential to 
be a profit 
Exceptional
ly scarce 
and 
valuable 
resources – 
potential to 
be a profit 
Exception
ally scarce 
and 
valuable 
resources 
– potential 
to be a 
profit 
Structural 
Connectivity 
 
    SPILL 
Over 
500,000 
IDPs/ 
refugees 
35,000 
IDPs/refuge
es 
200,000-
500,000 
IDPs/refuge
es 
20,000 up 
IDPs/refu
gees 
  
 
 
 
 
ECIMPORT 
Not highly 
integrated in 
the regional 
and 
international 
market, not a 
strong and 
important 
trading 
partner, 
without 
membership 
in important 
trading 
agreements 
Not highly 
integrated 
in the 
regional and 
internationa
l market, 
not a strong 
and 
important 
trading 
partner, 
without 
membership 
in important 
trading 
agreements 
Highly 
integrated 
in the 
regional and 
internationa
l market, a 
strong and 
important 
trading 
partner, 
with 
membership 
in important 
trading 
agreements 
Not highly 
integrated 
in the 
regional 
and 
internatio
nal 
market, 
not a 
strong and 
important 
trading 
partner, 
without 
membersh
ip in 
important 
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trading 
agreement
s 
Structural 
Level of 
Outrage 
 
 
 
   MEDIA 
Media 
coverage 
was 
extremely 
intense after 
the televised 
Santa Cruz 
massacre 
Coverage 
was 
sporadic 
and did not 
generate 
any 
domestic 
political 
resonance 
Coverage 
was 
directed 
towards the 
conflict as 
there were 
incidents of 
high-profile 
kidnappings
, but there 
has yet to 
be any 
sustained 
attention on 
the conflict 
itself. 
No 
evidence 
of 
concentrat
ed media 
attention 
on this 
conflict 
  
 
INTENVIRO 
Post-Rwanda 
and 
Srebrenica 
Post-
September 
11th and 
post-Bali 
War on 
Terror has 
extended to 
the 
Philippines 
and ASG 
No 
evidence 
on how 
this might 
impact on 
the 
attractiven
ess of 
non-
interventi
on 
Perceptual 
Costs, Risks 
and Benefits 
 
 
   REPUT 
In respect of 
ASEAN 
Limited 
evidence: 
the 
possibility 
of gaining 
negative 
reputations 
did not 
hinder 
intervention
. 
No 
evidence of 
reputational 
interest in 
decision to 
not 
intervene 
No 
evidence 
of 
reputation
al interest 
in 
decision 
to not 
intervene 
  
 
LIKESUCCE
SS 
No stalemate 
evident or 
substantial 
agreement, 
yet there was 
a strong 
grassroots 
community 
The conflict 
was ‘ripe’ 
for 
intervention 
Strong civil 
society, 
stalemate 
and 
agreement 
No 
stalemate 
evident or 
substantial 
agreement
, yet there 
is a strong 
grassroots 
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willing for 
peace 
communit
y willing 
for peace 
  
 
   CLEAR 
A clear exit 
strategy 
Possibility 
of quick 
reduction of 
substantial 
military and 
police 
numbers 
No clear 
exit points 
No clear 
exit points 
Perceptual 
Connectivity 
 
 
 REFCRISIS 
600,000-
700,000 
IDPs = a 
humanitarian 
crisis 
35,000 up = 
not a 
humanitaria
n crisis 
200,000 to 
500,000 = a 
humanitaria
n crisis 
20,000 up 
= not a 
humanitar
ian crisis 
  
 
DEATHMAG 
250,000 Less than 
300 
annually = 
between 
300-1000 
Between 
65,000-
120,000 
Between 
30,000-
100,000 = 
a “silent 
genocide” 
Perceptual 
Level of 
Outrage 
 
 
  LEVOUT 
Medium to 
high level of 
outrage  
There is not 
wide 
evidence of 
a large level 
of outrage  
Muslim 
diaspora 
substantial  
Medium 
level of 
outrage   
 
Highlight = illustrates the secondary conditions that resulted in multilateral 
intervention and non-intervention 
Highlight = illustrates the primary conditions that resulted in multilateral intervention 
and non-intervention 
 
Figure 17: Summary Comparison of Case Studies: Evidence of Primary 
Conditions for Multilateral Intervention and Non-Intervention in Order of 
Importance: 
 
Primary Conditions for 
Intervention 
Primary Conditions for Non-
Intervention 
East Timor Solomon Islands Philippines West Papua 
1. REFCRISIS 1. MAGFAIL 1. TACSTRA 1. MEDIA 
2. INITIATE 2. INTENVIRO 2.DURATION 2. PHASE 
3. INTENVIRO 3. 
LIKESUCCESS 
3.INITIATE 3.CLEAR 
4. MEDIA 4. INITIATE 4. INTENVIRO 4. DURATION 
5. DEATHMAG 5. ECOCAP 5. MEDIA   
7. LEVOUT 6. CLEAR 6. CLEAR  
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8. ECWEALTH 7. PHASE  7. ECIMPORT  
9. REPUT 8. DURATION   
 
Figure 18: Summary Comparison of Non-Overlapping Primary Conditions that 
Attracted Multilateral Intervention and Non-Intervention 
 
Intervention Non-Intervention 
DURATION DURATION 
INITIATE INITIATE 
MAGFAIL ECIMPORT 
INTENVIRO INTENVIRO 
CLEAR NO CLEAR 
REPUT  
MEDIA  
PHASE  
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